PRIMARY VOTER PARTICIPATION IN MAJORITY AND MINORITY PARTIES AND ELECTORAL REALIGNMENT

BY

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To my wife and parents

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This study examines and analyzes electoral change in seven states which historically have had one-party systems (Arizona, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania). Since the Second World War, the traditional state minority parties have become more competitive in gubernatorial and senatorial elections.

Three hypotheses were tested. First, the decline of one-partyism is the result of realigning electorates; a greater proportion of the state electorate begins to identify formally with the minority party of the state, and minority party success is not solely the result of short-term forces which disrupt the majority party coalition. Second, state electoral realignments are secular; gradual changes in the socioeconomic environment cause partisan shifts in the state electorate. Third, there is a two-tiered

party system in the seven selected states, a presidential tier with one voting pattern and a subpresidential tier with a different voting pattern. The third hypothesis was tested to demonstrate empirically the possibility that realignments at the state level can simultaneously occur with partisan disaggregation at the national level.

Aggregate primary and general election data are employed to test the hypotheses. A variation of V. O. Key, Jr.'s, concept of the index of primary balance is used as the critical variable. The variable serves as the measurement of the degree of inter-party competition. In this study, the variable is defined as the ratio between the number of voters participating in the historical minority party's primary and the number of voters participating in the majority party's primary. I argue that if the ratio increases over time, then the state's electorate is realigning in favor of the minority party. The measurement is used as the independent variable in a cross-county bivariate regression model which tests the first and third hypotheses. The primary balance index is then used as the endogenous variable in a path model which tests the second hypothesis.

The first hypothesis is confirmed for Maine, Pennsylvania, Iowa, and Arizona. In Florida and New Hampshire, there has been a partial realignment; however, minority

party success in these two states depends on short-term forces which disrupt the majority party coalition. In Kentucky, minority (Republican) party success is the result of short-term forces. Results of path analysis, which was used to test whether realignments are secular, indicate that socioeconomic conditions explain in part electoral change. Unexpectedly, it was found that Democratic Party growth in the four northern states is associated in part with economic stagnation. Republican Party growth in Arizona and Florida is caused to a measurable degree by migration. There is a very slight relationship between Republican Party growth and industrialization in Kentucky. Finally, tests indicate that a two-tiered party system, as hypothesized above, exists in Maine, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and probably in Arizona and Florida. In Kentucky, and probably in Iowa, the two-tiered system assumes a different form: the senatorial and presidential races are on one tier while the gubernatorial races are on a second tier.

CHAPTER 1

THE DECLINE OF ONE-PARTYISM IN STATES POLITICS

During the last third of the 19th century, one-party systems evolved in many states. The South became the bedrock of the Democracy while many northeastern and midwestern states, particularly those without large urban centers, developed into strongholds of the Republican Party. The affective attachment which bound many 19th century voters to their respective regional parties was forged by the patriotism of the Civil War. Moreover, this affective attachment was transmitted often from one generation to the next (Dawson and Prewitt, 1969). However, the late V. O. Key, Jr. (1949, 1956) hypothesized that sectional interests also were responsible for the repression of a second, viable party in states politics. Key (1964: 232) described sectional politics as involving "interests and attitudes by people of all sorts in a major geographical region against a similar clustering of interests and attitudes of the people of another region." Thus to Key, one important reason for the persistence of one-partyism in states politics was the continuing utility the party served in uniting the region's politicians against the "enemy."

Southern politicians maintained a united front on the problem of race relations. But another southern problem was a fluctuating world market affecting the agrarian economy (Key, 1964). In order to combat northern interests, southern politicians used the Democratic Party as an instrument to forge southern unity. Democratic senators and representatives from southern states, re-elected term after term, gained disproportionate influence in Congress by obtaining powerful congressional committee assignments under seniority rules. They used the Democratic Party organization to promote and defend their region's economic and racial interests (Key, 1964). One spillover effect was that the Democratic Party became dominant in state matters. The local minority party, the GOP, worked under the handicap "that it [bore] the name of the enemy nationally" (Key, 1956: 24).

Reasons for the continuation of Republican domination in northern states are more complex. The issue of the protective tariff, opposed by the South, bound together northern industrial and labor interests (Key, 1964). Although northern farmers were usually at odds with other interests over the tariff issue, the growers were appeased by the frequent nomination of midwesterners for president. But even progressives, such as Robert LaFollette, who generally opposed the regular Republican leadership, were

firmly attached to the party label (Key, 1956). The insurgents preferred challenging the party leadership through the primaries rather than through another party during the general election. They recognized that to form a new party was futile because memories of the Civil War made deserting the Republican Party unthinkable for many voters.[1] As Key (1956: 93) dryly observed, "LaFollette and the voters who followed him perhaps wanted to go to heaven but they insisted on traveling under Republican auspices."

Beginning in the 1920s, both Democratic and Republican presidential candidates began carrying, with greater frequency, states controlled by the opposite party. As a result of this decline in the sectional nature of national politics, some political scientists (Key, 1956; Lockard, 1969; Sundquist, 1973) assert that one-partyism in states politics is also on the decline. In its place is a competitive two-party system. Since the Second World War, minority party success in the South (the eleven states of the Confederacy) and the "Old" North (the states remaining in the Union in 1861) has become commonplace. (The term "minority party" is used in this study to designate a state's historical minority, or weaker, party. The term is not used to infer that party's present degree of competitiveness.) Republican candidates have won congressional and/or gubernatorial contests in every southern state, although

the region is still dominated by the Democratic Party. The Democratic Party has fared even better in states once dominated by the GOP. States such as Maine, Iowa, and Wisconsin, which were classified as one-party, GOP states in the 1950s (Key, 1956: table 9), now are judged to have competitive two-party systems (Ranney, 1976: table 4). It has generally been assumed that the growing frequency of minority party success has signified that a realignment was occurring among a state's electorate, resulting in more minority party members.

In recent years, some political scientists (Burnham, 1970; Ladd and Hadley, 1975; Pomper, 1975; Miller et al., 1976; Nie et al., 1976; Beck, 1977) have questioned the salience of party identification in voting. They argue that partison disaggregation, also termed partisan decomposition or partisan dealignment, is occurring, meaning that voters no longer have firm ties with political parties. There is, however, disagreement concerning the extent of partisan disaggregation. For example, Ladd and Hadley (1975) argue that partison identification is still an important factor in the voting choice in electoral contests below the presidential level. On the other hand, Nie et al. (1976) assert that disaggregation is affecting state and local contests as well. Thus it is possible to suggest a different interpretation from the one stated above for minority party success. Minority party candidates may be

winning more frequently because the state's populace no longer has an effective feeling toward the state's traditional majority party.

The purpose of this study is to establish the possibility that minority party success in states politics is the result of electoral realignments. I shall examine the electoral events during the post-Second World War period in seven states: Arizona, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania. These states were selected largely on the basis of their historical one-partyism.[2] Using primary and general election data, I shall introduce a new method to examine the nature of electoral change in each state. I also shall compare state electoral patterns with presidential electoral patterns as well as attempt to identify some possible causes of electoral change. One possibility which will be examined is the impact of a changing economy on the electoral system. Another possible cause is migration.

The degree of inter-party competition as well as changes in the degree of inter-party competition have been used to explain a variety of political and socioeconomic phenomena. For example, as will be discussed below, Key (1959, 1964) argued that realignemnts between the parties reflected changes in economic conflict between different segments of the nation's population. Burnham (1970) asserts

that change in American politics has occurred abruptly at periodic intervals, and that it is the mechanism of sudden shifts in the degree of inter-party competition which makes such change possible. Policy analysts have debated whether or not levels of partisan competition have affected levels of policy outputs. Dye (1975) argues that the level of a state's economic development has a far greater impact on policy outputs than the political system, including the degree of party competition. On the other hand, Sharkansky and Hofferbert (1971) have demonstrated that partisan competition is an important variable in explaining the level of outputs in the area of welfare and education policies.

With the possibility of partisan disaggregation, the process of conflict resolution may change. Columnist David Broder (1972) worries that the growing irrelevance of political parties means that important policies will not be enacted. Burnham (1970: 133) asserts that parties are the only effective "countervailing collective power on the behalf of the many individually powerless against the relatively few who are individually—or organizationally—powerful." Should parties disappear, then the powerful few would presumably go unchallenged in the making of public policy.

It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to assess the impact of electoral change on conflict or policy

outputs, much less to determine whether partisan decomposition profoundly changes the policy-making process. Rather, I deal with the far simpler empirical issue of whether state electoral change is the result of a realignment. I believe the answers, which will be suggested by this study, are a necessary first step in attempting to determine the impact of recent electoral events on American politics. Before discussing the specific hypotheses, however, some general remarks on electoral change are in order.

Above I had introduced the idea that the two major political parties were used as instruments to forge regional political unity. Until recently, national cleavages between competing interests divided the nation along geographical lines. Turner (1932) described the conflict as between two Atlantic sections (North and South) engaged in a struggle for domination of the nation. Each Atlantic section strived for control by attempting to politically ally itself with western states. This sectional character of politics is shown by the Electoral College voting pattern from 1880 to 1924 (Congressional Quarterly, 1975). When the GOP won the presidency, most western states were allied with the North against the South. When the Democrats captured the White House, the West generally supported the Democratic presidential candidate, as did the South. Seldom did either party make inroads into the other party's regional stronghold.

Sectional conflict after the Civil War reached an extreme point during the presidential election of 1896. The issues in that year were free silver, the protective tariff, and the Depression of 1893. The Democrats attempted to build a coalition between the agrarian South and the agrarian West against the financial and manufacturing interests of the Northeast (Key, 1964). Silver-mining interests in western states, in hopes of higher prices for silver if the Democratic platform was enacted into policy, also allied itself with the Democratic Party. In addition, the Democratic Party attempted to bring northern industrial labor into the coalition by making free silver the symbol of "protest against the depredations of the plutocracy" (Key, 1964: 171). However, the Republican Party was able to win the labor vote by convincing workers that the enactment of the Democratic platform would cause factories to close down. As a result, the Republican Party forged an enduring coalition between northern financial, manufacturing, and labor interests which lasted until the New Deal. In the process, section conflict between the North and the South was reinforced, and the North demonstrated it could win presidential elections without much support from western states. The Republican Party in 1896 carried its own region and only the western and border states of California, Oregon, North Dakota, Kentucky, Maryland, and

West Virginia. Clearly, as long as sectional conflict endured, the North and the Republican Party had the advantage because of the large population in the North.[3]

The 1928 presidential election returns indicate that sectional politics had begun to erode. In that year, Republican candidate Herbert Hoover carried five southern states. Hoover's success was the result of short-term forces peculiar to that campaign; many native white southerners refused to vote for Democrat Al Smith because of the nominee's Catholicism and opposition to Prohibition. At the same time, Smith won a greater proportion of the vote in northern industrial centers as compared to 1924 (Key, 1964). During the next four elections, Franklin Roosevelt garnered most of the "Old" North states principally because he carried the northern cities. Roosevelt's appeal in the one-time bastion of the GOP was made possible primarily by the entry into the electorate of both naturalized citizens and second generation Americans who identified themselves as Democrats (Andersen, 1976).

Since the New Deal era, the one-time Republican, large industrial states of the Northeast and Midwest, as well as California, have become "swing" states with the winner of the majority of these states capturing the Presidency.[4] At the same time, southern states have become increasingly nonsupportive of the Democratic Party. Since World War II,

Republican and third-party presidential candidates have made significant inroads into the once solid Democratic South. The climax of defections occurred in 1972 when the eleven southern states were carried by Richard Nixon. Only in 1976, when the Democrats nominated Jimmy Carter, has the South voted as a fairly unified Democratic bloc. However, Beck (1977) notes that a majority of southern whites apparently voted for former President Ford over President Carter. Thus the nature of southern Democratic solidarity appears quite different from earlier elections.

Figure 1 presents an illustration of the decline of sectionalism in presidential elections since 1896. The three upper New England states, Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont, were selected as being representative of states once totally dominated by the Republican Party. The three deep South states, Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia, were selected to represent the states once controlled by the Democratic Party. For each of the two sets of states, the Republican proportion of the vote is graphed as a percentage deviation, over time, from the national proportion of the vote for the GOP presidential candidate. Historically, the three upper New England states provided a greater proportion of support than the nation as a whole. On the other hand, the three deep South states provided a smaller proportion of support than the national average. Beginning



Figure 1

Percentage Deviation from Mean of Two Groups of Selected States, 1896-1972.

in 1960, the voters of upper New England began dividing in proportions similar to the nation. They were even less supportive of the GOP than the nation in 1964. The decline of sectionalism in the three southern states appears to have begun in 1952. Although it appears that there are continued differences between the two groups of states, it is evident that both groups have become detached from their traditional political party at the presidential level.

As stated above, some political scientists (Key, 1956; Lockard, 1969; Sundquist, 1973) believe that in the wake of the decline of sectionalism, one-partyism in state politics also is on the decline. Three hypotheses are offered as possible explanations for the decline of one-partyism. The first was formulated by Key (1959, 1964). He hypothesized that the rise of an urban society is the primary cause for the decline of sectional politics. "Urbanization can serve as a shorthand term inclusive of a variety of tendencies destructive of sectionalism, such as industrialization, a sharpening of class consciousness and immigration" (Key, 1964: 229). Key argued that one-partyism was most extreme in rural, agrarian areas, both North and South. Agrarianism, as the single, homogeneous economic interest, forced persons of all classes into a single political party. However, as the area's economy diversified through industrialization, the conflict within each region between

different groups sharpened while the conflict between regions lessened because they became more alike economically. As a result, the political system was transformed from a single, multi-class party to a two-party system along class lines (Key, 1964). In the North, the Democrats became the party of the urban cities while the Republicans became dependent on rural and small town support. In southern states, Republican strength grew in cities where new business classes were being established as well as in upper class residential districts. Key (1964) noted that sectional, one-party politics in the South declined most quickly in areas which were most dramatically affected by industrialization and least affected by racial problems.

Key (1964) recognized that the transformation from the politics of sectionalism to the politics of urbanism was not rapid but rather gradual. He noted that the growth of Democratic Party strength in northern cities began long before the Democratic Party became dominant in the 1930s. Increasing Republican strength began appearing in southern states as early as 1928. However, the vestiges of sectionalism still remain today. For example, much of the conflict between Democratic factions is between liberal urban Democrats of the North and the more conservative rural Democrats of the South. Conflict between Republican factions also appears to be sectional. The conflict was once

centered between eastern and western Republicans. The conflict now appears to be more between the older Republican Party of the North and the newer, growing GOP of the "Sunbelt." But it should be noted that while sectionalism may remain to some degree, the conflict now is centered within each of the two major parties rather than each party solely representing a section of the nation.

Key employed little data, with the exception of aggregate election statistics, to back up his arguments. Other, more empirical studies tend to weaken certain aspects of Key's hypothesis. Ladd and Hadley (1975), in their analysis of the New Deal coalition, challenge Key's notion that electoral change resulted in class-based parties. Instead, the authors argue that the New Deal coalition was not that much different from earlier Democratic voter coalitions. White southern voters of all classes remained overwhelmingly Democratic during the electoral realignment of the 1930s. Catholics in northern states also were loyal to the Democratic Party both before and after the election of 1932. On the other hand, northern white Protestant voters largely remained with the GOP. The only two groups who switched their partisan support from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party during the 1932 election were blacks and Jews. The authors do note a higher degree in the salience of voting along class lines during the

Roosevelt and Truman administrations. However, this degree of class differentiation declined afterwards. One reason for this decline has been the growth of a middle class which identifies with the Democratic Party and sees little conflict between its own interests and positive government management of the economy (Ladd and Hadley, 1975).

On the other hand, Andersen (1976) provides empirical evidence which tends to confirm Key's contention that immigration partially effected electoral change. Andersen argues that most new supporters of the Democratic Party in 1932 were naturalized citizens and second generation Americans entering the electorate for the first time and thus overwhelming the traditional Republican majority. This finding also tends to refute the assumption that electoral realignments are solely the result of individuals and groups switching parties. Although Key (1959: 204-205) was not clear on this point, he appeared to argue that realignment was more the result of generational replacement rather than partisan conversion: "[a] generation or so may be required for one outlook to replace another, for example, for the values of a farming group transplanted to an industrial environment to be replaced by another world view."

Despite the evidence which appears to question aspects of Key's argument that urbanization induces electoral change

by generating class conflict, economic changes in the environment have probably caused some dilution of sectional interests. Lubell (1965) is certainly correct when he describes Franklin Roosevelt's appeal to the electorate as being economic in character. The loyalties generated between new Democratic voters and the party were certainly not a reinforcement of sectional loyalties. During Roosevelt's presidency, the image of the Democratic Party of the North was transformed from being a "Catholic Party" to a national party whose economic appeal undermined the Republican Party (Lubell, 1965). Schattschneider (1960) described the process as replacing an extreme sectional party alignment with a national party alignment where a two-party system is flourishing locally nearly everywhere. The inconsistency between Key's theory and empirical observation is that industrialization apparently did not cause some groups to slowly change their partisan allegiance because of sharpening class conflict. However, the question remains whether economic change does contribute at all to political change. This question will be examined and empirically tested in a very limited manner in this study.

Key was somewhat inconsistent in his writings when naming the process of electoral change. In one article entitled "Secular Realignments and the Party System" (1959), he used the term secular realignment to describe changes

in the degree of inter-party competition. However, in a later work, Key (1964) dropped the term in favor of describing electoral change as the result of urbanization. No matter what terminology Key used, his basic theory is essentially the same in both publications. In this study, I will use the term secular realignment when referring to Key's theory. Key (1959: 199) specifically defined secular realignment "as a movement of the members of a population category from party to party that extends over several . . . elections and appears to be independent of the peculiar factors influencing the vote at individual elections." I also will modify Key's definition by defining secular realignments in this study as a gradual change in the degree of competition between the two major parties brought about by changes in the socioeconomic environment.

There is a major conflict between Key's theory of secular realignment and other political scientists' theory of electoral change (Schattschneider, 1960; Burnham, 1970; Sundquist, 1973; Shade, 1973). Burnham argues that electoral change in the past did not occur gradually but rather abruptly during critical elections.[5] Burnham (1970: 10) defines critical realignments as "short, sharp reorganizations of mass coalitional bases of the major parties which occur at periodic intervals on the national level. . . ." Sudden electoral shifts occur during periods

of major stress because political institutions, including political parties, are unable either to aggregate demands or produce satisfactory policy (Burnham, 1970). During these periods of stress, the two major parties are ideologically polarized at different extremes. Such polarizations cause the electorate to divide in proportions which are different from partisan divisions prior to the crisis, and these new partisan divisions tend to endure as a stable voting pattern once the crisis is resolved (Burnham, 1970).

Burnham (1970) acknowledges that the stable voting pattern between critical elections is occasionally disrupted by short-term forces which allow minority party candidates to win elections. For example, the 1952 and 1956 Eisenhower victories are usually attributed to short-term forces (Pomper, 1968; Campbell et al., 1960). Burnham (1970) also notes that "secular" realignments have occurred in the Northeast and South since the critical election of 1932. However, Burnham (1970: 5) appears to dismiss the importance of "secular" realignments in his overall theory of critical elections and American politics by characterizing the "secular" shifts as "localized readjustments."

Sundquist (1973) shares Burnham's view that change occurs during a critical realignment. The major difference between Sundquist and Burnham is that Sundquist links

electoral change at the state level with electoral change at the national level. He characterizes the electoral shifts occurring at the state level during the 1950s and 1960s as "after-shocks" of the New Deal critical realignment of the 1930s. "Much of what appears as a secular realignment is simply a later stage, or series of stages, of a preceding critical realignment" (Sundquist, 1973: 8). Sundquist argues that the New Deal realignment occurred in two stages. First, there was the massive shift of voter allegiance at the national level. Then, at a later period in time, the shift occurred at the state and local level. Sundquist argues that the unappetizing nature of the local minority party leadership during the 1930s and 1940s prevented the electorate from immediately switching their partisan allegiance locally so that it matched their behavior at the national level.

Sundquist's theory constitutes the second possible explanation for state electoral change. Basically, his argument is that the character of minority party candidates is a critical factor in determining whether or not a state's electorate will realign. For example, Sundquist argues that it was not until northern programmatic liberal Democrats began replacing older party leaders did the party begin successfully challenging the Republican Party at the state level. The older leaders appeared too

Catholic to the northern Protestant majorities. Sundquist argues that the new Democratic leaders were able to win over progressive GOP voters, thus reducing the Republican Party to a conservative, minority coalition. Some of the new Democratic leaders Sundquist cites as examples are Senators William Proxmire and Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin; Senators George McGovern and James Abourezk of South Dakota; Senator Frank Church of Idaho; former Senator Harold Hughes and Senator Richard Clark of Iowa; and Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine.

Sundquist (1973) describes the rise of the GOP in the South as being similar to the rise of the Democracy in the North. The one major difference is that the social barriers to voting Republican were far greater. As long as the Democratic Party was seen by voters as embracing the cause of white supremacy, it was untenable for many whites to vote Republican. After the Second World War, when the Democratic Party split over the issue of civil rights, conservative Democrats began voting Republican at the national level. Sundquist argues that these voters were latent Republicans and anti-New Dealers, and that they only were kept in the Democratic Party's ranks by social pressure. When the new, programmatic conservative GOP leaders began emerging in the wake of the Goldwater candidacy, the Republicans began carrying subpresidential contests,

usually against more liberal Democratic opposition.[6] Some of the new programmatic Republicans of the South are Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina; former Senator William Brock of Tennessee; and Senator John Tower of Texas.

The argument that the character of a political candidate can either strengthen or weaken his party is shared by many political scientists and political observers. For example, Lockard (1959) attributes the success of the Democratic Party in Maine to Senator Muskie's appeal and skill as a politician. The authors of the Almanac of American Politics 1976 echo Lockard's themes (Barone et al., 1975). They assert that Muskie's popularity and competence built the Democratic Party in once Republican Maine in much the same way as Senator Hubert Humphrey built the party in Minnesota. Peirce (1972b) argues that one factor responsible for building the Republican Party in Arizona is the excellence of its candidates such as Senator Barry Goldwater and U.S. House Minority Leader John Rhodes. Conversely, Peirce (1972a: 464) cites the example of the "mercurial, buffoonish personality of [former Governor] Claude R. Kirk, Jr." as why the Republican Party in Florida has not done better.

Some of the authors who accept this interpretation also assume that the image of candidates is nontransitive; that is, popular candidates cannot build permanent

coalitions which will persist after they leave office. Barone et al. (1975) argue that Maine's Democratic Party may presently be on the decline. At the same time, Maine's GOP may be on the rise because of the attractiveness of its new politicians, Representatives Cohen and Emery. This view reverses the Barone et al. (1973) interpretation of Maine's politics made only two years earlier in which they concluded that Maine was a strongly Democratic state. Sundquist does not share the view that candidate appeal is nontransitive. Instead, he clearly links candidate personality, as an essential causal factor, with state-wide electoral realignments.

One critical difference between Key's theory and Sundquist's theory is that Sundquist (1973) subsumes state electoral change under his theory of national realignments and Key does not. Sundquist reasons that if change does not occur at the national level, it will not occur at the state and local level. He appears to argue that the only reason state electoral change does not occur simultaneously with national political change is because of extenuating circumstances: the local minority party leadership is at first too unattractive for many voters to support. Sundquist clearly believes that electoral change is, in general, a relatively rapid process.[7] On the other hand, Key (1959 , 1964) directly linked state electoral change

with change in the socioeconomic environment. Unlike Sundquist, Key did not completely subsume state electoral change under national electoral change, although it is reasonable to assume that socioeconomic change affects both levels.

A second difference between Key's and Sundquist's theories is the speed of electoral change. As discussed above, Sundquist believes that realignments occurred abruptly during critical electoral periods while Key argued that change occurred more gradually. As a result, each author offers a different explantion for the relatively slow rate of change at the state level. Sundquist links the continuing dominance of the traditional majority parties in states politics in the 1930s and 1940s with the poor leadership of the minority parties. Key believed that state electoral change occurred slowly because of the durability of the then existing partisan attachments and the relatively slow rate of social and economic change.

There may be a third difference between Key's and Sundquist's theories. While Sundquist clearly links candidate personality with electoral change, Key was inconsistent on this point. In his "Secular Realignments" article, Key (1959) acknowledged that the socioeconomic change does not simply determine political change; the minority party leadership must work actively to exploit the situation.

Yet in his later work, Key (1964) seemed to have relied far more on the deterministic effect of social and economic change as the causal factor of political change. Sundquist, as discussed above, argues that the role of candidates is essential for bringing about a realignment. He also argues that economic change does not necessarily cause electoral change. Rather, socioeconomic change must first give rise to a political issue which must disrupt the existing partisan cleavages (Sundquist, 1973).

Up to this point, I have discussed two alternative explanations for state electoral change. The first explanation is that a secular realignment is occurring because of changes in the socioeconomic environment. The second explanation is that the changes at the state level are "aftershocks" of the New Deal critical realignment. There is also a third possible explantion: one-partyism is on the decline because of partisan disaggregation. Minority party candidates may be winning elections because voters no longer have a close or affective attachment with the traditional party of their region. Ladd and Hadley (1975: 291) assert the following:

> No facet of the current transformation assumes greater importance than the pronounced weakening of citizenry ties to political parties. Groups are relocating across party lines, to be sure, in response to new conflict structures. But equally impressive is the movement of voters away from firm partisan ties generally. We are becoming a nation of electoral transients.

Other political scientists also argue that partisan decomposition is occurring. Burnham (1970) asserts that political parties are no longer capable of maintaining a hold on the electorate and candidates must now campaign on their virtue as individuals, not partisans, in order to be successful. Pomper (1975) notes that the impact of partisanship on presidential voting has diminished since 1960, and that fewer than half of all partisan identifiers since 1960 always have voted for the same party. Miller et al. (1976) found in their study of the 1972 election that proximity measures of issues attitudes between voters and candidates explain as much of the variance in the vote as does party identification. Nie et al. (1976) note that between 1956 and 1972 there has been an increase in the proportion of voters who decide their ballot purely on the issues while disregarding partisan orientation.

There is disagreement concerning the extent of partisan disaggregation. Ladd and Hadley (1975: 260) argue that a two-tiered party system exists "with one [voting] pattern applying at the presidential level, and another everywhere else." At the subpresidential level, the two major parties are still perceived in New Deal-like terms. As a result, partisan identification is assumed to have a greater impact on the voting decision at the state and local level than at the presidential level. Freedman's

(1974) study of the 1970 congressional election appears to confirm this view. Freedman notes a strong correlation between an individual's partisan identification and his vote for a congressional candidate. Yet other political scientists have cited the rise of ticket-splitting in state elections as evidence that partisan disaggregation is occurring below the presidential level. DeVries and Tarrance (1972) argue that while they believe partisan identification still has an influence in voting choice, they assume that the impact is greatest below the level of Congress. Nie et al. (1976) note that ticket-splitting is on the rise at the state and local level, and they attribute it to the decline of partisanship.

What actually is being suggested above is that political parties may no longer be viewed as affective organizations. Campbell et al. (1960) characterized the nature of the bond between individual and party as a psychological tie. They go on to state the following:

> In characterizing the relation of individual to party as a psychological identification we invoke a concept that has played an important if somewhat varied role in psychological theories of the relation of individual to individual or of individual to group. We use the concept here to characterize the individual's affective orientation to an important group-object of his environment. Both reference group theory and small-group studies of influence have converged upon the attracting or repelling quality of

> the group as the generalized dimension most critical in defining the individual-group relationship, and it is this dimension that we will call identification. (Campbell et al., 1960: 121)

In 1952, it was estimated that 64 percent of the population positively evaluated their own party while negatively evaluating the opposition party (Nie et al., 1976: figure 4.7). At the same time, only 31 percent of the population negatively evaluated both parties. However, by 1972, the proportion of persons positively rating their own party's performance and negatively rating the opposition declined to 45 percent while the proportion of persons negatively rating both parties rose to 51 percent.

A variety of reasons are offered to explain partisan decomposition. Sundquist (1973) asserts that recent issues, such as race and Vietnam, cut across party lines and thus temporarily cause the proportion of independents to rise. Once these cross-cutting issues disappear, Sundquist believes the New Deal party system will re-emerge. Other political scientists believe the decline may be permanent. Ladd and Hadley (1975) believe the electorate has become more issue and candidate oriented; as a result, it is less partisan oriented. The authors argue that much of this change can be attributed to the decline of linkage functions parties once performed between the populace and government officials. Because the electorate can now obtain a more

personalized view of candidates through television, it is only natural that it behave in a less partisan manner. Nie et al. (1976) attribute the rise of issue voting to the rising intensity of issues during the 1960s, coupled with the fact that voters are now more often given meaningful issue choices. In other words, if the candidates take different issue positions, many voters will choose on the basis of issues rather than party. Yet the authors also note that the increase in the proportion of independents is attributed only to younger cohorts entering the electorate since 1960. For the most part, older voters have retained their partisan identity although they also are more likely to disregard party in favor of issues.

Burnham (1970) and Converse (1972) both argue that electoral reforms introduced in the late 19th century triggered a process of long-term partisan erosion. Essentially, the intent of the reforms was to depolitize the electoral process by limiting the power and functions of party organizations. For example, the introduction of the Australian ballot removed from parties the vital organizational function of printing and distributing ballots. Ticket-splitting became easier because all the candidates appeared on a single, official ballot rather than appearing separately on privately printed, partisan ballots. Voters no longer had to deposit party ballots in ballot boxes

under the watchful eye of party leaders who easily could establish which voters remained loyal. As a result, the incidence of ticket-splitting increased (Converse, 1972). A second reform was the introduction of the direct primary election. Its purpose was to democratize the nomination process by removing from the party organization leaders the power to nominate. The existence of the primary was crucial if any sort of popularly elected, governmental system was to exist at all in one-party states (Key, 1956). However, one result was that the majority party organization was weakened (Sorauf, 1972). Another result was the continuation of one-partyism was ensured because the minority party was stripped "of its sole remaining resource, monopoly of opposition" (Burnham, 1970: 75). I shall further discuss the relationship between primary elections and one-partyism in the next chapter.

To briefly summarize, three different explanations for the decline of one-partyism have been discussed. The first was formulated by Key (1959, 1964). Key argued that urbanization, which includes industrialization, increased class consciousness and immigration, generated a secular realignment. The second theory is offered by Sundquist (1973) who argues that state electoral change is part of the New Deal realignment. The third explanation is deduced from a variety of recent voting studies which indicate that

partisan disaggregation is occurring at the national level. If this is indeed the case, then the same process may be occurring at the local level. The barrier once preventing minority party success, a psychological dislike for the party, is removed and the end result is more minority party victories.

Which of these three theories is most appropriate for explaining the decline of one-partyism? In light of most recent voting studies, is it proper to discuss state electoral change in any terms other than as the result of short-term forces creating temporary, unstable political coalitions? Or are state voting patterns different from the presidential voting pattern as Ladd and Hadley suggest? If state patterns are different (and if they are more subject to partisan pressure), what is the nature of electoral change? Is it a secular process as Key suggested or is it a part of the New Deal critical realignment as Sundquist suggests?

Three hypotheses will be tested in an attempt to answer some of the above questions. First, the decline of one-partyism is the result of a realignment of the electorate in each state. In the next chapter, I shall introduce a new method for measuring electoral change using aggregate primary and general election data. I will contend that this method can be used to determine whether a realignment has occurred during a series of elections.

The second hypothesis is that a two-tiered party system exists. That is, state-level voting patterns are different from the presidential-level voting pattern. The purpose for testing this hypothesis is to add some empirical credence to Ladd and Hadley's hypothesis concerning a two-tiered party system.

The third hypothesis is that state-wide realignments are caused by socioeconomic change. This hypothesis will be tested in Chapter 6 using path analysis. By demonstrating the possibility of a causal relationship between socioeconomic change and electoral realignment, I believe I will have at least established the possibility that Key's assertion of the existence of secular political change is correct.

Notes

1. The reluctance of Republican insurgents to challenge the regular party organization diminished with the passage of time. For example, LaFollette ran for President as a Progressive in 1924, capturing 16.6 percent of the vote. LaFollette did best in western states which were largely unsettled and were only territories at the outbreak of the Civil War. (The only state he carried was Wisconsin, his native state.) In northern states which were established at the time of the war, LaFollette's appeal was weak.

2. Additional details concerning the criteria used for selecting these seven states will be found in Chapter 2. It should be mentioned here, however, that some of the states had more pure one-party systems than others. For example, following the Civil War, the GOP in Florida quickly declined once Union troops were withdrawn. In Pennsylvania, the Democratic Party remained fairly competitive until the realignemnt of 1896 (Burnham, 1970). Kentucky also had electoral periods prior to the Second World War which have been described as two-party competitive (Jewell and Cunningham, 1968). Generally speaking, however, all seven states were one-party states prior to the period of analysis.

3. Key (1964) asserted that both the Republican and Democratic Parties had to seek support outside their respective regions in order to win control both of the presidency and Congress. Technically, while Key was correct when speaking about the Congress, he was incorrect part of the time when referring to the presidency. Below is a table listing the Electoral College vote from 1880 to 1924 of the "Old" North and the remaining states. (Note that I excluded California and Oregon from the "Old" North category.) The "Old" North had an Electoral College vote majority until the 1912 election. Thus an alliance with western states was usually not necessary for the Republican Party to win the presidency. However, most western states were usually carried by the Republican Party when the party captured the White House (with the notable exception of the 1896 election). On the other hand, the Democratic victories of 1884, 1892, and 1916 were possible only because the Democratic Party carried some northern states. The 1912 Democratic victory was made possible by the split in the GOP between Theodore Roosevelt's progressives and William Howard Taft's Old Guard.

YEAR	1880	1884-1888	1892	1896-1900	1904	1908	1912-1924
"Old" North*	208	217	227	227	242	242	262
Other states	161	184	217	220	234	241	269

*States of the "Old" North are Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin.

4. It should be noted that Key (1955) originally argued that electoral change occurred abruptly during a critical election. However, Key (1959) modified his views in the "Secular Realignment" article.

5. Scammon and Wattenberg (1970) designate these "swing" states the Quadcali. The Quadcali consists of the following states: California, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, West Virginia, Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin. These states constitute just over half of the Electoral College votes. With one exception, the winner of the majority of the Quadcali's Electoral votes always has won the presidential election. The exception occurred in 1948 when Dewey won 141 of the Quadcali's votes to Truman's 126 votes. It also should be noted that in 1968, Richard Nixon barely won a majority of the Electoral votes in the Quadcali; 137 to Humphrey's 136.

6. While the usual pattern of GOP successes in southern states is conservative Democrats voting for the Republican candidate who is running against a more liberal Democratic opponent, Sundquist (1973) has identified some other patterns of success. For example, liberal Democrats in Texas apparently supported conservative Republican Senator John Tower in 1961 over an equally conservative Democrat in an attempt to destroy the conservative influence in the Democratic Party. Another pattern is that of the Republican candidate being more liberal than his Democratic opponent; thus the liberals of the Democratic Party desert their party in order to vote Republican. Such was the case when Republican Winthrop Rockefeller won the 1966 Arkansas gubernatorial election.

7. In fairness to Sundquist (1973), I should point out that he asserts that realignments may occur over what he calls an extended time period. However, his formulation is closer to Burnham's theory than it is to Key's theory because Sundquist argues that the realignment process occurs during the life of the realigning issue. In other words, the more quickly the realigning issue is resolved, the more rapid the realignment. On the other hand, Key asserted that realignments are a continuous process which is independent of issues affecting specific issues.

CHAPTER 2

MEASURING INTER-PARTY COMPETITION

When attempting to document a realignment, the basic objective is to measure empirically the changing proportion of political, or partisan, groupings relative to each other. While this statement may appear to be obvious and simplistic, a brief definition of what is meant by political groupings, followed by a discussion of how such groupings can best be measured, is necessary.

Key and Munger (1970) suggested that it is possible to conceive of a geographical area, such as a county, as having long-term political groupings. These political groupings should be thought of as being independent of other social groupings. In other words, the grouping's members have decided to continuously support one set of candidates based on a historical decision to align themselves with a particular party. Their continuing support does not necessarily mean that the social attributes of the group are the paramount determinant of the long-standing electoral decision. Instead, issues which generated the formation of the political grouping in the first place have long been replaced by other issues, but the grouping continues to support the same party out of habit. In Key and Munger's

analysis of Indiana, the authors concluded that the Civil War had generated political groupings in each county based on the majority's sentiment toward the war, and that these groups existed well into the 20th century. It should be noted that the idea of a political grouping does not imply that the same set of people continually vote for the majority party. There can be crossing of party lines by the voters; some members of the majority party's grouping may desert their party in a particular election while members of the minority party's grouping may switch their support to the majority party. In addition, over long periods of time, members of a political grouping die and are replaced by new members. The net effect is a "long-term electoral decision" to support the same party (Key and Munger, 1970: 256-257).

By comparing the size of the two political groupings with one another, the degree of inter-party competition is determined. The larger one grouping is relative to the second, the more dominant one political party is to the second. At issue here is how the relative strengths of these political groupings can be best measured? Key and Munger (1970) used general election returns in their case study of Indiana politics to document continuity of political groupings as well as electoral realignment. Their basic premise was that if a geographical region continues to support one political party with a fairly stable

proportion of the vote, then it can be assumed that the area's political grouping has remained intact. Conversely, changing levels of support imply that a realignment has occurred. Burnham (1970) also uses general election data both to document electoral stability and critical realignments by employing two measurement techniques. The first is the discontinuity test developed by Ezikiel and Fox (1959). As Burnham uses the test, ten presidential elections in sequence are regressed against a dummy variable. The first five elections have independent variable values of zero while the next five have values of one. Burnham reasons that if a clear transition appears between the first five and the second five elections, then it will be reflected in the discontinutiy coefficient by approaching unity. The second test is to compare the means between the two periods and, using the t test to test for differences between the means, judge whether they are statistically different.[1]

One obvious problem with using general election data is that shifts in the level of support for a party may be the result of short-term electoral forces. Such short-term forces cause members of a political grouping to temporarily desert their party.[2] The problem can be minimized by studying a series of elections over an extended period of time in order to judge whether shifts in partisan support are temporary or permanent.[3] If minority party success is

solely the result of short-term forces, then its occurrence should be rare. However, if partisan decomposition is occurring, minority party success may occur more frequently. With the absence of long-term partisan loyalties, short-term forces solely would form the electoral majority. The state's historical minority party would benefit because it would no longer be hampered with the problem of the majority of voters having a long-term attachment with the traditional majority party.

An independent measurement of inter-party competition is required if partisan competition is to be measured accurately. Such a measurement must be immune to short-term forces which affect the general election vote. However, such a measurement also should be sensitive to partisan decomposition if such a trend is occurring.

Analysis of survey research data concerning the proportion of Republicans, Democrats, and independents in the voting population is one possible alternative method for measuring inter-party competition. Regular sampling of the population should provide a sensitive indication of partisan distribution over time.[4] The problem, of course, is that such measurements are national, and partisan distribution at the state and local level differs radically. To continuously sample the population in order to determine the degree of inter-party competition in all 3,000 counties is simply too costly.

Another alternative measurement of inter-party competition can be developed using Key's concept, the primary balance index. Key (1956) asserted that by computing the ratio between Democratic and Republican primary voter participants, an accurate assessment of the degree of inter-party competition can be made. A state's primary election data are almost always broken down to at least the county level; thus it is possible to use the data to assess the degree of partisan competition for far smaller geographical areas than is possible using survey data. However, unlike survey results, the ratio clearly does not measure the psychological bond between voter and party. We cannot assume automatically that such a bond exists simply because the voter chooses to participate in a party's primary. In one-party regions, the voter may choose to register as a member of the majority party because it is that party's primary which selects the next office holder. Dauer (1972) cites a survey which shows that roughly 40 percent of the Florida voters registered in each of the two major parties actually consider themselves to be independents. They have joined the majority party in their county in order to effectively participate in local elections. While the primary balance index does not necessarily classify individuals by their partisan preference, I believe the index, nevertheless, can be used as an accurate estimate of

inter-party competition. Indeed, this is the best one can do. A review of the evolution of primary elections, and of primary voter participation trends, confirms this first impression.

One-party politics existed in most states after the realignments of 1860 and 1896. As a result of one-partyism, the nomination process of the dominant party became critical. The lack of inter-party competition made the then prevalent method of nomination, the convention, appear inadequate to many individuals. Sorauf (1972) observes that Progressives insisted that the system was corrupt because of the oligarchical control party bosses often held over conventions. The insurgents pushed for reform in nomination procedures by advocating a direct primary election which not only "democraticized" the nomination procedure, but also decentralized the party organization, and thus indirectly crippled the party bosses. The introduction of the direct primary can be interpreted as substituting intra-party politics for a defunct inter-party system.

Key (1956) was one of the first to suggest that the adoption of the direct primary constituted an escape from one-partyism.[5] The most strident one-party region, the South, began using primaries for local races in the 1970s. After the realignment of 1896, western and northern states, having become firmly dominated by the Republicans, began adopting the primary.

Reformers saw the direct primary as the means for restoring popular government in one-party regions. Key (1956: 89-90) quoted the following passage from the Atlanta Daily Constitution, written in 1876:

> The system of primary elections is admirably adapted to our city and county. If parties were evenly divided, perhaps the old caucus plan would do. Then there would be two good tickets for local officers in the field. The knot of worthies who, under that plan would gather in a room just large enough to hold them, would be on their good behavior. They would remember their constituents, and would confine their log rolling within prudent bounds. But when, as in our local politics, they have nothing to fear from the opposition, there is very little guarantee that the delegate system would give the voters a square chance. For maneuvering and wire pulling, the delegate plan is entitled to the blue ribbon in local contests. We have no desire to return to it. We prefer the easier simpler plan of direct voting.

Key (1956) noted that the few states which had well established two-party systems at the turn of the century failed to embrace the primary wholeheartedly. For example, New York adopted the primary but later abolished it for state-wide offices. (New York again adopted the state-wide primary in 1967.) Other two-party states which did not immediately adopt the primary were Connecticut and Rhode Island. The high degree of inter-party competition in these states made the primary unnecessary in maintaining popular rule. However, the primary appeared to be necessary in one-party states if popular rule was to exist.

It also should be noted that in two-party states which have adopted the primary, it appears that the intent of the primary has been altered. Primary elections often are not electoral contests for nomination but rather are opportunities for the party's voters to ratify the party organization's choice for nominee. Sittig (1967) notes that strong party organizations can discourage persons from seeking a particular nomination. For example, in Illinois, the party organizations offer a slate of candidates for voters to approve. Seldom are there any successful challenges against the parties' slates (Sittig, 1967). Five states legally allow the party organizations to designate a choice for nominee whom the voters may accept or reject. These states are Colorado, Utah, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Connecticut (Sittig, 1967). All five states had competitive two-party systems when this particular nominating procedure was instituted (Key, 1956: table 9; Ranney, 1965: table 1).[6]

Key (1956) proposed that voters' interest in primary elections was dependent upon the intensity of inter-party competition. If the level of competition was low, meaning that the minority party did not have much chance of winning, then interest tended to center on the majority party's primary, the point of the real decision. Conversely, if the level of competition was high, then interest centered

on the general election rather than on the primaries. Key concluded that primaries operated differently in one-party states as compared to two-party states, or states possessing intermediate forms of inter-party competition.

Analyzing the time period of roughly 1910 to 1952, Key computed the mean percentage of the gubernatorial vote the Democrats received in fifteen non-southern states. As expected, in states where the Democrats were extremely weak, turnout in the Democratic primary was low. In states where the Democrats were highly competitive, interest in the Democratic primary was very high. Thus, in Vermont, Democrats averaged only 30.5 percent of the general election vote and the participants in the Democratic primary averaged only 6.3 percent of the voters participating in the Republican primary. In Nevada for roughly the same time period, the average Democratic vote was 52.9 percent; the percentage of participants in the Democratic primary was 150.3 percent of the participants in the GOP primary (Key, 1956: table 9). Key generalized by suggesting that if the states are ranked in declining order by the Democratic vote, there is a corresponding, yet more rapid, decline of the proportion of participants voting in the Democratic primary.

Key (1956) designated the ratio between the participants in the Democratic primary and the Republican primary as the primary balance index. As Key defined the index, it was

the number of participants in the Democratic primary as the percentage of the number of participants in the Republican primary. Thus a value of 10 would mean that for every 10 Democratic primary participants, there were 100 Republican participants. In this study, I shall generalize by defining the index as the state's historic minority party's total primary vote as a percentage of the majority party's primary vote.

Key (1956) asserted that the primary balance index suggests another dimension of inter-party competition not readily seen by examining aggregate vote totals alone. Using the example of Massachusetts and Kansas, Key computed the average Democratic gubernatorial vote for the period of analysis to be 48 and 43 percent respectively. Relying on these figures alone suggests that the two states' Democratic political groupings were similar in size. However, the primary balance index for Massachusetts is 76 while only 38 for Kansas; thus suggesting that the Democratic political grouping was far stronger and more competitive in Massachusetts than in Kansas.

As a state's minority party becomes more competitive, the primary balance index approaches a value of 100. Key observed this sort of trend in Michigan and Massachusetts. Over a long period of time (1912-1952), the number of participants in the primary of each party tended toward

equality as the states were transformed from a strong Republican to a two-party competitive system. Key (1956: 101-102) asserted that "wide changes in the ratios of primary participants between the parties probably reflect durable changes in the relative sizes of the groups of strong partisans, a matter of more significance than momentary shifts in voting strength in response to particular campaigns."

Key developed the concept of the primary balance index in order to demonstrate the unrepresentative character of the primary constituency. Key (1956) reasoned that Democratic voters living in localities controlled by the Democratic Party were more likely to vote in primary elections than Democrats living in GOP-dominated areas. Key demonstrated empirically this idea using the 1944 Ohio gubernatorial primaries as an example. In counties having higher index values, a large number of Democratic primary voters relative to the Democratic gubernatorial general election vote was observed. Conversely, in counties with low primary balance index values, the proportion of Democratic primary votes relative to the Democratic general election vote was small. I replicated Key's example by carrying out the same computation on the 1970 Maine gubernatorial primaries. The results are presented in Table 1. In counties having higher index values, Democratic voters

Table 1

Differentials Among Counties in Participation in Maine Gubernatorial Primaries of 1970

County	Primary Balance Index	Party Primary Vote as Percentage of Its General Election Vote		Primary Participation Distortion*
		Dem.	Rep.	
Androscoggin**	278.4	56.3	36.4	+19.9
York**	98.6	37.5	42.4	-4.9
Oxford**	96.7	42.3	45.5	-3.2
Penabscot**	62.8	31.6	52.1	-20.5
Aroostook**	58.1	21.1	38.9	-17.8
Sagadahoc	57.5	27.5	46.4	-18.9
Somerset	51.4	23.2	35.1	-11.9
Cumberland**	50.2	24.5	55.0	-30.5
Kennebec**	50.1	26.0	52.8	-26.8
Washington	46.3	31.8	51.4	-19.6
Franklin	33.3	17.6	44.8	-27.2
Piscataquis	30.5	22.8	65.2	-45.6
Waldo	29.5	31.2	57.9	-26.7
Knox	22.9	24.4	64.6	-40.2
Hancock	21.7	34.1	70.7	-36.6
Lincoln	19.2	22.9	59.6	-36.7

*The primary participation distortion is the difference between the two parties' primary vote as a percentage of its respective general election vote. The larger the value, the greater the degree of domination of one party over the other.
**Carried by the Democrats in the general election.

appear more likely to vote in their party's primary than in counties controlled by the GOP.

In this study, the primary balance index will be used strictly as an independent measurement of inter-party competition. Two basic assumptions concerning the primary balance index are made. First, continuously increasing values of the primary balance index are empirically measuring party realignment. Second, should minority party success occur in the absence of increasing values of the index, then it is assumed that such success should be explained by short-term deviating forces.

In Table 2, the primary balance indexes for the seven selected states in this study are regressed against time. In this example, the regresion coefficient is a descriptive statistic indicating whether increasing minority party strength is occurring. In five of the seven states (Arizona, Florida, Iowa, Maine, and Pennsylvania), the slopes are positive and the degree of association, as measured by Pearson's r, is quite strong. This indicates that the minority party political grouping has grown. For New Hampshire, the regression coefficient is considerably lower, indicating lesser growth of minority party strength. The regression and correlation coefficients for Kentucky indicate no minority party growth.

The primary balance index should not be interpreted too broadly. The index does not measure the psychological

Table 2

Regression and Correlation Coefficients: Time-Series Analysis of Primary Balance Index for the Seven Selected States

State	b	r	No. of Cases
Arizona (1946-1974)	2.62	.97	14
Florida (1948-1974)	1.41	.82	9
Iowa (1946-1974)	2.17	.87	15
Kentucky (1940-1974)	.08	.05	22
Maine (1946-1974)	2.32	.93	14
New Hampshire (1950-1974)	.53	.61	13
Pennsylvania (1946-1974)	4.04	.95	14

attachment between member and party, but merely counts the number of voters who participate in the party's primary. Voters may join a party for reasons other than having a psychological or ideological commitment to the party. This problem may become especially acute in the ten states which have open primaries. Under the open primary system, voters do not disclose their party preference when voting. As a result, they can easily vote in a different party's primary each time a primary election is held. If partisan decomposition is occurring, voters may switch back and forth to vote for whichever candidate is most appealing in the two parties' primaries. I have attempted to minimize the problem of voters switching parties by selecting only those states which hold closed primaries. Under most closed primary systems, voters can only switch their partisan allegiance prior to the day the primary is held. They often also must publically declare their loyalty to their new party. As a result of these legal requirements, I believe switching is less likely to occur, and the index should remain fairly immune to short-term forces.[7]

The values of the primary balance index cannot be interpreted as the division in the general election vote. If the Republicans average 60 percent of the vote in a particular county, then we can conclude that out of every 100 voters, 60 are likely to be members of the majority political grouping. However, as we observed above, the

majority party's members are more likely to participate in their primary than are the minority party's members. The county's corresponding primary balance index may be 20; only 20 Democrats vote in their primary while 100 Republicans are participating in their primary. Obviously, we cannot conclude that 83.3 percent of the county's voters are Republicans. The primary balance index is not measuring the relative sizes of partisan groupings. Instead, it is measuring the degree of inter-party competition which is an abstract number meaningful only when one value is compared to another. Ordering counties by their declining values of the primary balance index should accurately rank the counties by their degree of inter-party competition.

It also should be recognized that there can be some fluctuation in the primary balance index over time that does not represent a realigning trend. Participation in either the majority or the minority party's primary may be enhanced or suppressed by political events. If a primary contest has only one candidate, then voter turnout is likely to be lower than in a situation where the nomination is hotly contested. For example, in Maine, Democratic Senator Edmund Muskie is a popular political figure, and no Democrat has ever seriously challenged him in the Democratic primary. As a result, opposition has been at a minimum and voter participation has been lowered. Muskie's popularity also may have lowered Republican participation in primary

elections. No more than two Republicans during any given primary election have ever sought the dubious honor to oppose Muskie, and this must have certainly lowered participation rates. The opposite situation occurs when many politicians view their party's primary as the first step to certain victory in the November general election. The 1948 and 1952 Republican primaries in Maine were both wide-open affairs with the victors triumphing over the organization's candidates (Lockard, 1959). Because of the high voter interest, participation in the two Republican primaries was greater than usual.

"Friends and neighbors" voting may affect primary participation in only certain counties of a state. For instance, candidates in the Florida Democratic gubernatorial primaries were likely to receive their greatest level of support in their home and nearby counties (Key, 1949). It is not unreasonable to conclude that primary participation may increase when a local resident is one of the candidates.

To briefly summarize, the primary balance index is an abstract measurement of inter-party competition which is meaningful only when compared to other values. In other words, the index does not measure the relative sizes of political groupings. But continuously changing values of the index do indicate changing proportions of partisan distributions.

I propose to use the primary balance index as the independent variable in a series of cross-county bivariate regression equations. The dependent variable is a ratio between the state's historic minority party and majority party's general election vote for a particular office. The ratio will be called the general balance index. When the general balance index is regressed against the primary balance index, the regression coefficient should be positive; that is, the greater the value of the county's primary balance index, the greater the value of the general balance index.

Blalock (1972) has described the regression equation as the "law" of science. If the regression equation measuring the general balance index as a function of the primary balance index changes over time, and if such change appears to have a pattern, then it can be assumed that the nature of the state's politics is changing. Several a priori deductive assumptions concerning the meaning of such change can be made. First, in a period of normal, one-party politics, if the minority party wins an election, the regression coefficient's value should be greater than if the majority party has won. It is reasoned that the increased support for the minority party in a winning contest will come proportionally more from those counties having higher primary balance index values. Voters in counties which

are totally dominated by the traditional party are not expected to vote for the minority party. Second, if no realignment is occurring, then minority party victories will always have regression coefficients which are greater than had the majority party won.

However, if the minority party continues to win, and the primary balance index is increasing in those counties which are becoming most supportive of the minority party, then a realignment is occurring. The realigning trend is empirically measured by the declining value of the regression coefficients over time. The decrease occurs because as the range of the independent variable increases, the least squares regression line "stretches" out, and as a result, the steepness of the line's slope lessens. This expectation is based on the assumption that a county's general balance index reaches a maximum value long before the maximum value is achieved in the independent variable. It is reasoned that initial minority party success is made possible by short-term forces which form a majority coalition made up of minority party members, independents, and majority party members. It is only over an extended period of time that some members of this majority coalition actually formally associate themselves with the minority party by registering and voting in the party's primary.

There are several additional features concerning the regression model which need to be presented. First,

counties which are least supportive of the minority party are those which have the lowest primary balance index values. In a series of regression equations, it is expected that the values of both the independent and dependent values will remain fairly constant. In other words, the lower end of the regression line should remain "anchored" in a series of regression equations. A second feature is that the relationship is linear. There is nothing in Key's writings or in this study which suggests otherwise. It also should be noted that both the primary and general balance indexes will be multiplied by a population weight in order to control for differences in population. By doing so, the problem of a large shift of votes in small counties having undue influence is avoided.

Finally, I do not believe that it is possible to use this model to test for partisan disaggregation. As stated above, minority party victories which occur in the absence of significantly increasing values of the primary balance index are the result of short-term forces. However, there are no theoretical grounds which allow us to assume that little or no change in the index values signifies partisan disaggregation. Indeed, there are presently no empirical studies existing to indicate how the disaggregation process will affect primary voter participation. The primary balance index may remain constant or may fluctuate because

fewer individuals participate in each party's primary. As a result of this uncertainty, no assessment will be made of those minority party successes which I shall classify as the product of short-term forces.

It also cannot be assumed that partisan disaggregation is ruled out as a cause of electoral change if realigning trends are identified. It cannot be logically argued that if a realignment is occurring, then disaggregation is not occurring. Both processes may be occurring simultaneously, although one trend may be more predominant than the other. However, the limitations of the aggregate voting data and the analytical techniques prevent us from determining the relative strengths of the two processes.

I have constructed an example to clearly explain the assumptions of the regression model. Figure 2 presents graphs of a hypothetical state with 15 counties equal to each other in population. In Figure 2 A, I have graphed the distribution of data points, as well as the least squares regression line, for the general and primary balance indexes. The graph represents a majority party victory during an era of normal, one-party politics. In Figure 2 B, I have graphed the data points and regression line for a new set of values of the general balance index and the same values for the primary balance index. The graph in Part B represents a minority party victory which resulted from



Figure 2

Hypothetical Realignment in a State with 15 Counties.

short-term electoral forces. Note that the regression coefficient increased from a value of 1.51 in Part A to a value of 2.66 in Part B. As long as the values of the independent variable remain fairly static, minority party victories will always have a higher regression coefficient value.

However, if a realignment is occurring, the values of the regression coefficient measuring minority party success will decrease over time. Figures 2 C and 2 D represent two consecutive elections in time. The general balance index's values in both graphs are equal to the values in Figure 2 B. The primary balance index's values are different with the range in Figure 2 D greater than the range in Figure 2 C. The increasing magnitude of the range indicates that the strength of the minority party has increased in some counties. As a result, the regression coefficient decreases from 1.48 to 1.06. In general, during a realignment, we should expect to observe a pattern of regression coefficients similar to the examples in Figures 2 A through 2 D; first increasing then decreasing coefficient values.

Several problems were encountered using the regression model as described above. (The results of the initial analysis are presented in Appendix A.) Because of these problems, several modifications of the model were made. The most glaring problem in all seven states was extreme

outliers. In some instances, these outliers represent counties which have extremely large populations in comparison to the remaining counties of the state (e.g. Dade County, Florida; Jefferson County, Kentucky; Pima and Maricopa Counties, Arizona). Other outliers represent counties which have a fairly sizable population, and have always been a stronghold for the states' historical minority party. For example, Androscoggin County in Maine is an outlier because a sizable proportion of its population is French-Canadian and Democratic (Lockard, 1959). The outliers exert undue influence in determining the value of the regression coefficient and intercept. In the example of Arizona, the data point representing the twelve smallest counties cluster tightly together in relation to the data points representing Maricopa and Pima Counties. The result is that the two outliers largely determine the regression equation's parameters. One indication of this undue influence of the outliers is the Pearson correlation coefficients exceeding values of .99 (see Tables A-13, A-14, and A-15). Blalock (1972) suggests that in cases in which outliers are present, the regression analysis should be conducted both with and without the outliers. Of course, it should be recognized that while the outliers' influence is removed, the entire state is no longer being analyzed; in Arizona, a majority of the population is not analyzed when the outliers are removed.

The regression analysis was performed again without the outliers and the results are presented in Appendix B. Although the regression coefficient patterns are clearer without the outliers, two problems remained. First, the fluctuating values of the intercept indicate that the assumption of the left end of the regression line remaining "anchored" was incorrect. It should be noted that part of the fluctuation is the result of the influence of counties having higher values in the independent and dependent variable values. For example, in the hypothetical example presented in Figures 2 A through 2 D, the intercept value varies even though I deliberately kept the values of the one-party counties' indexes fairly constant. The variation of the intercept is mostly the result of the varying values of the two-party counties' indexes. A comparison of the regression equations in Appendix A and Appendix B reveals that the removal of the outliers generally reduces the magnitude of fluctuation in the intercept.

However, an examination of the one-party counties in all seven states reveals that part of the intercept value fluctuation is the result of those counties giving greater support to minority party candidates in particular elections. In some states, such as Maine, this increased support is the result of a realignment of the population toward the minority party, although the magnitude of the

electoral shift is small compared to a shift in two-party counties. In other states such as Florida, the one-party counties' increased support for the minority party is the result of short-term electoral forces temporarily disrupting the majority party political grouping. Thus attention must be paid to the intercepts when assessing electoral events.

Raw intercept values, however, are by themselves meaningless numbers because the values of the counties' indexes have been multiplied by a population weight. In order to simplify the analysis, and to make comparison between states possible, a standardized intercept is computed for each regression equation. This computation is based on the data in Appendix B. Specifically, in each table, the intercept values are summed, averaged, and the standard deviation computed. A standardized intercept is then computed using the following equation:

$$sa = \frac{a - \bar{a}}{a},$$

where sa is the standardized intercept, a the raw intercept, $\bar{a}$ the mean of the intercepts, and s the standard deviation. This formula is identical to the one for computing Z scores which indicate the distance between an observation and the mean in standard deviation units; the larger the value of the standardized intercept, the greater the distance

between it and the mean of the intercepts. The assumption is made that the intercept values in each table are normally distributed. The interpretation of the standardized intercepts will be deferred until the data are presented in Chapters 3 through 5.

The second problem encountered in the analysis presented in Appendix B was heteroscedasticity. Counties having higher primary balance index values have greater variation in their general balance index values than counties with lesser values in the independent variable. This problem is usually handled by using the weighted least squares (WLS) technique when estimating the regression coefficient's value. However, the purpose of WLS is to lessen the influence of cases with greater independent and dependent variable values (Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1970). In this particular analysis, these cases represent the counties where most of the state's population reside and where it is hypothesized that most of the electoral change occurs. To reduce the influence of these counties does not make much sense. However, individual coefficient values are often influenced by idiosyncratic election returns in larger, two-party counties. The result is that the overall pattern of the regression coefficients is disrupted. The way I have chosen to handle this problem is to compute what I shall designate the moving-average regression

coefficient. It is computed by averaging each regression coefficient in Appendix B with its preceding and following value. (The first and last coefficients in the series are averaged with their following and preceding coefficient values respectively.) The purpose of the technique is to "smooth out" the pattern of the regression coefficients. By using the moving-average coefficients, I believe that the influence of idosyncratic counties is reduced in the overall pattern of the moving-average coefficients without reducing the influence of those counties in the individual regression equations.

I shall use the regression model to test the first two hypotheses which were presented at the end of Chapter 1—that the decline of one partyism is the result of an electoral realignment and that presidential and subpresidential electoral patterns differ. Principally, we are interested in the pattern of the moving-average regression coefficients; if later subpresidential minority party victories have coefficient values which are less than earlier coefficient values, then we can conclude that a realignment has occurred in the state's partisan groupings. If the pattern of coefficients measuring presidential elections differs from the subpresidential pattern, then we can conclude that there exists a two-tiered party system.

Notes

1. Another technique based on general election data is factor analysis. This technique is used by MacRae and Meldrum (1960), Rogin and Shover (1970), and Shade (1973). Shade inputs 27 differentiating characteristics of elections (e.g. percent vote for the winning party, national margin of victory, percent of states carried by winning party) in the factor analysis, and extracts six factors such as normal competition, two-party realignment and deviating elections. Then, using a hierarchical clustering technique, Shade classifies presidential elections on the basis of the individual factor scores. For example, he classified the elections 1896, 1920, and 1932 as two-party realignments. Recent elections such as the 1956 and 1964 elections are classified as maintaining.

2. Converse (1960: 11) argues that the vote of any part of the electorate can be split "into two components: (1) the normal 'baseline' vote division to be expected from a group, other things being equal; (2) the current deviation from that norm, which occurs as a function of the immediate circumstances of the specific election." The long-term, or normal, component reflects the underlying partisan division of the group while the short-term factors induce some members of the group to defect across party lines. However, the defections are not accompanied "by any underlying revision of party loyalty" (Converse, 1960: 15).

3. Shade (1973) criticizes Burnham's measurement techniques because of the extended time period involved and because it focuses on electoral periods rather than specific elections. Shade argues that a specific election must be identified as the critical election, and he apparently dismisses the notion that a realignment of partisan groupings may occur over several elections as Key (1959) had argued. As discussed in the first note above, Shade's factor analysis classifies elections such as 1920 as a realigning election. This interpretation differs from most political scientists who classify the 1920 election as maintaining (e.g. Pomper, 1968). I believe Shade makes the error of assuming that all significant shifts in the general election data, as indicated by his factor analytic technique, always reflect a change in the psychological attachment of a great many individuals with their respective political parties.

4. The best known survey questions concerning party identification were developed by Campbell et al. in The American Voter (1960). The measurement is based on self-classification, and the authors assert that it measures both direction and the intensity of partianship.

5. For a more detailed discussion of the adoption of the primary election in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, see Merriam and Overacker (1928).

6. Three of the five states (Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Colorado) have developed modified one-party systems (Ranney, 1976: table 4) since the adoption of the states' present nominating procedure. This does not modify the contention that the existence of a strong two-party system will alter the operation of the primary election.

7. All seven states selected for this study require that voters switch their partisan allegiance prior to the day of the primary election. Iowa does permit a voter to change party registration on primary election day, but he can be challenged.

CHAPTER 3

THE NORTHERN STATES

The four northern states—Maine, New Hampshire, Iowa, and Pennsylvania—are presented in this chapter because they share two attributes: first, all were once dominated by the Republican Party and second, all have experienced at least some growth in Democratic Party strength. For each state, I first shall review briefly the minority party's successes during the post-Second World War period. Then I shall present the empirical results of the tests on the first two hypotheses which were introduced at the end of Chapter 1.

Maine

Duane Lockard (1959) asserts that traditional Republican politics in Maine resembled the politics of one-party southern states in many ways. For most of the 20th century, no strong GOP organization existed, and as a result, there has been a series of political factions competing with each other in the Republican primary elections. Winning the Republican nomination usually meant automatic victory in the fall general elections. The Democratic Party was rarely able to capture the state house, and when it did, it was usually the result of short-term aberrations which

divided the Republican Party. For example, the Democrats won the gubernatorial races in 1910 and 1914 because of the split between "Old Guard" and Progressive Republicans (Lockard, 1959).

Beginning in 1954, the fortunes of the Democratic Party began to change. In that year, Edmund Muskie was elected governor, and he was re-elected two years later. In 1958, he was elected U.S. Senator. The Democrats retained the governor's mansion that year. However, the winner, Dr. Clinton Clausen, died the following year, and the seat reverted to GOP control. The Democratic Party also captured one U.S. House seat in 1958. In 1960, it appeared that the Republican Party reasserted its control by winning the governor's race and recapturing the House seat. But the setback for the Democrats was only temporary. The party won the gubernatorial race in 1966 and 1970. The Democrats controlled one House seat from 1965 to 1973, and controlled the second House seat from 1967 to 1975. Senator Muskie easily won re-election in 1964, 1970, and 1976. In 1972, Democrat William Hathaway upset Senator Margaret Chase Smith for the second U.S. Senate seat. The Democratic Party also has been successful in local races: after 1974 and the 1976 elections, they controlled the lower house in the state legislature.

Although the Democrats have become extremely competitive, the party does not hold a lock on all the major

offices. The 1974 gubernatorial election is a case in point. James Longley, who ran as an independent, beat both the Republican and Democratic gubernatorial nominees. Longley won because of voter disillusionment with government (Peirce, 1976). Also, as mentioned in Chapter 1, some observers believe the GOP will make a comeback because of the attractiveness of its new leaders: U.S. Representatives Cohen and Emery (Barone et al., 1975).

As recalled from Chapter 1, the first hypothesis is that minority party success is the result of a realigning electorate. State-wide primary and general election data, which are presented in Table 3 and Figure 3, indicate that some sort of a realignment has taken place. In Table 3, the state-wide primary balance index generally increases over time. The general balance indexes for the offices of president, governor, and senator do not follow the same clear-cut pattern as the primary balance index. Instead, the general election indexes flucuate, although the indexes measuring the gubernatorial and senatorial races do appear to generally increase over time. The fluctuations are the result of short-term forces peculiar to individual elections. For example, the 1964 general balance indexes for president and senator are extremely high because Senator Barry Goldwater's candidacy for president induced many Republicans to cross party lines and vote Democratic. As can be seen,

Table 3

Maine's State-Wide Indexes*

Year	Primary Balance Index	General Balance Index		
		President	Governor	Senator
1946	21.10	-	63.11	57.37
1948	16.55	74.49	52.44	40.25
1950	27.94	-	64.67	-
1952	16.29	51.13	64.22	59.38
1954	14.91	-	119.75	70.63
1956	31.47	41.11	144.90	-
1958	39.14	-	108.29	154.86
1960	44.64	75.29	89.89	62.21
1962	54.50	-	99.67	-
1964	50.12	220.95	-	199.55
1966	59.25	-	113.33	-
1968	-	123.77**	-	-
1970	68.06	-	100.55	161.38
1972	59.13	62.62	-	113.82
1974	91.71	-	57.06***	-

*No state-wide primary in 1968. In 1962, the term for governor was lengthened from two to four years.
**The general balance index is the ratio between the Democratic vote and the combined Republican and third parties vote. The general balance index between the two major parties is 128.39.
***The general balance index is the ratio between the Democratic vote and the combined Republican and Independent vote. (The Independent won the race.) The ratio between the two major parties is 157.07.



Figure 3

Democratic and Republican Primary Vote, and Democratic General Election Vote as a Percentage of Total Gubernatorial Vote: Maine, 1946-1974.

the primary balance index is not subject to such extreme variations thus making it a superior indicator of inter-party competition. Generally, if the primary balance index increases over time, it indicates that a realignment is occurring, and that the minority party is benefiting from the electoral shift.

A different method for showing this electoral shift is presented in Figure 3. The graph presents the total state-wide primary vote for both the Republican and Democratic Parties as a percentage of the gubernatorial vote against time. The proportion of the Democratic vote for governor also is graphed. As time passes, the two lines representing the two parties' primary vote converge. At the same time, the Democratic general election vote also changes. Prior to 1954, the number of voters supporting the Democratic candidate in the general election approximated the number of participants in the Republican primary. After 1954, the share of votes the Democrats were winning exceeded the number of GOP primary participants.

The graph reveals shifting voter interest from the Republican primary to the general election. As the Democratic Party becomes more competitive, the participation rate in the GOP primary declines relative to the total gubernatorial vote. The participation rate in the Democratic Party's primary increases, and the convergence of the two graph lines indicates durable shifts in the size

of the partisan groupings. The graph line measuring the Democratic general election vote further confirms this interpretation. The analysis is similar to the one Key (1956) conducted in American State Politics. He demonstrated that states having a more equal proportion of participants in each party's primary are more competitive than those states where the number of voters in the GOP primary far exceeded the number voting in the Democratic primary.

The first hypothesis also is confirmed when using the cross-county regression model which was introduced at the end of Chapter 2. Table 4 presents the results of regressing the general balance index, which measures the gubernatorial vote, against the primary balance index. The moving-average regression coefficients, mb, follow the pattern which is expected if a realignment had occurred. The coefficient values first began increasing around the time the Democratic Party began winning gubernatorial elections. The peak coefficient value occurs in 1954, the year Edmund Muskie first won the governor's race. After 1954, the coefficient values decrease gradually, and values measuring later Democratic victories are less than the values measuring initial Democratic successes.

The moving-average regression coefficients should be declining because the range of the independent variable is increasing, thus "stretching" the length of the

Table 4

Standardized Intercepts and Moving-Average Regression Coefficients: Maine Gubernatorial Elections, 1946-1974 (N=15)*

Year	sa	mb	σ_x	$\sigma_{y\|x}$
1946(R)	.38	2.41	118.06	216.16
1948(R)	-.41	2.37	101.17	122.29
1950(R)	-.40	2.97	135.98	205.34
1952(R)	-.74	4.18	80.88	148.50
1954(D)	1.79	4.65	75.68	391.65
1956(D)	1.80	4.15	166.04	503.76
1958(D)	1.10	2.64	223.55	517.87
1960(R)	-.10	2.01	245.73	239.13
1962(R)	-.35	1.81	268.97	225.91
1966(D)	-.75	1.74	309.10	229.76
1970(D)	-1.16	1.34	361.26	245.11
1974(I)**	-1.14	1.10	590.75	82.47

*Androscoggin County excluded. In 1962, the term for governor was lengthened from two to four years.
**The general balance index for 1974 is the ratio between the Democratic vote and the combined Republican and Independent vote.

regression line. (See figure 2 A through 2 D, in Chapter 2, for a graphic demonstration of this argument.) The standard deviation of the primary balance index, σ_x, is reported in order to check this assumption. If the range of the index is increasing over time, the standard deviation of the variable also should increase. This is indeed the case for Maine's gubernatorial contests. However, there is another factor which may cause the moving-average regression coefficients to decline over time. If the degree of association between the primary balance index and the general balance index lessens, the coefficient values will decrease. In order to test that this is not happening, the standard error, $\sigma_{y|x}$, is examined. If the standard error does not increase at a proportionally faster rate than the standard deviation, then we can conclude that the coefficient values are declining because the model is behaving as has been hypothesized.[1] In Table 4, the coefficients decrease because the range of the primary balance index is continuously increasing.

As explained in Chapter 2, attention also must be centered on the standardized intercepts, sa, because the one-party counties do contribute, at times, greater than usual support to the minority party. In Table 4, initial Democratic successes are characterized by high, positive standardized intercept scores while later Democratic

victories are characterized by negative scores. Examination of scattergrams indicate that a partial realignment has occurred in the one-party counties, although the electoral shift, as measured by the counties' primary balance index, is not as large as in two-party counties. Graphically, what occurs is that the one-party counties initially shift upwards, parallel to the y-axis. Then, in later elections, the counties shift to the right, parallel to the x-axis, and away from the y-axis. This means that in later elections, the regression line will intercept the y-axis at a lower point.

When other states are examined, we shall observe that the standardized intercepts will not necessarily follow the same pattern as the intercepts measuring Maine's gubernatorial elections. However, some generalizations are possible. First, extremely high, positive intercept scores indicate the presence of short-term forces in one-party counties. If all minority party victories are characterized by such scores, then it is assumed that a realignment is not occurring in these counties. Second, if initial minority victories are marked by high, positive intercepts while later victories are characterized by scores which are either moderately positive or negative, two different interpretations can be offered: either a partial realignment has occurred in the one-party counties or the one-party counties

have returned to the traditional party's fold. In any event, an accurate interpretation of the intercept scores is not possible without checking the scattergrams. As a result, this constitutes a drawback to the model because the numbers cannot be interpreted without making reference to external information.

A final point must be made concerning the standardized intercepts. While the intercept scores add valuable information to the electoral pattern of the state, the moving-average regression coefficients remain the more important parameter of the regression model. As explained in Chapter 2, most of the state's population resides in counties with higher values in both of the indexes. And while the one-party counties fail to remain "anchored" as originally hypothesized, they do not experience the magnitude of change in the indexes as do the two-party, or larger, counties. In other words, minority party growth is geographically uneven, and this growth is measured by the moving-average regression coefficients.

The regression analysis of Maine's senatorial elections is presented in Table 5. The parameters indicate that a realignment has occurred. Initial Democratic victories are characterized by high, positive standardized intercepts and high moving-average regression coefficients. Equations measuring later Democratic victories in 1970 and 1972 have

Table 5

Standardized Intercepts and Moving-Average Regression Coefficients: Maine Senatorial Elections, 1946-1972 (N=15)*

Year	sa	mb	σ_x	$\sigma_{y\|x}$
1946(R)	-.02	2.02	118.06	198.35
1948(R)	-.45	2.58	101.17	102.29
1952(R)	-.55	3.33	80.88	108.97
1954(R)	-.22	3.68	75.68	211.75
1958(D)	1.06	2.87	223.55	508.61
1960(R)	-.40	2.32	245.73	169.84
1964(D)	2.60	1.68	327.12	766.28
1966(R)	-.85	2.10	309.10	155.43
1970(D)	-.53	1.85	361.26	348.14
1972(D)	-.64	2.20	332.69	261.49

*Androscoggin County excluded.

lower coefficient values and negative intercept scores. As in Table 4, the peak coefficient value occurs in 1954, even though the senatorial race was won by a Republican. The standard deviation of the independent variable and the standard error indicate that the coefficient values after 1954 are declining as a result of the increasing range of the primary balance index. Special note must be taken of the 1964 senate race. The intercept score for that election is extremely high because of the presence of short-term forces. Undoubtedly, the Goldwater candidacy had an effect on the senate election in the form of increased support for Senator Muskie in the Republican counties.

Overall, the data in Tables 4 and 5 show that a realignment has occurred in Maine. The peak moving-average regression coefficients of 1954 can be used as a dividing point between two electoral eras. Prior to 1954, the state had a one-party, Republican-dominated political system. After 1954, the state had a two-party competitive system. This does not mean that a sudden electoral transformation occurred in 1954 with the coefficient values signifying a "cutting edge" between two electoral periods. (Burnham, 1970, uses Ezikiel and Fox's discontinuity coefficient in just this manner.) The coefficients of 1954 merely serve as a convenient dividing point between two electoral eras. Later in this study I will attempt to document the gradual nature of this electoral transformation.

So far, the interpretation of the gubernatorial and senatorial races has been based on an "eyeball" analysis of the model's parameters. In order to strengthen the interpretation of the moving-average regression coefficients' pattern, the Wald-Wolfowitz Runs test is employed. I have argued that a realignment is indicated when the coefficient values first increase, then decrease in value over time. The runs test will test for this pattern. For each series of coefficients, the median value is computed. Elections whose coefficients are less than the median value are assigned a value of zero. Elections whose coefficient values are greater than or equal to the median value are assigned a value of one. The number of runs is determined by examining the pattern of zeros and ones. If the values of the moving-average regression coefficients occur randomly, then a high number of runs should be observed. If the coefficients follow the pattern I have hypothesized, only three runs should occur: first a series of zeros, then ones, then zeros again. The probability that such a pattern will occur by chance is small. In general, the greater the number of runs, the less confidence I can attach to the interpretation that a realignment has occurred.

The runs tests results are reported in Table 6. For the gubernatorial moving-average regression coefficient pattern, four runs were observed. For the senatorial

Table 6

Wald-Wolfowitz Runs Tests: Maine Gubernatorial and Senatorial Moving-Average Regression Coefficient Patterns

Gubernatorial pattern:	
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0	(4 runs) p = .067
Senatorial pattern:	
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0	(3 runs) p = .008

coefficient partern, three runs were observed. Considering the small size of total observations, the probability of either series occurring by chance is slight. Overall, the results add confidence to the interpretation of the coefficient patterns. However, it should be noted that the coefficients which are greater than the median value occur early in both the gubernatorial and senatorial series. Thus it is proper to conclude that the realignment in Maine occurred in the late 1940s and the 1950s rather than the 1960s and 1970s. As will be seen below, runs tests for other states produce different patterns and that, as a result, it is possible to characterize state realignments as occurring at different times.

The second hypothesis is that the electoral pattern of presidential contests differs from the pattern of sub-presidential contests. To test this hypothesis, I regressed Maine's presidential vote, which is defined the same way as the state election vote, against the primary balance index. If the moving-average coefficient pattern differs from the gubernatorial and senatorial pattern, then the results can be interpreted as an empirical indication that a two-tiered party system exists in Maine.

The regression analysis of the presidential elections is presented in Table 7. The moving-average regression coefficients do not appear to follow the pattern observed in Tables 4 and 5. In other words, the coefficients

Table 7

Standardized Intercepts and Moving-Average Regression Coefficients: Maine Presidential Elections, 1948-1972 (N=15)*

Year	sa	mb	σ_x	$\sigma_{y\|x}$
1948(R)	.23	3.14	101.17	236.07
1952(R)	-.42	2.51	80.88	110.20
1956(R)	-.60	1.95	166.04	111.74
1960(R)	-.26	1.86	245.73	191.46
1964(D)	2.34	2.15	327.12	782.37
1968(D)**	-.58	1.98	309.10	235.26
1972(R)	-.71	1.60	332.69	99.84

*Androscoggin County excluded.
**The general balance index for 1968 is the ratio between the Democratic vote and the combined Republican and third parties vote. Because there was no state-wide primary in 1968, the dependent variable is regressed against the primary balance index for 1966.

measuring presidential elections do not indicate a realignment. While the state electoral patterns signify a realignment in the 1940s and 1950s, the first Democratic victory at the presidential level does not occur until 1964. (Note the high intercept score for 1964 indicating the presence of short-term forces caused by the Goldwater candidacy.)

A correlation analysis was performed in order to check the interpretation that presidential and state electoral patterns differ. Correlation coefficients were computed using the raw regression coefficient patterns which are reported in Appendix B. (The reason the raw regression coefficients were used instead of the moving-average regression coefficients was to remove the longitudinal influence of electoral events from the analysis. It should be recalled from Chapter 2 that the moving-average coefficients were computed in order to de-emphasize the individual idiosyncracies of larger two-party counties on the overall electoral pattern. In the correlation analysis, I am attempting to discover whether two electoral patterns exist simultaneously at any given point in time.) Each individual value of each raw regression coefficient pattern—gubernatorial, senatorial, and presidential—was paired with its corresponding value from another series. Interpolation of coefficients was performed when elections for different offices did not occur at the same time.

For example, the 1954 and 1958 senatorial regression coefficients were averaged together, and the average figure was paired with the 1956 presidential coefficient. The results of the correlation analysis are presented in Table 8. The gubernatorial and senatorial regression coefficients correlate with each other strongly while each correlates weakly with the presidential regression coefficients. It appears reasonable to conclude that presidential and subpresidential electoral patterns differ.

While I have presented empirical evidence that there exists two different electoral patterns, it should not be considered as conclusive proof that a two-tiered party system exists as hypothesized by Ladd and Hadley (1975: 264-265). Ladd and Hadley argue that the difference between the two tiers is based on the way the electorate evaluates candidates. On the subpresidential level, voters are likely to use their partisan allegiance in order to evaluate the candidates. At the presidential level, candidates are more likely to be judged by voters on personal and issue-position criteria (Ladd and Hadley, 1975). There is nothing in the data analyzed in this study which permits us to conclude that the electorate's evaluative procedures differ on the two levels. What I have demonstrated is that a two-tiered party system is a reasonable hypothesis. As a result, it strengthens the first hypothesis that state

Table 8

Correlation Analysis of Maine Presidential and Subpresidental Raw Regression Coefficient Patterns

Paired Patterns	r	r^2	No. of Cases
Gubernatorial vs. Presidential	.34	.12	7
Senatorial vs. Presidential	.19	.04	7
Gubernatorial vs. Senatorial	.81	.66	10

electoral change is the result of a realigning electorate even though presidential electoral change may occur for very different reasons.

New Hampshire

The Democratic Party of New Hampshire has always commanded a large bloc of voters usually averaging at least 40 percent of the vote in gubernatorial elections from 1932 to 1960. However, the Democrats were unable to win any major state-wide offices until 1962 when they captured both the governor's mansion and a U.S. Senate seat. These initial Democratic victories were possible because a bitter fight had errupted among Republican factions during the primary, badly dividing and weakening the party (Peirce, 1976). The winner of the gubernatorial race, John King, went on to win re-election in 1964 and 1966. The winner of the Senate race, Thomas J. McIntyre, won relection in 1966 and 1972. The only other Democrat who has successfully campaigned for a state-wide office is John Durkin who won the second U.S. Senate seat in a special election in 1975. The initial race in 1974 between Durkin and Republican Louis Wyman ended in a virtual tie. In House races, Democrats have won only three times since the Second World War; 1964, 1974, and 1976. After the 1974 and 1976 elections, the state senate was evenly divided between the two parties while the state house was controlled by the GOP.

Writing before the Democratic successes in 1962, Lockard (1959: 65) attributed the failure of the party to win elections on the lack of leadership within the party and what he termed "internecine warfare between ethnic factions." Lockard also noted that the Republican Party generally did not take anything for granted in general elections in contrast with dominant majority parties in other one-party states where the party's primary was considered the real decision-maker. In other words, the Democrats have historically commanded a large coalition of voters, yet the combination of poor leadership and usually efficient Republican opposition has prevented them from winning more elections.

In recent years, both parties have been racked with ideological strife. The primaries for both parties have produced conservative candidates for governor (Peirce, 1976). The Republican candidate, Meldrim Thomson, has won these elections because of his firm opposition to raising taxes (Angle and Walters, 1977). It is believed by writers such as Peirce (1976) and Angle and Walters (1977) that should a conservative Republican run against a moderate or liberal Democrat, the result would be a Democratic victory. This feeling is grounded on the example of liberal Democrat Durkin's victory over conservative Republican Wyman.

Two events appear responsible for the Democratic successes. First, the divisive GOP primaries in 1962

induced many Republicans to vote Democratic that year. The Democratic victors, King and McIntyre, then went on to win re-elections for their respective offices. Second, Senator Durkin's victory in 1975 appears to be the result of the poor condition of the state's economy (Peirce, 1976). Thus it may seem reasonable to conclude that the minority party successes are the result of short-term forces. The empirical data presented in Figure 4 appear to support this contention. The two graph lines which measure the two parties' primary voters as percentages of the total gubernatorial vote do not appear to converge over time. This would seem to indicate that partisan loyalties are remaining relatively stable.

However, this assertion is contradicted by the statewide primary balance index which is presented in Table 9. Overall, there is a slight and gradual increase which suggests some growth of Democratic Party strength. (This is the data used in the time-series analysis which is presented in Table 2. Compared to other states which have experienced a realignment, the regression and correlation coefficients for New Hampshire are only moderately positive.) The gradual increase in the primary balance index may be an indication that a realignment is just now beginning in New Hampshire.

This suggestion is further strengthened when we examine the results of the cross-county regression analysis. In



Figure 4

Democratic and Republican Primary Vote, and Democratic General Election Vote, as a Percentage of Total Gubernatorial Vote: New Hampshire, 1950-1974.

Table 9

New Hampshire's State-Wide Indexes

Year	Primary Balance Index	General Balance Index		
		President	Governor	Senator
1950	39.94	-	75.75	68.29
1952	42.50	64.14	58.36	-
1954	39.70	-	81.41	66.06 (66.18*)
1956	46.45	51.19	82.72	56.08
1958	45.78	-	93.60	-
1960	45.86	87.20	80.31	65.71
1962	34.17	-	143.26	67.48 (109.97*)
1964	55.31	176.94	201.28	-
1966	42.17	-	117.36	117.72
1968	45.14	78.63**	90.31	68.65
1970	44.03	-	78.89+	-
1972	54.07	50.25	64.02++	131.92
1974	56.93	-	95.39	100.00+++

*Special election to fill unexpired term.
**The general balance index is the ratio between the Democratic vote and the combined Republican and third parties vote. The general balance index between the two major parties is 84.30.
+The general balance index is the ratio between the Democratic vote and the combined Republican and third party vote. The general balance index between the two major parties is 95.89.
++The general balance index is the ratio between the Democratic vote and third party vote. The general balance index between the two major parties is 94.32.
+++First election between Durkin (D) and Wyman(R). In special election in 1975, the general balance index is 124.57.

Table 10, which presents the regression parameters of the gubernatorial elections, the moving-average regression coefficients increase in value from 1950 to 1964. The coefficients then decline slightly. The coefficients follow the same pattern in Table 10 which presents the analysis of the senatorial races. The coefficient patterns differ from the gubernatorial and senatorial patterns in Maine where the coefficient values first increase, then decrease, with later values far less than initial values. The standard deviation of the independent variable in Tables 10 and 11 has generally fluctuated over time. This indicates that no substantial growth of Democratic strength in any of the counties has yet occurred.

Five of the six Democratic victories are characterized by positive standardized intercept scores. The score for the 1964 gubernatorial race is particularly high because of the Goldwater presidential candidacy. The standardized intercepts measuring Senator McIntyre's three victories may be indicating some sort of realignment in Republican counties. McIntyre's support has shifted from Manchester City which is usually a Democratic stronghold (and an outlier excluded in this analysis) to more traditional GOP areas—Peirce, 1976).

The runs tests provide further empirical evidence that a realignment may be underway. The results of those tests

Table 10

Standardized Intercepts and Moving-Average Regression Coefficients: New Hampshire Gubernatorial Elections, 1950-1974 (N=11)*

Year	sa	mb	σ_x	$\sigma_{y\|x}$
1950(R)	-.32	.88	237.97	145.00
1952(R)	-.49	.98	224.77	143.92
1954(R)	-.31	.80	303.71	197.56
1956(R)	.24	.97	418.51	234.62
1958(R)	.29	.95	246.89	294.70
1960(R)	-.12	1.72	231.59	234.18
1962(D)	.48	1.85	169.00	451.61
1964(D)	2.75	1.98	362.85	631.99
1966(D)	.44	1.43	273.65	336.72
1968(R)	-.24	1.20	244.65	240.27
1970(R)**	-.41	1.25	262.11	170.13
1972(R)**	-2.03	1.29	252.92	146.64
1974(R)	-.29	1.49	344.68	375.26

*Manchester City excluded.
**The general balance index for 1970 and 1972 is the ratio between the Democratic vote and the combined Republican and third party vote.

Table 11

Standardized Intercepts and Moving-Average Regression Coefficients: New Hampshire Senatorial Elections, 1950-1974 (N=11)*

Year	sa	mb	σ_x	$\sigma_{y\|x}$
1950(R)	.69	.80	237.97	246.24
1954(R)	-.05	.68	303.71	176.31
1954(R)**	-.47	.70	303.71	158.89
1956(R)	-.42	.75	418.51	139.78
1960(R)	-.85	1.00	231.59	154.70
1962(R)	-1.56	1.43	169.00	178.55
1962(D)**	.55	1.66	169.00	321.89
1966(D)	2.12	1.50	273.65	331.99
1968(R)	-1.04	1.70	244.65	149.32
1972(D)	-.04	1.47	252.92	365.60
1974***	1.07	1.63	344.68	295.77

*Manchester City excluded.
**Special election to fill unexpired term.
***First election between Durkin(D) and Wyman(R).

are presented in Table 12. For the coefficients measuring the gubernatorial races, four runs were observed. Two runs were observed for the coefficients measuring the senatorial elections. The pattern for both series is generally first zeros, then ones (with one minor exception in the gubernatorial series). The probability of either runs pattern occurring by chance is slight. The results appear to confirm that the state is presently undergoing a realignment. The coefficient values perhaps have reached a high plateau. Once the range of the independent variable begins increasing significantly, the coefficient values should begin to decrease.

The second hypothesis, regarding the possibility of a two-tiered party system, also is confirmed. The regression analysis of the presidential races is presented in Table 13. The moving-average regression coefficients do not follow the same pattern as the coefficients measuring the subpresidential races. (Note the high standardized intercept score for the 1964 election.) The correlation analysis of the three raw regression coefficient patterns corroborates this interpretation. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 14. There is a fairly strong degree of correlation between the gubernatorial and senatorial coefficient pattern. However, the degree of association of each of the two patterns with the presidential pattern is far lower.

Table 12

Wald-Wolfowitz Runs Tests: New Hampshire Gubernatorial and Senatorial Moving-Average Regression Coefficient Patterns

Gubernatorial pattern:	
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1	(4 runs) p = .043
Senatorial pattern:	
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1	(2 runs) p = .004

Table 13

Standardized Intercepts and Moving-Average Regression Coefficients: New Hampshire Presidential Elections, 1952-1972 (N=11)*

Year	sa	mb	σ_x	$\sigma_{y\|x}$
1952(R)	-.40	.74	224.77	120.45
1956(R)	-.31	1.00	418.51	133.11
1960(R)	-.44	1.04	231.59	177.53
1964(D)	2.22	1.36	362.85	523.25
1968(R)**	-.32	1.15	244.65	206.41
1972(R)	-.73	1.11	252.92	168.56

*Manchester City excluded.
**The general balance index for 1968 is the ratio between the Democratic vote and the combined Republican and third parties vote.

Table 14

Correlation Analysis of New Hampshire Presidential and Subpresidential Raw Regression Coefficient Patterns

Paired Patterns	r	r^2	No. of Cases
Gubernatorial vs. Presidential	.44	.19	6
Senatorial vs. Presidential	.25	.06	6
Gubernatorial vs. Senatorial	.78	.61	9

Iowa

Jonathan Dolliver, a turn-of-the-century Republican Senator, once remarked, "When Iowa goes Democratic, Hell will go Methodist" (Peirce, 1973: 93). The sectional loyalties generated by the Civil War made solid Republicans out of the state's population, and these loyalties remained frozen for a long time. Democratic candidates for governor were able to win only twice in the 98-year span from the 1850s to 1956. The only Democrat who fared well prior to the post-World War II period was Guy Gillette who held a U.S. Senate seat from 1937 to 1955.

In recent years, however, Iowa has become a politically marginal state. Democrat Hershel C. Loveless won the governorship in 1956 and 1958. A second Democrat, Harold Hughes, won the gubernatorial elections of 1962, 1964, and 1966. He went on to win a Senate seat in 1968, although by an extremely thin margin. In 1972, Democrat Dick Clark won the second Senate seat by upsetting incumbent Senator Jack Miller. When Hughes decided not to run for re-election in 1974, John Culver successfully retained the seat for the Democrats. The Democratic Party also has been winning U.S. House seats since 1958 when they carried four out of the eight districts. After the 1976 election, they held four out of the six U.S. House seats, and they controlled both houses of the state legislature.

Most observers assert that the Democratic Party's success is the result of an electoral realignment. Two factors are cited as causes of the realignment. First, the Democratic Party has fielded many attractive candidates, such as Hughes and Clark, who have encouraged voters to align themselves with the party (Barone et al., 1975; Sundquist, 1973). Second, Iowa has experienced a transition from a rural-based economy to an urban-based economy thus resulting in Democratic Party growth (Peirce, 1973). Both these arguments were discussed extensively in Chapter 1. However, there also is a third factor which has contributed to minority party success. Farmers have become increasingly independent. They are quite willing to "revolt" against the Republican Party and vote Democratic if farm prices are too low (Hahn, 1971). Thus it may be more accurate to describe minority party success in Iowa as a result of short-term forces.

The empirical data, however, conclusively show that a realignment has occurred in Iowa. State-wide electoral data are presented in Table 15 and Figure 5. In Table 15, the primary balance index has increased substantially over time with the 1974 figure exceeding 100. The same trend is revealed in Figure 5 where the two graph lines which measure primary voter participation converge and then cross. Despite the growing independence of farmers observed by

Table 15

Iowa's State-Wide Indexes

Year	Primary Balance Index	General Balance Index		
		President	Governor	Senator
1946	22.74	-	73.41	-
1948	20.54	105.74	78.43	139.07
1950	38.58	-	68.52	81.55
1952	25.68	55.82	92.06	-
1954	26.98	-	94.11	91.03
1956	47.36	68.82	105.02	85.47
1958	47.53	-	118.01	-
1960	54.15	76.22	91.79	92.63
1962	42.63	-	110.78	87.30
1964	63.41	163.20	217.62	-
1966	46.33	-	125.28	62.05
1968	47.52	69.54*	84.84	101.13
1970	71.74	-	91.45	-
1972	73.74	70.26	68.91	124.90
1974	102.17	-	70.63	110.08

*The general balance index is the ratio between the Democratic vote and the combined Republican and third parties vote. The general balance index between the two major parties is 77.00.



Figure 5

Democratic and Republican Primary Vote, and Democratic General Election Vote, as a Percentage of the Total Gubernatorial Vote: Iowa, 1946-1974.

Hahn (1971), the primary participation data indicate a durable electoral shift toward the Democratic Party.

This conclusion is corroborated by the cross-county regression analyses of the subpresidential elections. In Table 16, which reports the regression parameters of the gubernatorial elections, the moving-average regression coefficients generally increase from 1946 to 1954, then decline slightly, then increase to a peak value of 2.04 in 1964, then decline again. The standard deviations of the primary balance index and the standard error indicate that the decreasing values are the result of the increasing range of the independent variable. The moving-average coefficient pattern in Table 17, which presents the senatorial regression parameters, also indicates a realignment. However, the senatorial coefficient pattern is different from the gubernatorial pattern. The overall pattern appears to decline gradually over time. Such a pattern suggests that the realignment was perhaps underway prior to the beginning of the period of analysis.

This suggestion is strengthened by the results of the runs tests which are presented in Table 18. Five runs were observed in the gubernatorial coefficient pattern while four runs were observed in the senatorial pattern. The pattern of zeros and ones, however, is different for the two offices. The general pattern for the governor's

Table 16

Standardized Intercepts and Moving-Average Regression Coefficients: Iowa Gubernatorial Elections, 1946-1974 (N=97)*

Year	sa	mb	σ_x	$\sigma_{y\|x}$
1946(R)	.11	1.39	28.29	35.86
1948(R)	1.41	1.33	26.95	57.24
1950(R)	-.94	1.51	43.87	34.16
1952(R)	.44	1.76	28.00	74.10
1954(R)	.13	1.87	33.36	56.33
1956(D)	-.33	1.71	54.17	60.13
1958(D)	.83	1.43	58.74	72.60
1960(R)	-.73	1.58	66.68	53.43
1962(D)	-1.05	1.81	49.25	62.00
1964(D)	2.56	2.04	81.08	156.69
1966(D)	.41	1.89	62.24	120.41
1968(R)	-1.42	1.46	51.64	43.80
1970(R)	-.52	1.01	91.34	44.02
1972(R)	-.40	.62	117.57	38.59
1974(R)	-.50	.46	158.91	39.56

*Dubuque and Polk Counties excluded.

Table 17

Standardized Intercepts and Moving-Average Regression Coefficients: Iowa Senatorial Elections, 1948-1974 (N=97)*

Year	sa	mb	σ_x	$\sigma_{y\|x}$
1948(D)	2.76	1.74	26.95	105.06
1950(R)	-.17	1.77	43.87	37.23
1954(R)	.28	1.43	33.36	49.00
1956(R)	-.18	1.35	54.17	41.81
1960(R)	-.10	1.24	66.68	45.45
1962(R)	-.64	1.12	49.25	41.31
1966(R)	-.39	1.45	62.24	46.21
1968(D)	-1.18	1.34	51.64	57.91
1972(D)	.13	1.33	117.57	65.10
1974(D)	-.50	.97	158.91	60.15

*Dubuque and Polk Counties excluded.

Table 18

Wald-Wolfowitz Runs Tests: Iowa Gubernatorial and Senatorial Moving-Average Regression Coefficient Patterns

Gubernatorial pattern:	
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0	(5 runs) p = .015
Senatorial pattern:	
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0	(4 runs) p = .167

races is zeros, then ones, then zeros. A "perfect" three-run pattern is disrupted by a single zero which is in the middle of the ones and assigned to the 1958 moving-average coefficient. On the other hand, the general pattern for the senatorial elections is ones, then zeros. A "perfect" two-run pattern was disrupted by a single one which is in the middle of the zeros and is assigned to the 1966 coefficient. The probability of either runs pattern occurring by chance is fairly low. The coefficient patterns and the runs tests give a strong impression that the electoral patterns of the two races differ. I shall return to this point when I discuss the results of the second hypothesis.

The standardized intercept scores clearly reveal the farmers' "revolts" against the GOP. In 1948 and 1958 the farmers voted Democratic in order to protest low farm prices. As a result of the Goldwater candidacy, the 1964 election is marked by massive vote-switching from the GOP to the Democratic Party in one-party counties. In Table 16, the three highest positive intercept scores are measured in those three years. In Table 17, the only senatorial election which occurred during the three years in question is in 1968. As can be seen, the standardized intercept score for 1948 is positive and very high compared to other values. The standardized intercept scores also indicate a "revolt" against the Democratic Party in 1968. The scores for

gubernatorial and senatorial elections are the largest negative value in either table. Hughes won the senatorial seat by an extremely narrow margin of 6,415 votes, a result of rural voters' reaction to Hughes' record as governor. During his administration, the size of the budget increased and taxes were raised (Peirce, 1973: 97).

Tests on the second hypothesis do not reveal the usual two-tiered party system. The regression analysis of the presidential elections is presented in Table 19. The moving-average coefficient pattern appears to follow the same pattern as the coefficients measuring the senatorial races. This observation is confirmed by the correlation analysis which is reported in Table 20. The correlation between the two offices' coefficient patterns is .71. The correlation between the gubernatorial and presidential coefficient patterns also is fairly high. Surprisingly, however, the correlation between the gubernatorial and senatorial coefficient patterns is much weaker. It seems contradictory that two variables would correlate moderately high with a third variable but not with each other. I believe this is the result of a measurement problem. Because the three offices do not always hold elections at the same time, I often had to interpolate and produce averaged coefficients in order to achieve paired data. At best, the measuring of association is approximate. Thus it is

Table 19

Standardized Intercepts and Moving-Average Regression Coefficients: Iowa Presidential Elections, 1948-1972 (N=97)*

Year	sa	mb	σ_x	$\sigma_{y\|x}$
1948(D)	1.53	1.43	26.95	76.23
1952(R)	-.46	1.27	28.00	39.64
1956(R)	-.49	1.04	54.17	35.35
1960(R)	-.46	1.11	66.68	40.35
1964(D)	1.55	1.25	81.08	96.04
1968(R)**	-1.15	1.15	51.64	39.30
1972(R)	-.52	.62	117.57	31.81

*Dubuque and Polk Counties excluded.
**The general balance index for 1968 is the ratio between the Democratic vote and the combined Republican and third parties vote.

Table 20

Correlation Analysis of Iowa Presidential and Subpresidental Raw Regression Coefficient Patterns

Paired Patterns	r	r^2	No. of Cases
Gubernatorial vs. Presidential	.63	.40	7
Senatorial vs. Presidential	.71	.50	7
Gubernatorial vs. Senatorial	.37	.14	10

difficult in this particular instance to reach a conclusion concerning the hypothesis. My guess is that a two-tiered party system does exist, but the senatorial elections are on the same tier as the presidential elections. Despite the moderate degree of association between the gubernatorial and presidential coefficients, I feel the gubernatorial elections belong on the second tier. In other words, I am placing far more emphasis on the correlation between the gubernatorial and senatorial patterns than on the correlation between the gubernatorial and presidential patterns.

This conclusion is based on the fact that one of Iowa's basic economic actitities is agriculture. As a result, the state is dependent on the Federal Government's farm support policies for its economic well-being. Thus the factors influencing the outcome of presidential elections should also affect the senatorial elections. This statement may appear ludicrous in light of the fact that Iowa has gone Republican in the last three presidential elections while the Democratic Party has won the senate races. However, it should be noted that the Democratic Party has improved its performance in each successive election: George McGovern received more votes in 1972 than Hubert Humphrey received in 1968, and Jimmy Carter did better in 1976 than McGovern in 1972. (Indeed, Carter may have carried the state had Eugene McCarthy not been on the ballot as a third party

candidate.) One other consideration contributed to the conclusion that Iowa has a two-tiered party system with the presidential and senatorial races on the same tier. Kentucky, as Iowa, has an agricultural economy, and as will be seen, has a two-tiered party system identical to Iowa's. The only difference is that the empirical analysis is much more conclusive in the case for Kentucky.

There is no question that a realignment has occurred in Iowa. What remains unclear is when the realignment occurred. The analysis of the senatorial elections indicates that it occurred at an earlier point in time than did the analysis of the gubernatorial elections. The relationship between the presidential and subpresidential election patterns also is unclear. If a two-tiered party exists in the form I just described above, then it may be accurate to describe the gubernatorial races as indicating a realignment in the 1950s. On the other hand, the senatorial election may be influenced by factors which also affect the presidential elections. These factors may reflect more the short-term forces of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the state of Iowa's economy than underlying partisan dispositions. However, such conclusions are not based on analysis of data in this study.

Pennsylvania

When formulating the research design for this study, I made the a priori assumption that electoral change did not begin occurring in any of the northern states until after World War II. In other words, I considered the Democratic Party successes in the 1930s in Maine, Iowa, and Pennsylvania as deviations from the normal voting pattern. The fact that the Republican Party reasserted its dominance in all three states during the war appeared to confirm this assumption. However, while this assumption is generally true for Maine and Iowa, it is not correct for Pennsylvania, as will be seen below.

Pennsylvania is different from the other six states selected in this study because it developed an industrial economy during the 19th century. The fact that Pennsylvania was largely a one-party state from the time of the Civil War to at least the Depression seems to weaken Key's contention that economic diversification in the form of industrialization leads to two-party class politics. However, it should be noted that while Pennsylvania was economically developed, there was a single dominant economic interest, steel (Peirce, 1972a). The managerial and working classes formed a coalition to protect that interest, and this coalition was firmly aligned with the GOP. The 19th century Democratic Party leadership articulated a "backward looking" philosophy—

strongly steeped in agrarianism and individualism—in opposition to the industrialization process (Burnham, 1970). As a result, Pennsylvania voters looked upon the Democratic leadership as the Commonwealth's economic enemy. Thus it was only natural for the state to have a one-party system.

The Democratic Party began emerging in the 1930s during the Depression. The Party won the gubernatorial and senatorial elections in 1934, and by 1936 controlled the state's General Assembly. The Party also held the majority in the delegation to the U.S. House of Representatives. However, the Republican Party reasserted itself and controlled the state government and the U.S. Congressional Delegation from 1943 to 1954.

In 1954, Democrat George Leader won the gubernatorial election. Two years later, former Philadelphia Mayor Joseph Clark, a Democrat, won a U.S. Senate seat. The Democrats again won the governor's mansion in 1958, and Clark won re-election in 1962. However, Clark was defeated in 1968 by Republican Richard Schweiker. In gubernatorial elections since 1958, the GOP has won twice (1962 and 1966) and the Democratic Party has won twice (1970 and 1974). Since 1964, the Democrats have held a majority of the U.S. House seats, although often the majority was only by one seat. After the 1976 election, the Democrats held seventeen of the twenty-five U.S. House seats, and they controlled both houses of the General Assembly.

The electoral data clearly reveal that a realignment has taken place. State-wide analyses are presented in Table 21 and Figure 6. The primary balance index in Table 21 has increased substantially: by 1974, there were nearly three voters in the Democratic primary for every two voters in the GOP primary. In Figure 6, the graph lines measuring participation in the two parties' primaries converge, then diverge in favor of the Democratic Party. The data suggest that not only has the Democratic Party become competitive, it has become the stronger of the two parties.

The regression analyses of the gubernatorial and senatorial elections are presented in Tables 22 and 23 respectively. In both tables, the values of the moving-average regression coefficients increase only very slightly at first, then decline gradually over time. The standard deviation and the standard error indicate that the declining coefficient patterns are caused by the increasing range of the independent variable. However, the overall change in the coefficient values is slight compared to the other northern states. It appears that the realignment occurred prior to the period of analysis.

The conclusion is strengthened by two additional empirical observations. First, the standardized intercept scores appear to randomly fluctuate. There appears to be no correspondence between extreme scores and Democratic

Table 21

Pennsylvania's State-Wide Indexes*

Year	Primary Balance Index	General Balance Index		
		President	Governor	Senator
1946	41.06	-	69.51	67.19
1948	42.82	92.13	-	-
1950	40.00	-	95.23	93.06
1952	42.86	88.84	-	93.03
1954	60.84	-	116.26	-
1956	67.72	76.66	-	100.80
1958	90.44	-	103.90	94.48
1960	84.13	104.77	-	-
1962	93.48	-	79.95	104.86
1964	116.51	187.07	-	97.09
1966	104.34	-	88.55	-
1968	93.66	91.53**	-	88.24
1970	144.14	-	132.42	88.24
1972	-	66.20	-	-
1974	148.41	-	118.96	86.59

*State-wide primary election data unavailable for 1972.
**The general balance index is the ratio between the Democratic vote and the combined Republical and third parties vote. The general balance index between the two major parties is 108.10.



Figure 6

Democratic and Republican Primary Vote, and Democratic General Election Vote, as a Percentage of the Total Gubernatorial Vote: Pennsylvania, 1946-1974.

Table 22

Standardized Intercepts and Moving-Average Regression Coefficients: Pennsylvania Gubernatorial Elections, 1946-1974
(N=65)*

Year	sa	mb	σ_x	$\sigma_{y\|x}$
1946(R)	-1.10	.76	83.84	37.01
1950(R)	.90	.79	92.24	56.68
1954(D)	1.55	.75	121.97	65.61
1958(D)	-.42	.64	136.07	59.12
1962(R)	-.77	.54	146.95	55.16
1966(R)**	-1.39	.50	146.40	48.01
1970(D)	.89	.50	260.31	83.44
1974(D)	.33	.48	218.32	86.51

*Allegheny and Philadelphia Counties excluded.
**Because the county-level returns for the 1966 state primary election are unavailable, the general balance index for 1966 is regressed against the primary balance index for 1964.

Table 23

Standardized Intercepts and Moving-Average Regression Coefficients: Pennsylvania Senatorial Elections, 1946-1974 (N=65)*

Year	sa	mb	σ_x	$\sigma_{y\|x}$
1946(R)	-.83	.73	83.84	37.05
1950(R)	2.17	.87	92.24	55.01
1952(R)	-.66	.94	70.67	46.54
1956(D)	-.70	.88	102.48	52.00
1958(R)	.16	.70	136.07	55.33
1962(D)	.55	.59	146.95	63.11
1964(R)	1.00	.56	146.40	60.49
1968(R)	-.24	.47	137.48	55.95
1970(R)	.07	.43	260.31	50.95
1974(R)	-1.52	.38	218.32	54.89

*Allegheny and Philadelphia Counties excluded.

successes. This is because the fluctuation of the raw intercepts is small from one elction to the next compared to other states. Second, the runs tests, which are reported in Table 24, show a "perfect" two-runs pattern for both the gubernatorial and senatorial coefficient patterns: first ones, then zeros. The probability of either occurring by chance is slight.

Tests of the second hypothesis indicate that a two-tiered party system, similar to Maine's and New Hampshire's, exists in Pennsylvania. The cross-county regression analysis of the presidential elections is presented in Table 25. The standarized intercept score for the 1964 election reveals short-term forces in reaction to the Goldwater candidacy. The moving-average regression coefficients appear to follow the same pattern as the coefficients which measure the gubernatorial and senatorial elections. However, the correlation analysis of the raw regression coefficient gives a fairly strong indication that a two-tiered party system exists (see Table 26). The correlation between the gubernatorial and senatorial coefficient patterns is strong while the correlation of each subpresidential pattern with the presidential coefficient pattern is moderate. When the common variance between the subpresidential and presidential coefficients patterns is examined, the difference between the two tiers is accented.

Table 24

Wald-Wolfowitz Runs Tests: Pennsylvania Gubernatorial and Senatorial Moving-Average Regression Coefficient Patterns

Gubernatorial pattern:	
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0	(2 runs) p = .029
Senatorial pattern:	
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0	(2 runs) p = .008

Table 25

Standardized Intercepts and Moving-Average Regression Coefficients: Pennsylvania Presidential Elections, 1948-1972
(N=65)

Year	sa	mb	σ_x	$\sigma_{y\|x}$
1948(R)	-.26	1.15	78.00	44.93
1952(R)	-.30	.98	70.67	45.27
1956(R)	-.77	.85	102.48	39.63
1960(D)	-.50	.87	110.47	72.60
1964(D)	2.41	.85	146.40	111.02
1968(D)**	-.16	.66	137.48	59.68
1972(R)***	-.42	.40	260.31	45.22

* Allegheny and Philadelphia Counties excluded.
**The general balance index for 1968 is the ratio between the Democratic vote and the combined Republican and third parties vote.
***Because the county-level returns for the 1972 state primary are not available, the general balance index for 1972 is regressed against the primary balance index for 1970.

Table 26

Correlation Analysis of Pennsylvania Presidential and Subpresidential Raw Regression Coefficient Patterns

Paired Patterns	r	r^2	No. of Cases
Gubernatorial vs. Presidential	.47	.22	7
Senatorial vs. Presidential	.52	.27	7
Gubernatorial vs. Senatorial	.74	.55	10

Summary

Based on the data analyzed and presented in this chapter, it is clear that the four northern states have experienced at least some growth in the size of Democratic Party groupings. It is quite clear that realignments have occurred in Maine, Iowa, and Pennsylvania. Although the state-wide electoral data for New Hampshire are less clear, the results of the cross-county regression analyses for the state indicate that a realignment is just beginning. Correlation analyses of the raw regression coefficients reveal that a two-tiered party system exists in Maine, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania. The analysis is less clear in the case of Iowa, although I believe a two-tiered party does exist but that it assumes a different form.

Although I have occasionally mentioned other observers' opinions on why these electoral shifts have occurred, I have yet to systematically deal with the causes of electoral change. I shall do so in Chapter 6. In the next two chapters, I shall briefly present the results of the tests on the first two hypotheses for the three remaining states—Arizona, Florida, and Kentucky.

Note

1. The conditional distribution of the general balance index given a particular value of the primary balance index can be expressed as follows:

$$y|x \sim N(\mu_x+\rho_{xy}\frac{\sigma_y}{\sigma_x}(x-\mu_x),\ \sigma_y^2(1-\rho_{xy}^2)),$$

where y represents the general balance index, x represents the primary balance index, μ_x and μ_y represent the means of the primary and general balance indexes respectively, σ_x and σ_y represent the standard deviation of the two indexes, and ρ_{xy} is the coefficient measuring the degree of correlation between x and y. Within the above expression, we are interested in two particular parts: first, the regression coefficient,

$$b = \rho_{xy}\frac{\sigma_y}{\sigma_x};$$

and second, the conditional variance,

$$\sigma_{y|x}^2 = \sigma_y^2(1-\rho_{xy}^2).$$

The square root of the conditional variance is the standard error,

$$\sigma_{y|x} = \sqrt{\rho_y^2(1-\rho_{xy}^2)}.$$

If the regression coefficient, or its modified value, the moving-average regression coefficient, decreases for the reason I hypothesize, then ρ_{xy} and σ_y should remain fairly constant while σ_x increases in value. However, the slope may decrease because ρ_{xy} is decreasing; in other words, the relationship between x and y weakens. In order to ensure that my interpretation of the decreasing moving-average coefficient values is correct, σ_x and $\sigma_{y|x}$ must be examined. If σ_x is increasing, while $\sigma_{y|x}$ does not increase at a proportionally faster rate, then the realignment interpretation is confirmed.

CHAPTER 4

THE SUNBELT STATES

In this chapter, we will examine Republican Party successes in two states which were once bastions of the Democratic Party. Along with the other states which make up the southern half of the nation, Arizona and Florida have been designated the "Sunbelt" states. In recent years, these southern states have experienced greater than average economic growth, in-migration of whites, and increased Republican strength. The question is whether GOP victories are the result of realigning electorates. The primary balance index is the reverse of that used in Chapter 3: it is now defined as the number of Republican primary participants as a percentage of the Democratic primary participants. The general balance indexes also are revised in an identical manner.

Arizona

Prior to the Second World War, Arizona was a one-party Democratic state with copper interests exerting a strong influence on governmental policies (Peirce, 1972b). Since the war, the state has undergone a political transformation from Democratic to Republican dominance. The

tranformation at times has appeared so complete that the state sometimes has been characterized as a one-party Republican state. The initial GOP success occurred in 1950 when Howard Pyle won the governor's race. He won re-election two years later. Since that time, the GOP has won six out of ten gubernatorial elections. In 1952, Barry Goldwater won his first election to the U.S. Senate. Senator Goldwater won re-election in 1958, and (after giving up his seat in 1964 to run for president) won senatorial elections in 1968 and 1974. Republican Paul Fannin replaced Goldwater in 1964 and won-reelection in 1970. In 1976, with Fannin retiring, the Democrats won the Senate seat after the Republican Party split during the bitter Senate primary election between Congressmen Sam Steiger and John Conlan.

The Republicans have been successful in other races. The party has controlled one House seat since 1952, a second since 1966. When the state was given an additional seat in 1972 after reappointment, the GOP held it for two terms. Peirce (1972b) characterizes the 1966 elections as a key contest, with the Republicans winning every statewide office, as well as winning control of the state legislature. Recently, however, it appears that the Democratic Party has been regaining strength. Raul Castro nearly beat Republican Governor Williams in the

1970 gubernatorial election. In 1974, Castro was elected governor. But despite these recent setbacks, the GOP is still a competitive party. After the 1976 election, the party controlled the lower house of the state legislature.

In Chapter 1, I discussed Peirce's (1972b) contention that the quality of GOP candidates, such as Goldwater and Rhodes, was one factor essential to GOP success. Another factor Peirce lists is the large migration into the state by midwesterners who are usually Republican. In Chapter 6, I shall discuss the impact which in-migration into both Arizona and Florida has had on Republican Party growth.

The state-wide electoral data clearly reveal a realignment. The state-wide primary balance index, which is reported in Table 27, increases over time. In Figure 7, the two graph lines which measure the participation rate in the two parties' primaries converge over time. The Republican proportion of the gubernatorial vote also is graphed. Prior to 1952, the number of voters participating in the Democratic primary exceeded the number of votes the GOP received in the general election. After 1952, (with two minor exceptions) the number of Democratic primary voters declines relative to the GOP general election vote.

The graph in Figure 7 is the best empirical indication that a realignment has occurred in Arizona. Unfortunately, the cross-county regression analysis is of very limited

Table 27

Arizona's State-Wide Indexes*

Year	Primary Balance Index	General Balance Index		
		President	Governor	Senator
1946	5.94	-	66.40	43.55
1948	14.65	81.47	67.71	-
1950	13.26	-	103.11	59.22
1952	30.97	140.09	151.02	105.37
1954	24.90	-	90.45	-
1956	36.73	156.79	67.93	62.90
1958	24.57	-	122.87	127.56
1960	43.09	125.15	145.73	-
1962	49.70	-	121.37	82.01
1964	53.78	102.01	87.82	105.87
1966	60.04	-	116.31	-
1968	61.64	122.86**	137.17	133.73
1970	63.47	-	103.78	122.17
1972	-	202.89	-	-
1974	87.09	-	98.31	139.59

*No state-wide primary in 1972. In 1970, the term for governor was lengthened from two to four years.
**The general balance index is the ratio between the Republican vote and the combined Democratic and third parties vote. The general balance index between the two major parties is 156.42.



Figure 7

Republican and Democratic Primary Vote, and Republican General Election Vote, as a Percentage of Total Gubernatorial Vote: Arizona, 1946-1974.

value because of the necessity of excluding the outlier cases. As explained in Chapter 2, such outliers exert undue influence in determining the value of the intercept and regression coefficient. In the case of Arizona, Maricopa and Pima Counties constitute outliers and thus are excluded from the analysis. As a result, less than 40 percent of the population is left to be analyzed in the remaining twelve counties.

The results of the cross-county regression analyses of the gubernatorial and senatorial races are presented in Tables 28 and 29 respectively. Generally, the moving-average regression coefficients decline with time. The standard deviation of the independent variable and the standard error indicate that the declining values of the coefficients are the result of the increasing range of the primary balance index. The standardized intercept shows the presence of short-term forces, which favor the Republican gubernatorial candidate, in 1952. Fairly large negative scores indicate heavy support for the Democratic nominees for governor and senator in 1956. These scores are not surprising because both nominees, Senator Carl Hayden and Governor (and former Senator) Ernest MacFarland, were popular with the voters.

Examination of individual counties reveals that a partial realignment has occurred in some of the rural

Table 28

Standardized Intercepts and Moving-Average Regression Coefficients: Arizona Gubernatorial Elections, 1946-1974 (N=12)*

Year	sa	mb	σ_x	$\sigma_{y\|x}$
1946(D)	.65	4.59	12.18	62.42
1948(D)	.35	5.15	26.59	59.17
1950(R)	1.29	4.55	21.32	72.22
1952(R)	2.16	4.68	41.00	78.69
1954(D)	-.03	3.27	34.50	49.11
1956(D)	-2.25	3.45	36.76	21.19
1958(R)	-.55	3.78	28.65	60.26
1960(R)	.10	4.28	44.50	64.06
1962(R)	.11	3.11	44.90	59.02
1964(D)	-1.19	2.53	53.51	42.16
1966(R)	-.04	2.03	50.27	60.29
1968(R)	-.59	1.94	58.39	46.75
1970(R)	-.03	1.60	60.91	64.70
1974(D)	.01	1.40	72.39	87.67

*Maricopa and Pima Counties excluded. Term for governor was lengthened from two to four years in 1970.

Table 29

Standardized Intercepts and Moving-Average Regression Coefficients: Arizona Senatorial Elections, 1946-1974 (N=12)*

Year	sa	mb	σ_x	$\sigma_{y\|x}$
1946(D)	-.60	3.16	12.18	35.28
1950(D)	-.26	3.16	21.32	46.48
1952(R)	.39	2.58	41.00	41.94
1956(D)	-2.10	3.29	36.76	26.97
1958(R)	.65	2.91	28.65	65.52
1962(D)	-.88	3.15	44.90	41.75
1964(R)	-.38	2.19	53.51	53.35
1968(R)	.96	2.18	58.39	66.75
1970(R)	.69	1.94	60.91	65.85
1974(R)	1.51	1.80	72.39	110.15

* Maricopa and Pima Counties excluded.

counties. However, the one-party Democratic counties have remained solidly Democratic. The pattern of the moving-average coefficients suggests that the realignment was underway prior to the beginning of the period of analysis. This impression is confirmed by the runs tests which are presented in Table 30. Four runs were observed both for the gubernatorial and senatorial coefficient patterns. The runs pattern for both series is ones, then zeros, with one minor exception in each case. The probability of either pattern occurring by chance is small.

The exclusion of the outlier cases also limits the value of the tests on the second hypothesis. The results of the cross-county regression analysis of the presidential elections are presented in Table 31. The 1972 standardized intercept indicates the presence of short-term forces; undoubtedly, George McGovern's candidacy induced many Democrats to vote Republican that year.

The correlation analysis of the raw regression coefficients series is presented in Table 32. The results clearly reveal that a two-tiered party system exists in the smaller twelve counties of Arizona.

The cross-county regression analyses presented in this section clearly demonstrate the difficulty of using the model when the state's population is extremely maldistributed. The problem could be eliminated, or minimized, if the

Table 30

Wald-Wolfowitz Runs Rests: Arizona Gubernatorial and Senatorial Moving-Average Regression Coefficient Patterns

Gubernatorial pattern:		
	1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0	(4 runs) p = .001
Senatorial pattern:		
	1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0	(4 runs) p = .167

Table 31

Standardized Intercepts and Moving-Average Regression Coefficients: Arizona Presidential Elections, 1948-1972 (N=12)*

Year	sa	mb	σ_x	$\sigma_{y\|x}$
1948(D)	-.16	3.87	26.95	57.89
1952(R)	.84	4.22	41.00	75.99
1956(R)	-.25	4.13	36.76	88.71
1960(R)	-.70	3.68	44.50	76.13
1964(R)	-1.12	2.64	53.51	60.85
1968(R)**	-.63	2.65	58.39	59.54
1972(R)***	2.07	2.41	60.91	158.58

* Maricopa and Pima Counties excluded.
**The general balance index for 1968 is the ratio between the Republican vote and the combined Democratic and third parties vote.
***Because there was no state-wide primary in 1972, the general balance index for 1972 is regressed against the primary balance index for 1970.

Table 32

Correlation Analysis of Arizona Presidential and Subpresidential Raw Regression Coefficient Patterns

Paired Patterns	r	r^2	No. of Cases
Gubernatorial vs. Presidential	.34	.12	7
Senatorial vs. Presidential	-.09	.01	7
Gubernatorial vs. Senatorial	.74	.55	10

larger counties could be subdivided. I followed this procedure in the analysis of New Hampshire, dividing Hillsborough County into three subunits: Manchester City, Nashua City, and the remaining county. (Manchester City, because of its large size and heavy support for the minority party still had to be excluded.) Unfortunately, the data at the city level are not available in Arizona.[1] As a result, I caution the reader not to place too much emphasis on the regression analyses presented in this section. The most conclusive evidence that Arizona has undergone a re-alignment is the graph on Figure 7 and the state-wide data which are presented in Table 27.

Florida

Florida has been, and remains, heavily Democratic. This does not mean that the character of the state's politics has remained static. Because the state has experienced tremendous growth in population as a result of migration, Dauer (1972) abandons Key's contention that the present voting trends are explained by past voting patterns. Instead, Dauer reasons that present voting patterns can be explained only by analyzing the socioeconomic characteristics of the state. In other words, the traditional political groupings have been overwhelmed by newcomers.

Florida can best be characterized as a "giant suburbia" whose inhabitants have conservative tendencies (Dauer, 1972: 94). However, the state is still firmly dominated by the Democratic Party. Only three Republicans have successfully sought state-wide offices. Claude Kirk was elected governor in 1966, but lost his re-election bid in 1970. In 1968, Edward Gurney, then a U.S. Representative, won a Senate seat. He retired six years later under indictment for influence peddling. (He was never convicted.) The GOP's nominee for the 1974 Senate race, Jack Eckerd, narrowly lost to Democrat Dick Stone. Eckerd apparently lost many conservative voters to third party candidate, John Grady. (Grady was the 1976 GOP nominee for U.S. Senator, but lost the general election to Senator Lawton Chiles.) The third successful Republican candidate was Paula Hawkins who has twice won elections to the Public Service Commission. After the 1976 elections, Republicans held five of the fifteen House seats. At the local level, however, the GOP has been even less successful. Presently, they hold ten of the forty state senate seats and twenty-eight of the 120 state house seats.

In contrast to state Republican candidates, Republican nominees for president have done very well in Florida. Eisenhower carried the state in 1952 and 1956, and Nixon won the state in 1960, 1968, and 1972. Florida supported the Democratic presidential nominees in 1964 and 1976.

The state-wide electoral data are presented in Table 33 and Figure 8. The primary balance index which is reported in Table 33 indicates that a partial realignment has occurred in Florida. However, the small number of GOP victories at the gubernatorial and senatorial level, two out of a total of nineteen races, indicates that the GOP victories were probably the result of short-term forces. This conclusion is corroborated by the graph in Figure 8. The two lines measuring the participation of voters in the two parties' primaries have converged over time. But most of the convergence is the result of the decline in participation in the Democratic primary relative to the total gubernatorial vote. The general election vote received by GOP gubernatorial candidates has yet to exceed the number of persons voting in the Democratic primary. Overall, the graph suggests that voter interest has shifted from the Democratic primary to the general election, but the Democratic Party is still the dominant party.

The cross-county regression analyses also indicate a partial realignment. The gubernatorial analysis is reported in Table 34. The moving-average regression coefficient first declines, then increases, then declines because of the increasing range of the independent variable. The sole GOP victory is characterized by the highest positive score of the standardized intercept. The runs test,

Table 33

Florida's State-Wide Indexes*

Year	Primary Balance Index	General Balance Index		
		President	Governor	Senator
1946	-	-	-	27.14
1948	2.99	68.90	19.96	-
1950	-	-	-	31.06
1952	3.51	122.27	33.63	0.00**
1954	5.40	-	24.27+	-
1956	-	134.03	35.70	0.00**
1958	-	-	-	40.39
1960	9.57	106.25	67.10	-
1962	-	-	-	42.79
1964	11.53	95.51	73.51	56.36
1966	11.84	-	122.89	-
1968	24.65	68.16++	-	126.76
1970	47.29	-	75.81	85.64
1972	-	258.70	-	-
1974	32.91	-	63.40	69.26+++

*Special two-year gubernatorial term established in 1964 so that future gubernatorial elections would be held in non-presidential years. No state-wide GOP primary held in 1946, 1950, 1956, 1958, and 1962.
**No GOP opponent.
+Special election to fill unexpired term.
++The general balance index is the ratio between the Republican vote and the combined Democratic and third parties vote. The general balance index between the two major parties is 131.03.
+++The general balance index is the ratio between the Republican vote and the combined Democratic and third party vote. The general balance index between the two major parties is 94.32.



Figure 8

Republican and Democratic Primary Vote, and Republican General Election Vote, as a Percentage of the Total Gubernatorial Vote: Florida, 1948-1974.

Table 34

Standardized Intercepts and Moving-Average Regression Coefficients: Florida Gubernatorial Elections, 1952-1974 (N=66)*

Year	sa	mb	σ_x	$\sigma_{y\|x}$
1952(D)	-1.00	2.40	21.59	51.64
1954(D)**	-1.47	2.27	27.59	27.68
1960(D)	-.12	1.88	79.15	116.64
1964(D)***	.09	2.37	67.70	113.49
1966(R)	1.65	1.93	68.26	204.41
1970(D)	1.03	1.59	226.64	351.14
1974(D)	-.19	.73	132.70	83.75

*Dade County exluded.
**Special election to fill unexpired term.
***Two-year term.

which is reported in Table 35, indicates that the pattern of the coefficient has a fairly high probability of occurring by chance. Overall, the analysis suggests that while there has been some GOP growth, the party is still a weak minority party that is unable to seriously challenge the majority party most of the time.

The regression analysis of the last four senatorial elections is presented in Table 36. Earlier Senate races were not analyzed for two reasons. First, there was no Republican candidate in the 1952 and 1956 races. Second, in 1946, 1950, and 1958, there was no Republican primary because only a single person sought the GOP senatorial nomination. As a result, there is no way to compute the primary balance index for those years. (Primary balance indexes from other years could have been substituted; however, such analysis is unnecessary because the gubernatorial analysis clearly indicates the weak position of the Republican Party.) The 1968 GOP vistory is characterized by the sole positive standardized intercept score. It is quite clear that both the 1966 gubernatorial victory and the 1968 senatorial victory were made possible by the short-term forces which induced Democrates living in one-party counties to cross over and vote Republican.

The cross-county regression analysis of the presidential elections is reported in Table 37. The moving-average

Table 35

Wald-Wolfowitz Runs Test: Florida Gubernatorial Moving-Average Regression Coefficient Pattern

Gubernatorial pattern:	
1 1 0 1 1 0 0	(4 runs) p = .543

Table 36

Standardized Intercepts and Moving-Average Regression Coefficients: Florida Senatorial Elections, 1964-1974 (N=66)*

Year	sa	mb	σ_x	$\sigma_{y\|x}$
1964(D)	-.45	1.39	67.70	83.55
1968(R)	1.73	1.20	159.00	208.04
1970(D)	-.56	1.11	226.64	98.04
1974(D)**	-.71	.98	132.70	90.75

*Dade County excluded.
**The general balance index is the ratio between the Republican and the combined Democratic and third party vote.

Table 37

Standard Intercepts and Moving-Average Regression Coefficients: Florida Presidential Elections, 1952-1972 (N=66)*

Year	sa	mb	σ_x	$\sigma_{y\|x}$
1952(R)	-.07	10.46	21.59	216.09
1956(R)**	-.08	7.96	27.59	271.61
1960(R)	-.17	5.48	79.15	211.15
1964(D)	-.32	1.98	67.70	170.54
1968(R)***	-1.36	1.61	159.00	76.58
1972(R)****	2.00	1.50	226.64	383.45

* Dade County excluded.
**Because the Republican Party did not hold a state-wide primary in 1956, the general balance index for 1956 is regressed against the primary balance index for 1954.
***The general balance index for 1968 is the ratio between the Republican vote and the combined Democratic and third parties vote.
****Because there was no state-wide primary in 1972, the general balance index for 1972 is regressed against the primary balance index for 1970.

regression coefficients decline over time because of the increasing range of the independent variable. The correlation between the raw regression ceofficients of the gubernatorial and presidential patterns is .47, an indication that a two-tiered party system exists in Florida. At the subpresidential level, a majority of voters support the Democratic Party while at the presidential level, a majority of voters usually support the GOP. The standardized intercept scores for 1968 and 1972 are particularly interesting. The1968 score is sensitive to the support given to George Wallace while the 1972 score indicates heavy support for Richard Nixon over George McGovern. What these scores reveal is that rural voters in one-party counties are quite willing to desert the Democratic Party but are unwilling to align themselves with the GOP.

Note

1. I was informed of this fact by Jeanne Burt, Reference Librarian, Department of Library, Archives and Public Records, State of Arizona.

CHAPTER 5

KENTUCKY

A review of Kentucky's recent electoral history suggests that a realignment has occurred. Unlike the other six minority parties examined in this study, Kentucky's minority (Republican) party has historically dominated a number of counties, particularly in the southeastern mountain area. The existence of these minority party partisan groupings dates back to the Civil War when the state's population was divided over the issues of succession and slavery (Jewell and Cunningham, 1968). Beginning in the 1940s, it appeared that the Republican Party was expanding in strength. Its candidate for governor won the race in 1943. In 1946, Republican John Sherman Cooper won the first of three special elections to serve out unexpired Senate terms. However, he lost twice when attempting to retain the seat in the following regular election. It was not until the 1960 regular election that Cooper was able to win a full six-year term. In 1956, Republican Thurston Morton won the other Senate seat. Morton won re-election in 1962. When Morton retired in 1968, another Republican, Marlow Cook, captured the seat. Another Republican success was Louis Nunn winning the gubernatorial election in 1967.

The fortunes of the GOP appear to have declined in the 1970s. The party was unable to retain the governor's mansion in the 1971 race. In the following year, when Senator Cooper retired, the seat was captured by Democrat Walter Huddleston. Senator Cook was defeated for re-election in 1974. Some observers believe that the GOP's difficulty stems in part from a divisive senatorial primary in 1972 (Barone et al., 1973). As the party began to grow and expand from its traditional mountain base into metropolitan areas such as Louisville, it became divided into two factions which are split over what is essentially personal differences (Jewell and Olson, 1978). There is, however, an indication that the GOP's difficulty is more than just a divided party. Unlike the minority parties in Maine, Iowa, Pennsylvania, and Arizona—states which have experienced a realignment—the minority party in Kentucky has never captured a majority of the seats in either house of the state legislature (Jewell and Olson, 1978: table A3). (In New Hampshire, a state whose electorate is just beginning to realign, the Democrats and Republicans each hold twelve seats in the state senate.) What this suggests is that Kentucky has not and is not experiencing a realignment.

This impression is confirmed by the state-wide electoral data which are presented in Table 38 and Figure 9.

Table 38

Kentucky's State-Wide Indexes*

Year	Primary Balance Index	General Balance Index		
		President	Governor	Senator
1940	33.07	73.64	-	71.60**
1942	23.06	-	-	80.70
1943	19.78	-	103.19	-
1944	74.05	83.04	-	81.98
1946	44.21	-	-	114.63**
1947	45.89	-	74.53	-
1948	37.95	73.10	-	94.00
1950	29.68	-	-	83.28
1951	34.93	-	83.16	-
1952	-	99.86	-	106.21**
1954	45.91	-	-	83.61
1955	19.25	-	71.44	-
1956	16.60	120.09	-	101.56 (113.82**)
1959	13.07	-	65.14	-
1960	27.18	115.47	-	114.97
1962	27.78	-	-	111.97
1963	14.70	-	97.10	-
1964	-	55.70	-	-
1966	73.80	-	-	181.83
1967	45.09	-	106.68	-
1968	58.13	78.28***	-	107.86
1971	22.50	-	87.66	-

Table 38—(continued)

Year	Primary Balance Index	General Balance Index		
		President	Governor	Senator
1972	55.49	182.25	-	93.53
1974	25.47	-	-	82.37

*No state-wide primary in 1952 and 1964.
**Special election to fill unexpired term.
***The general balance index is the ratio between the Republican vote and the combined Democratic and third parties vote. The general balance index between the two major parties is 116.32.



Figure 9

Republican and Democratic Primary Vote, and Republican General Election Vote as a Percentage of the Total Gubernatorial Vote: Kentucky, 1943-1975.

The state-wide primary balance index, which is reported in Table 38, fluctuates widely over time but does not indicate any genuine Republican Party growth. Fluctuation of the index is of a greater magnitude in Kentucky than in the other six states analyzed. This results from Kentucky's electoral system. Elections for governor are held in years which do not coincide with either presidential or congressional elections. Kentucky law does not permit the incumbent governor to seek re-election. As a result, the gubernatorial primaries, particularly the Democratic primaries, are usually hotly contested affairs. On the other hand, the senatorial primaries which are held in congressional election years may be far more sedate contests because the incumbent is faced with only minor opposition. For example, the 1943 Democratic gubernatorial primary was hotly contested, and the primary balance index is only 19.78. In the following year, the index increased to 74.04 because incumbent Senator Barkley had no serious primary opposition; thus participation in the Democratic primary dropped off.

The overall partisan trend is much clearer if we devote our attention to just the gubernatorial primary data. The data are presented in Figure 9. As can be seen, the two lines which measure participation in each of the two parties' primaries do not converge over time. This indicates that partisan loyalties are remaining relatively stable.

Jewell and Cunningham (1968) argue that there have been some partisan realignments at the county level. Several once-Republican counties in the coal-mining region have experienced political transformations. For example, the authors cite five coal-mining counties (Bell, Harlan, Letcher, Magoffin, and Perry) as realigning from strong Republican to Democratic, then to a marginal basis. However, other coal-mining counties have always been Democratic while others have remained Republican. There are also some counties where the Republican Party has made some gains. These counties, such as Boone and Oldham, are among Kentucky's richest in terms of median income. The shift is illustrated by examining four counties' gubernatorial primary balance indexes, which are reported in Table 39. Jewell and Cunningham report Jackson County as the most Republican county and Trimble County as the most Democratic county. They report Harlan County as making the largest Republican-to-Democratic shift while Boone County made the largest Democratic-to-Republican electoral shift. As can be seen, the primary balance index indicates that Jackson County has remained Republican (the 1959 index value is low because of the unusually small GOP voter turnout). At the same time, Trimble County's primary balance index indicates that the county has remained Democratic. On the other hand, the primary balance indexes for Harlan and Boone indicate some electoral shift to the countys' respective minority party.

Table 39

Primary Balance Indexes for Four Selected Counties

Year	Jackson	Trimble	Harlan	Boone
1943	414.8	4.2	106.6	1.2
1947	1022.3	3.3	138.8	5.9
1951	515.3	1.8	121.6	4.2
1955	435.1	1.4	51.9	2.9
1959	42.3	1.8	52.1	3.0
1963	111.3	1.0	42.4	3.9
1967	488.6	3.1	82.7	17.4
1971	326.9	3.7	51.8	16.1

The cross-county regression analysis of the gubernatorial elections is presented in Table 40. At first glance, the moving-average regression coefficients appear to indicate a realignment in favor of the GOP. This is because the later coefficients (1959 and later) are greater than the earlier coefficients. However, an examination of the standard deviations indicates that the range of the primary balance index is generally decreasing over time. Thus the coefficients increase not as a result of growing Republican strength but because the regression line is "shortened." The range of the independent variable is decreasing because most Republican counties are becoming more competitive. On the other hand, there has not been sufficient GOP growth in once Democratic counties to counteract the contraction of the range of the independent variable.

The same trend is apparent in Table 41, which presents the regression analysis of the senatorial elections. The moving-average regression coefficients increase because of the collapsing range of the independent variable. The trend is not quite so clear as in Table 40 because of the fluctuation in primary participation which affects the standard deviations. The regression analyses give the indication that the state may be realigning more in favor of the Democratic Party. However, this impression contradicts

Table 40

Standardized Intercepts and Moving-Average Regression Coefficients: Kentucky Gubernatorial Elections, 1943-1971 (N=119)*

Year	sa	mb	σ_x	$\sigma_{y\|x}$
1943(R)	1.73	1.00	57.30	42.53
1947(D)	-.55	.85	108.14	37.73
1951(D)	.69	.64	114.67	48.50
1955(D)	-.81	.84	37.11	39.05
1959(D)	-1.00	1.40	22.34	38.33
1963(D)	1.02	1.50	19.69	59.28
1967(R)	.15	1.64	45.88	72.82
1971(D)	-1.22	1.35	29.25	61.84

*Jefferson County excluded.

Table 41

Standardized Intercepts and Moving-Average Regression Coefficients: Kentucky Senatorial Elections, 1940-1974 (N=119)*

Year	sa	mb	σ_x	$\sigma_{y\|x}$
1940(D)**	-.12	.77	78.86	48.56
1942(D)	.01	.66	60.33	44.61
1944(D)	-.57	.71	186.07	45.67
1946(R)**	.34	.63	121.51	65.64
1948(D)	.07	.80	94.32	54.62
1950(D)	-.35	.71	52.28	50.87
1952(R)***	.77	.63	114.67	64.44
1954(D)	.04	1.20	112.70	55.40
1956(R)	-.38	1.63	23.92	62.07
1956(R)**	-.06	1.76	23.92	76.00
1960(R)	1.48	2.28	40.09	103.49
1962(R)	-1.02	1.58	28.69	64.46
1966(R)	2.78	1.25	104.88	132.26
1968(R)	-.40	.74	67.11	80.02
1972(D)	-.97	1.07	66.91	54.05
1974(D)	-1.62	1.19	32.63	59.24

*Jefferson County excluded.
**Special election to fill unexpired term.
***Special election to fill unexpired term. Nominations for office made by state convention. Dependent variable regressed against the primary balance index for 1951.

the state-wide primary election data in Table 38 and Figure 9. It is quite clear that individual counties are realigning. However, whether such electoral shifts are indicating greater Democratic domination remains to be seen.

The runs tests further reinforce the impression that the Democratic Party may be becoming stronger (see Table 42). Two runs were observed for the gubernatorial coefficient pattern. Four runs were observed for the senatorial coefficient pattern. Both patterns are generally first zeros, then ones. The probability of either runs pattern occurring by chance is very slight.

In light of the regression analyses of the subpresidential races, how is it possible for the GOP to win half of the U.S. Senate elections in a thirty-four-year period? The answer apparently lies in the nature of Kentucky's two-tiered party system. The results of the presidential regression analysis are presented in Table 43. Overall, the coefficient pattern appears to follow a trend consistent with that of both the gubernatorial and senatorial coefficient patterns. However, correlation analysis of the raw regression coefficient patterns reveals a two-tiered party system which is similar to Iowa's (see Table 44). The correlation between the senatorial and presidential coefficient patterns is quite high while each pattern correlates weakly with the gubernatorial pattern. Clearly, the senatorial and

Table 42

Wald-Wolfowitz Runs Test: Kentucky Gubernatorial and Senatorial Moving-Average Regression Coefficient Patterns

Gubernatorial pattern:	
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1	(2 runs) p = .029
Senatorial pattern:	
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1	(4 runs) p = .001

Table 43

Standardized Intercepts and Moving-Average Regression Coefficients: Kentucky Presidential Elections, 1940-1972 (N=119)*

Year	sa	mb	σ_x	$\sigma_{y\|x}$
1940(D)	.12	.52	78.86	51.57
1944(D)	-.53	.50	186.07	46.53
1948(D)	-.39	.45	94.32	43.28
1952(D)**	1.02	1.35	114.67	63.52
1956(R)	.36	1.70	23.92	83.47
1960(R)	1.10	2.03	40.09	77.88
1964(D)***	-1.48	1.21	19.69	38.14
1968(R)****	-1.51	1.21	67.11	52.35
1972(R)	1.31	1.09	66.91	122.34

*Jefferson County excluded.
**The general balance index for 1952 is regressed against the primary balance index for 1951 because there was no state-wide primary in 1952.
***Because there was no state-wide primary in 1964, the general balance index for 1964 is regressed against the primary balance index for 1963.
****The general balance index for 1968 is the ratio between the Republican vote and the combined Democratic and third parties vote.

Table 44

Correlation Analysis of Kentucky Presidential and Subpresidential Raw Regression Coefficient Patterns

Paired Patterns	r	r^2	No. of Cases
Gubernatorial vs. Presidential	.02	.00	8
Senatorial vs. Presidential	.94	.88	8
Gubernatorial vs. Senatorial	.31	.10	13

presidential elections belong on one tier while the gubernatorial races belong on a second tier. In other words, while the state has remained stongly Democratic at the gubernatorial level, this is not the case on the senatorial and presidential level. As explained in Chapter 3, the reason why Iowa and Kentucky's two-tiered party system assumes this form may be because they both possess an agricultural economy. However, this reasoning is based on pure speculation and not on the analysis of data.

CHAPTER 6

CAUSES OF ELECTORAL REALIGNMENT

In the three preceding chapters, I have attempted to discover the nature of electoral change in seven selected states. At least four of the seven states have experienced an electoral realignment during the past thirty years. In three of the four states—Maine, Iowa, and Arizona—the minority party has become very competitive. The minority party in the fourth state, Florida, is supported by more voters; however, it is not yet competitive enough to constantly challenge the majority party. A fifth state, Pennsylvania, also has experienced a realignment, but the cross-county regression analysis indicates that the realignment occurred prior to the period of analysis. For a sixth state, New Hampshire, the electoral data indicate that a realignment is just now beginning. In the seventh state, Kentucky, the electoral data indicate that Republican Party successes are not the result of a realigning electorate. Instead, the cross-county regression analysis indicates the possibility that the Democratic Party may be gaining strength relative to the GOP.

The question I shall now explore is what factors are responsible for bringing about state electoral realignments. In Chapter 1, I discussed three possible causes of electoral change. One possibility, partisan disaggregation, was not systematically examined because of the limitations of the data and analytical techniques. As I pointed out in Chapter 2, empirically demonstrating a realignment does not allow us to dismiss partisan disaggregation as a cause of electoral change. We do not know to what extent partisan disaggregation is responsible for causing electoral change, and because I cannot empirically test for the existence or nonexistence of disaggregation, it will not be further considered in this chapter.

A second possible cause of electoral change is suggested by Sundquist (1973). Sundquist argues that state electoral shifts, which have occurred in the 1950s and 1960s, are "after-shocks" of the New Deal critical realignment of the 1930s. In other words, political changes at the state level are readjustments flowing out of the national scene. The only reason why change at the state level does not occur simultaneously with change at the national level is because the state minority parties are initially led by individuals who are unacceptable to a majority of the state's voters. Once this leadership is replaced, the minority party becomes more competitive.

When examining electoral events in the seven states which were selected for this study, it often appears that Sundquist's theory is correct. Observers such as Barone et al. (1973, 1975), Lockard (1959), and Peirce (1972b, 1973, 1976) have cited excellent leadership as an essential factor in bringing about minority party success.

The third possible cause of state electoral realignment discussed in Chapter 1 is that political change is brought about by secular forces such as change in the economic or social order. Key (1964) argued that economic change brought about electoral realignments. Urbanization—a shorthand term Key used to describe the processes of industrialization, sharpening class conflict, and immigration—altered the patterns of conflict in the United States from one between sections of the nation to one between different socioeconomic classes. However, I also discussed Ladd and Hadley's (1975) demonstration that the New Deal realignment did not result in class-based parties, thus weakening Key's hypothesis to some extent.

In my opinion, both Sundquist's theory and Key's theory have elements of truth in explaining state electoral realignments. Minority party growth is probably less likely to occur if the party is led by unattractive leaders. To assume that electoral change occurs independently from socioeconomic change appears to be

unreasonable. Because I am using aggregate electoral data, I can make no determination concerning the effect of political leadership on political change. As a result, I also cannot empirically test the idea that state electoral change is an "after-shock" of the New Deal critical realingment. However, I can use the electoral data to test for the relationship between political change and several socioeconomic variables. In other words, prior to a shift in strength between two competing political groupings, some sort of state socioeconomic environmental change first must occur. Note I am expanding on Key's theory by positing that any sort of socioeconomic change, not just the process Key termed urbanization, will cause political change.

The proper term for describing electoral shifts caused by socioeconomic change is secular realignments. In Chapter 1, I discussed the differences between critical and secular realignments. One of these differences bears repeating here. Political scientists such as Burnham (1970) and Sundquist (1973) argue that realignments are critical, and that political issues, such as expansion of slavery in 1860, the Silver Question in 1896, and the Great Depression in 1932, caused rapid realignments because political institutions, including political parties, were unable to aggregate demands and produce satisfactory policies. As a result, elements of the electorate

developed new partisan allegiances, and the entire electorate divided into proportions which were different from partisan divisions prior to the crisis. These new partisan divisions tended to endure as a stable voting pattern once the crisis was resolved (Burnham, 1970. On the other hand, Key (1959, 1964) argued that electoral realignments were secular. Electoral shifts occurred gradually and were not caused by a critical political issue but were brought about directly by changes in the socioeconomic environment such as urbanization. Essentially, this is the difference between the two theories describing electoral realignments. According to the theory of critical realignments, major economic conflict generates political conflict which causes the electorate to rapidly realign. According to the theory of secular realignments, economic conflict arising out of changes in the economy causes the electorate to gradually realign.

The point of this discussion is that even should a relationship be established between socioeconomic and political change, it is not conclusive proof that such change is secular rather than critical because both theories posit economic conflict as the ultimate cause of electoral change. However, it is my feeling that such electoral change is secular. This feeling is based on the observation that change at the state level has occurred

gradually. The primary balance index did not radically shift in any of the six states where realignments have occurred or are occurring. Furthermore, initial minority party success at the gubernatorial or senatorial level was not accompanied by that party immediately capturing control of the state legislature in any of the states. This slow rate of change means that existing partisan loyalties at any given point in time are fairly immune to destruction, and thus new partisan divisions probably come about gradually as the result of generational replacement.

Path analysis was used to test the hypothesis that electoral realignments at the state level are secular. The technique is a method of measuring the direct influence of a particular exogenous (independent) variable on an endogenous (dependent) variable and "thus finding the degree to which variation of a given effect is determined by each particular cause" (Wright, 1921: 557). The total variation of the endogenous variable is assumed to be completely determined "by some linear combination of the variables in the system" (Land, 1969: 6).

The endogenous variable is the net change in a county's primary balance index from 1950 to 1970. The net difference is computed by taking the average of the three index values closest in time to 1950 subtracted from the average of the three index values closest to 1970. For

example, in Iowa, the index values for 1948, 1950, and 1952 were averaged, then substracted from the average index value for 1968, 1970, and 1972. This particular computational method was used to minimize the influence of any particular primary election which may have had an unusually low or high participation rate, thus distorting the true measure of inter-party competition. There were two exceptions in computing the net difference. For New Hampshire, only the 1950 and 1952 primary balance index values were averaged because the analysis dates back only to 1950. For Florida, only the 1952 and 1954 index values were averaged because the analysis begins in 1952.

Six exogenous variables were used in the analysis. The first four variables measure changes in the economic environment of the county. It is assumed that economic change is reflected by change in employment patterns. Thus each of the four variables measure the change from 1950 to 1970 of the percentage of employed persons working in a particular sector of the economy. The first variable measures the change in the percentage of persons employed in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. The second variable measures change in mining. The third variable measures change in manufacturing. All other jobs, with the exception of construction, which was not included in the analysis, are classified in the service sector, and this constitutes the fourth variable.

The last two exogenous variables are used to measure demographic changes which I believe have an impact in partisan realignments. The first variable measures the migrating flow into a county. In the first chapter, I briefly discussed the expansion of Key's hypothesis of secular realignment to include migration. It is reasonable to assume that one way a traditional political grouping can be replaced is by immigration of persons from another part of the country. The variable is computed by dividing the number of persons reported by the U.S. Census Bureau as moving into a county during two five-year periods, 1955-1960 and 1965-1970 by the population over five years of age for the appropriate time period. The two quotients are then averaged together. Although the variable does not measure the absolute number of persons immigrating for the whole twenty-year period, it does provide a good interval estimate between counties with low and high migration rates.

The second demographic variable is the net change in median age from 1950 to 1970. This variable was included in order to provide a second dimension to measure the influence of migration on realignments. In states such as Arizona and Florida, both young and old persons have migrated into the states; the young principally to seek jobs, the old to retire. By including the age variable,

it is hoped that the influence on realignments of various migrating groups can be distinguished.

Although the analysis is cross sectional rather than longitudinal, Key's theory, as modified here, is sufficient grounds for assuming that the six independent variables are causally related to the primary balance index. No causal ordering among the six exogenous variables is assumed. Thus the full model being tested is single stage, multivariate, and has the following structural equation:

$$PBI = p_1AG + p_2MINE + p_3MAG + p_4SER + p_5MIG + p_6AGE + a.$$

The symbol PBI represents the net change in the primary balance index. The symbols AG, MINE, MAG, AND SER represent change in the percentage of persons employed respectively in agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and the service sector. MIG represents average migration for two five-year periods relative to the total population. AGE represents the change in the median age. The symbol a represents the residual of variation left unexplained. The coefficients p's represent the standardized path coefficients which in this case are equivalent to the partial beta weights in the regression equation. When I present the empirical results, the unstandardized path coefficients also will be reported.

For each state, forward, stepwise inclusion regression analysis was used to select from among the six exogenous variables those variables which explained the most variation in the primary balance index. (See the tables in Appendix C which report the correlation matrix between the endogenous and exogenous variables.) The most appropriate model for each state was selected on the basis of partial F test scores after each independent variable was entered into the equation. Only those variables which met the .05 level of significance were included in the final model. Although I recognized that using a significance test may not be proper because a sample is not being tested for random probability of occurring, I found it nevertheless useful for selecting the appropriate variables for each state. The partial F tests not only identified which variables were statistically significant, but also which variables explained the greatest variation. It was assumed that variables with inadequate partial F test scores were not theoretically important, and thus could be safely excluded.

The result of the path analysis is mixed. No more than two independent variables were found to have a statistically significant relationship with the primary balance index for any state. For only two of the seven states are the variance explained over 50 percent. A third state's total variance explained is only 40 percent.

Figure 10 reports the path analysis for Maine. None of the exogenous variables were found to be significantly related to the primary balance index. However, because of the moderate causal relationship found between agriculture and the index, significant at the .10 level of significance, I decided that the relationship merited reporting. In very broad terms, the largest gains in Democratic Party strength occurred in counties where the percentage of persons employed in either agriculture, forestry, or fisheries declined the least. The amount of variance explained is only 23 percent. In other words, it appears that the Democratic Party has made its best gains in areas where the traditional economy of farming or fishing has changed the least. The bivariate model is essentially trivial because only one variable was found to be "significantly" related.

The path analysis for New Hampshire is reported in Figure 11. Again, the result is trivial because only one variable, manufacturing, was found to be significant. Generally, the largest gains in Democratic Party strength occurred in counties where the percentage of persons employed in manufacturing declined the least. There is a strong negative relationship between manufacturing and the service sector (r=-.77). Perhaps this indicates that areas where the percentage of white collar jobs has



Figure 10

Path Analysis: Maine*

A moderate, positive causal relationship exists between agriculture and the primary balance index. Generally, the largest gains in Democratic Party strength occurred in counties where the percentage of persons employed in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries declined the least.

*Not significant at the .05 level. It is significant at the .10 level. The number in parenthesis is the unstandardized path coefficient.



Figure 11

Path Analysis: New Hampshire*

A moderately strong, positive causal relationship exists between manufacturing and the primary balance index. Generally, the largest gains in Democratic Party strength occurred in counties where the percentage of persons employed in manufacturing declined the least.

*The number in parenthesis is the unstandardized path coefficient.

increased the most are the least fertile areas for the Democratic Party. On the other hand, areas where manufacturing has remained unchanged are where the Democratic Party has fared the best.

The results for Iowa are reported in Figure 12. Two variables, agriculture and age, are found to have a significant causal relationship with the primary balance index. However, the amount of variance explained is only 14 percent. Generally, areas where agriculture declined the least or the median age declined the most are the places where the Democratic Party fared best. The correlation between agriculture and age is slight and negative (r=-.23) thus indicating that the two variables are not explaining political change in the same counties. Again, it appears that the Democratic Party has fared best in counties where the traditional economy has changed the least.

Figure 13 reports the path analysis for Pennsylvania. Two variables, mining and manufacturing, were found to be significantly related to the primary balance index. Generally, the largest gains in Democratic Party strength occurred in counties where the percentage of persons in mining and manufacturing declined the most. Because Pennsylvania has experienced a long economic decline in its basic industries, Democratic gains appear to be greatest in areas where the decline is greatest. But it



Figure 12

Path Analysis: Iowa*

A weak, positive relationship exists between agriculture and the primary balance index while a weak, negative relationship exists betweeen age and the endogenous variable. Generally, the largest gains in Democratic Party strength occurred in counties where the percentage of persons employed in agriculture declined the least and the median age decreased the most.

*The numbers in parenthesis are the unstandardized path coefficients.



Figure 13

Path Analysis: Pennsylvania*

A moderate, negative causal relationship exists between the exogenous variables mining and manufacturing and the endogenous variable, the primary balance index. Generally, the largest gains in Democratic Party strength occurred in counties where the percentage of persons employed in mining and manufacturing declined the most.

*The numbers in parenthesis are the unstandardized path coefficients.

should be noted that only 27 percent of the variance is explained.

Figure 14 reports the results for Arizona. The migration variable was found to be the only significant variable related to the endogenous variable. Generally, the counties experiencing the most migration are areas where the Republican Party has made its most impressive gains. The total variance explained is 40 percent. In light of the tremendous migration into the state, this result appears to make sense.

The analysis of the Florida data produces results similar to those regarding Arizona. The result of the path analysis is reported in Figure 15. Two variables, migration and age, are significantly related to the primary balance index. The total variance explained is 54 percent. Republican Party gains were greatest in areas where there is the greatest amount of migration or the greatest increase in the median age. Because there is only a slight positive correlation between migration and age ($r=.24$), it is apparent that all segments of the migrating population contribute to increasing GOP strength, not just older migrants. (Also, it should be noted that the age variable adds only an additional 6 percent of the variance explained.)



Figure 14

Path Analysis: Arizona*

A moderate, positive causal relationship exists between migration and the primary balance index. Generally, the largest gains in Republican Party strength occurred in counties which have experienced the most migration relative to the total population.

*The number in parenthesis is the unstandardized path coefficient.



$r_{PBI \cdot MIG} = .70$

$r_{PBI \cdot AGE} = .39$

$R^2 = .54$

Figure 15

Path Analysis: Florida*

A moderately strong, positive causal relationship exists between the exogenous variables migration and age and the endogenous variable, the primary balance index. Generally, the largest gains in Republican Party strength occurred in counties which have experienced the most migration relative to the total population and the greatest increase in the median age.

*The numbers in parenthesis are the unstandardized path coefficients.

The path analysis for Kentucky is reported in Figure 16. A slight, positive relationship was found between manufacturing and the primary balance index. In the few counties where the Republican Party has made gains, there also has been an increase in the percentage of persons employed in manufacturing. However, the variance explained is very small (r^2=.12).

The path analyses for Arizona and Florida corroborate both Peirce's (1972b) and Dauer's (1972) feeling that migration has contributed to minority party growth. The results for Florida also corroborate the results of a survey which was conducted by Cohen (1976). Cohen estimates that about 77 percent of Florida's registered Republicans were originally from non-South regions of the nation. Furthermore, he was able to differentiate two groups of Republicans, "coastal" Republicans and "central" Republicans. Registered Republicans who live in coastal areas are, on the average, older and have often come to Florida to retire. The Republicans who live in the central parts of the state are younger, more likely to be employed, and have higher incomes. Thus Cohen's analysis appears to add confidence to the results of the path analysis which shows that segments of the population other than oldsters have contributed to GOP growth.

The results of the path analysis for Maine, New Hampshire, Iowa, and Pennsylvania are surprising. When



Figure 16

Path Analysis: Kentucky

A weak, positive causal relationship exists between manufacturing and the primary balance index. Generally, the largest gains in Republican Party strength occurred in counties where the percentage of persons employed in manufacturing has increased the most.

*The number in parenthesis is the unstandardized path coefficient.

I originally designed the path model, I expected Democratic party growth in counties which have become more industrial. In the model, these would be the counties which have experienced the largest percentage increase of jobs in the manufacturing and/or the service sector. Instead, the finding appears to be the opposite. Areas where the traditional economy has remained most intact (as in the case of Maine, New Hampshire, and Iowa) or areas where the traditional economy has declined most precipitously (as in the case of Pennsylvania) are the areas where the Democratic Party made the greatest gains. Indeed, it may be proper to generalize further by describing lack of economic change and economic decline as two different facets of economic stagnation. If so, then it can be said that Democratic Party growth is most likely to occur in areas which are economically stagnant.

It must be mentioned that these results may be reflecting deficiencies in the data analysis. One possible factor is the time period selected to study the causal impact of socioeconomic variables on electoral realignments. It may be a time period which is not sufficiently long in order to measure the effects of economic diversification. In other words, the twenty-year period may have experienced so little economic change relative to what a longer period of time may have measured that

economic stagnation was statistically more relevant than economic change. Another factor which may have affected the findings is that the employment data may not be appropriate for measuring change in an economy which is becoming less labor intensive.

If the analysis is accurate, it signifies that recent Democratic Party growth occurs in response to economic pressures which are very different from those pressures we usually associate with Democratic Party growth. Key's contention that urbanization in the North contributed to the growth of the party has not necessarily been proven incorrect because Key was describing earlier electoral trends. In any event, however, I have no immediate explanation for the results which were observed. Perhaps the appeal of the Democratic Party was spreading from the urban areas, where the party was already firmly established prior to 1950, to the hinterlands where the economy is stagnant and whose populace found the platform of the party attractive.

To briefly summarize, the results of the path analysis appear to indicate that electoral change is secular. Minority party growth in the four northern states was apparently caused in part by a stagnant economy. On the other hand, minority party growth in the Sunbelt was caused by migration. In Kentucky, there was a slight

relationship between GOP growth and industrialization. As explained above in this chapter, the path analysis neither confirms or falsifies the argument that state electoral change is related to the national critical realignment of the 1930s. Because no more than 58 percent of the variance can be explained by any of the six exogenous variables (and usually a good deal less), there is certainly room for other factors to account for the differences. The factors discussed by Sundquist are certainly one possibility.

Note

1. When interpreting the results of the path analysis, care must be taken. In this particular analysis, we are dealing with ecological correlations where the exogenous variables are measuring the percentages of a county's population possessing certain attributes. Robinson (1950) argues that ecological correlations cannot be substituted for individual correlations. In other words, we cannot draw an empirical conclusion of individual behavior on the basis of an ecological correlation. As a result, the path analyses for Arizona and Florida cannot be interpreted as showing that Republicans have migrated in from elsewhere. Instead, they only show that Republican Party growth is greatest in counties where the migration rate is highest. However, I will conclude in the next chapter that GOP growth may be the result of Republicans migrating from other areas.

CHAPTER 7

THE NATURE OF STATE-WIDE ELECTORAL REALIGNMENTS

The overall purpose of this study has been to analyze the nature of electoral change at the state level. Three hypotheses were tested: first, minority party success is the result of realigning electorates; second, there exists a two-tiered party system in state politics; and third, state electoral realignments are secular. In this chapter, I first shall restate the major conclusions of this study. I then shall review the primary balance index as a method of measuring inter-party competition. Finally, I shall suggest some possible new hypotheses which can be generated from the research findings of this dissertation.

The first conclusion of this study is that minority party successes in six of the seven selected states are the result of realigning electorates. Analysis of the state-wide primary balance indexes indicates that the size of the minority party political groupings has increased substantially in Maine, Pennsylania, Iowa, and Arizona. Minority party political groupings also have increased in Florida and New Hampshire, but to a lesser extent. A cross-county, bivariate regression model was used to

analyze gubernatorial, senatorial, and presidential elections. I argued that if a realignment had occurred within a state, then the moving-average regression coefficients measuring minority party victories would decrease in value over time. Using this technique, I demonstrated that realignments had occurred in Maine, Pennsylvania, Iowa, and Arizona. In Florida, the moving-average regression coefficients measuring gubernatorial elections, although declining generally over time as the result of the increasing range of the independent variable, indicate that the sole GOP victory was more the result of short-term forces. This conclusion is based on the high standardized score measuring the intercept. I asserted that high intercept scores indicate short-term forces within one-party counties, and that these forces benefited the minority party. This same phenomenon was observed when measuring the sole GOP senatorial victory in Florida.

The results of the Wald-Wolfowitz runs tests on the moving-average coefficients corroborate the findings that state-wide realignments have occurred in Maine, Pennsylvania, Iowa, and Arizona. The runs tests also provide some additional impressions. By examining the actual patterns of the runs, testing to see if individual moving-average coefficients are greater than or less than the median value, a very rough determination can be made as to when

the realignment occurred. It appears that the realignment in Maine occurred during the period of analysis. In Pennsylvania, the realignment had occurred prior to 1946, and it was probably well underway in Iowa and Arizona. On the other hand, the runs tests for New Hampshire indicate that the realignment is now underway.

The analysis of Kentucky's electoral data shows that minority party success is the result of short-term forces rather than of a realigning electorate. This conclusion is based on the observation that the overall trend of the primary balance index does not indicate a growing GOP political grouping. The regression equations analyzing the gubernatorial and senatorial races do not display the pattern we would have expected had a realignment occurred. Instead, the results indicate the possibility that it is the Democratic Party which is gaining strength. This suggestion is based on the observation that the range of the independent variable is contracting over time. As noted in Chapter 5, although the state-wide data indicate stable partisan loyalties, the electorate has been realigning in some counties: the Democratic Party is making gains in once strong GOP counties while the GOP has made some gains in once Democratic counties. Overall, it appears that the Democratic Party is getting the better bargain.

The second major conclusion is that a two-tiered party system exists. This conclusion is based on the

correlation analysis between the regression coefficients measuring the gubernatorial, senatorial, and presidential elections. In Maine, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Arizona, the correlation between the gubernatorial and senatorial coefficients is quite high while the correlation between the coefficients of each state-wide office with the coefficients measuring the presidential elections is either moderate or low. In Florida, the correlation between the gubernatorial and presidential elections is only moderate, thus indicating the presence of a two-tiered party system.

The two-tiered party system found in Maine, New Hampshire, Arizona, and Pennsylvania conforms with Ladd and Hadley's (1975) hypothesis that the presidential elections belong on one tier and subpresidential races belong on a second tier. The same type of system probably exists in Florida; however, the lack of empirical data prevented me from fully testing this hypothesis. A different type of party system was discovered in Iowa and Kentucky. Apparently, the presidential and senatorial elections are on one tier of the party system and the gubernatorial elections are on a second tier. The correlation analysis of the raw regression coefficients measuring Kentucky's elections clearly shows this to be the case. However, the correlation analysis for Iowa is not as clear-cut.

Nevertheless, I classfied Iowa's two-tiered party system as being similar to Kentucky's because both states have a predominantly agricultural economy. (This is an attribute that is not shared by the other five states in this study.) Because of the two states' dependence on federal farm policy for their economic well-being, senatorial contests may be more affected by the factors which influence presidential contests than is the case in other states.

The last major conclusion of the study is that realignments are probably secular. Using path analysis, I attempted to measure the causal relationship between change in the primary balance index and several socioeconomic measurements. In Maine, New Hampshire, and Iowa, Democratic strength grew in counties where the traditional economy appears to change the least. In the fourth northern state, Pennsylvania, Democratic strength increased in counties where the traditional economic enterprises of manufacturing and mining declined the most. As stated in the last chapter, these conclusions for the northern states are somewhat surprising because Democratic Party growth does not appear to be an urban phenomenon. The trends, which I believe would be associated with urban areas such as increasing number of people in manufacturing and service-related jobs, simply do not correlate with increasing Democratic strength. I shall expand on this subject below.

In the Sunbelt states of Arizona and Florida, migration was the greatest contributor to growing Republican strength. Counties having high rates of immigration were the areas where the GOP political groupings increased the most in size. It appears that a substantial part of the Republican Party's new strength is the result of Republican voters from other parts of the country migrating into these two states and overwhelming traditional political groupings in some counties.

Perhaps the most significant finding of the path analysis is the general absence of a causal relationship between measurements of economic diversification and political change (with the exception of Kentucky where there is very slight correlation between industrialization and increasing GOP strength). As I explained in the last chapter, this finding may be the result of examining too short a period of time. Or it may be the result of using inappropriate data to explain electoral change; employment data may not accurately measure economic change in an economy which is becoming less labor intensive. In any event, the results of the path analysis for the northern states contradict Key's (1964) hypothesis that the urbanization process in the northern states has led to Democratic growth in urban areas. Assuming that the data analysis is free of methological problems, it appears

that recent Democratic growth occurs for reasons different from those that caused Democratic growth of an earlier era which Key attempted to explain. However, the variance explained in the path models is generally very low. Thus I have at best provided only a partial explanation for minority party growth in northern states.

The path analysis does suggest two conclusions. First, it appears likely that not many native voters in Arizona and Florida are converting to the Republican Party, but rather Republican voters are probably migrating in from elsewhere. Second, at least some of the new Democratic voters in northern states are those living in areas which are economically stagnant. In other words, Democratic growth occurs in areas not where economic diversification has occurred, but in areas where economic change has failed to occur.

All of the conclusions discussed above rest on the assumption that the primary balance index is indeed measuring realignments. I discussed in Chapter 2 how the absence of a competitive two-party system made primary elections necessary if democratic choice was to exist in one-party states. It follows that the number of voters participating in the majority party primary exceeded, at first, the number of voters in the minority party's primary. This is because the majority party's primary

usually was the contest which determined who would be the next office holder. Key (1956) asserted that changing proportions of voters in each of the two parties' primaries indicated that a realignment was occurring. Key observed this trend in Massachusetts and Michigan. I noted the same phenomenon in the six states in which I believe a realignment has occurred or is occurring.

The superiority of the primary balance index as a measurement of inter-party competition is its simplicity and reliability. Unlike measurements which are based on general election returns and/or precentage of state offices won by a party, a measurement of voter participation in a primary election at a single point in time is far less susceptible to short-term forces. If we were to use general election data and/or percentage of offices controlled by a party, we would have to average the data over an extended time period in order to remove the influence of short-term forces. Also, we would have to combine several pieces of information, such as races for governor, state legislators, percentage of seats won by one party, and the duration the party holds those seats, in order to remove the short-term forces which may affect any one piece of datum. While the resulting information would be just as accurate, it would be harder to obtain, particularly at the county level. Legislative districts,

particularly since the Reynolds vs. Sims reapportionment decision by the Supreme Court in 1964, change periodically and seldom conform with county lines. On the other hand, if we use the primary balance index as the measurement of inter-party competition, a single piece of information, which is usually available at the county level, should suffice.

There are several disadvantages with the primary balance index. As explained in Chapter 2, the index does not measure the degree of inter-party competition by measuring the size of political groupings. This is because in states in which one party has traditionally dominated, the members of that party are more likely to vote in their primary than members in the minority party (Key, 1956; Jewell and Olson, 1978). Thus the values of the index are meaningful only when they are compared to one another within a state. Ranking counties by the value of the primary balance index will accurately rank the counties by the degree of inter-party competition. As a result, alternative measurements based on the general election vote are perhaps more useful when attempting to estimate the actual size of partisan groupings.

A second disadvantage with the index is that its values cannot be compared across state lines. This is because the primary balance index appears to "lag" behind

a realignment. Maine's 1974 primary balance index value was 91.71 while Pennsylvania's value was 144.14. I believe it would be incorrect to conclude that Pennsylvania's Democratic Party is stronger than Maine's. This is because the index does not need to achieve a value of 100 before the minority party begins winning elections regularly. This lag between the index and electoral realignments has been noted elsewhere (Jewell and Olson, 1978). The reason for Pennsylvania's 1974 index value exceeding Maine's is probably that the realignment occurred earlier in Pennsylvania. This conclusion conflicts with Key's (1956) assumption that index values are comparable between two or more states.

The main utility of the primary balance index is its use as the independent variable in the regression model introduced in Chapter 2. The regression equation measures the relationship between two variables; in this case, indexes measuring ratios of voters participating in primary and general elections. As the regression equations change over time, it is assumed that the nature of the state's politics is changing. If the equations' parameters follow a certain pattern, it is assumed that a realignment was occurring. Several modifications were made in light of the initial analysis conducted in this study. (The initial analysis is presented in Appendix A.) First, extreme

outliers had to be removed in order to obtain regression coefficients which accurately measured the relationship between the two variables. Second, moving-average regression coefficients had to be computed in order to reduce the influence of the idiosyncracies in the remaining counties. Third, attention had to be devoted to the intercept because the a priori assumption concerning the traditional counties' attachment to the majority party was incorrect. Traditional one-party counties have occasionally supported the minority party, and their support, as measured by high standardized intercept values, indicates the presence of short-term forces.

Overall, I assess the regression model, which uses aggregate voting data, as an adequate tool for measuring political change. There are some limitations for its future use. First, with the possible exception of Arkansas, Tennessee, and Texas, no other southern state can be analyzed because of a lack of GOP primaries (Jewell and Olson, 1978: table 4-2). In four southern states, the Republican Party has used state conventions to nominate candidates (Albright, 1976: table 8). In other southern states, as well as in some northern states, a primary election is not held if only one candidate files for a particular office (Gantter, 1957). As a result, minority parties in one-party-dominated states often failed to hold

primaries because few party members were interested in seeking an office they could not possibly hope to win. Another problem is that ten states hold open primaries while another two hold blanket primaries (Jewell and Olson, 1978: table 4-3). In these states, the primary balance index may be susceptible to short-term forces as voters switch back and forth to vote in the more interesting primary. Sorauf (1972) notes that there was considerable drifting across party lines in the 1952 Wisconsin primaries with Democrats voting in the hotly contested GOP senatorial primary. In that year, Senator Joseph McCarthy had strong, well publicized opposition, and Democrats found the GOP race more interesting than their own. On the other hand, Sorauf also argues that drifting becomes less pronounced as the two parties become more competitive. In 1952, Wisconsin was still a farily strong GOP state. Presumably, there is less drifting today because the Democrats are more competitive. Overall, I estimate that there are perhaps fifteen more closed primary states amenable to this technique of analysis. If the open primary states are included, then there are a total of 32 states, including the seven examined in this study, which can be analyzed.

The conclusion that a realignment has occurred in six of the seven selected states is replicated by Ranney (1965, 1976) who uses a different technique of measuring

inter-party competition. Ranney's measurement (1976) is based on four different figures computed for an extended period of time; the average Democratic proportion of the gubernatorial vote, the average percentage of seats in the state senate controlled by the Democrats, the average percentage of seats in the state house controlled by the Democrats, and the percentage of all terms for governor, senate, and house in which the Democrats had control. Ranney (1976: 468) then averaged the four figures together and designated the average as the state's "index of inter-party competition." As can be seen in Table 45, four of the seven selected states, Arizona, Iowa, Maine, and New Hampshire, have shifted from Ranney's modified one-party classification to a two-party classification. I identified realigning trends in these four states. In a fifth state, Florida, I concluded that there is some increase in GOP strength. Ranney's measurement shifts Florida from the one-party Democratic column to the modified one-party Democratic column. Ranney's measurements of Kentucky's inter-party competition show little change; an empirical indication which corroborates my assessment that GOP victories in Kentucky are deviating successes. Finally, Ranney classifies Pennsylvania as a two-party state in both time periods. I believe this judgment backs up my own conclusion that a realignment occurred in Pennsylvania prior to the period of analysis beginning in 1946.

Table 45

Ranney's Classification of the Seven Selected States by Degree of Inter-Party Competition

State	Ranney's 1946-1963 Classification and Index of Inter-Party Competition	Ranney's 1962-1973 Classification and Index of Inter-Party Competition	Mundy's Classification
Arizona	Modified one-party Democratic (.7490)	Two-party (.4377)	Realigned from one-party to two-party.
Florida	One-party Democratic (.9220)	Modified one-party Democratic (.7410)	Some GOP growth, but still one-party.
Iowa	Modified one-party GOP (.2495)	Two-party (.4113)	Realigned from one-party to two-party.
Kentucky	Modified one-party Democratic (.7650)	Modified one-party Democratic (.7037)	No realignment.
Maine	Modified one-party GOP (.2405)	Two-party (.4045)	Realigned from one-party to two-party.
New Hampshire	Modified one-party GOP (.2680)	Two-party (.3600)	Realignment underway.
Pennsylvania	Two-party (.4050)	Two-party (.4705)	Relignment before 1946.

Note. Ranney's classifications are defined as follows: .8500 to higher, one-party Democratic; .6500 to .8499, modified one-party Democratic; .3500 to .6499, two-party; .1500 to .3499, modified one-party Republican.

Ranney's classification scheme is somewhat suspect. Ranney (1965) originally classified states having indexes of .3000 or less as modified one-party Republican. Later, Ranney (1976) changed the dividing point to .3500 or less. He also has tinkered with the other classifications. In addition, Ranney's measurement technique is hampered by the need of measuring inter-party competition over several elections. Thus it is more difficult to spot electoral trends.

In Chapter 1, I briefly discussed the development and importance of the concept of inter-party competition. The concept has been used to describe or explain economic conflict (Key, 1964), political change (Burnham, 1970), the level of policy outputs (Sharkansky and Hofferbert, 1971), as well as other phenomena too numerous to list here. I also discussed the uncertainty of using the concept in the future to explain political phenomena because of the possibility of partisan disaggregation. Thus, I believe it was quite necessary to empirically establish the nature of electoral change at the state level. In the process, I have demonstrated that at least some states have experienced a realignment. (However, this does not mean that the possibility of partisan disaggregation has been dismissed as a cause of state electoral change.) Furthermore, I have shown that these electoral realignments

can occur simultaneously with other electoral patterns by empirically establishing the possible existence of a two-tiered party system. Finally, I have demonstrated that socioeconomic change is associated with electoral change, thus establishing the possibility that the realignments are secular. As a result of these findings. It appears reasonable to conclude that the concept of inter-party competition remains viable.

However, the findings of this study represent only a first step. Because of the limitations of aggregate data, I could not determine the motivations of individuals for identifying with a political party. Do voters align themselves with a party on the basis of some sort of affective, psychologically-based attachment? Or do voters choose a party on the basis of ideology or party performance? By identifying such motivation, the researcher can begin describing the role of the mass public in conflict resolution. While the study has suggested that there continues to be a bond between at least some voters and political parties, the analyses presented here cannot be used to describe that bond. At best, the study only generates new hypotheses which will test the nature of that attachment.

One possible hypothesis is that partisan identification, as described by Campbell et al. (1960), has not changed at the state level since it was observed by the

authors in the 1950s. In other words, many voters still have an affective, psychologically-based bond with a state political party. However, this bond has dissolved between many voters and the parties at the presidential level. I am referring, of course, to Ladd and Hadley's (1975) argument that a two-tiered party system exists. In the presidential tier, presidential contests have become the "principle arena" in which board policy or ideological differences are fought out. But at the subpresidential tier, ideology is blurred because candidates of each party represent wide ideological differences. As a result, subpresidential contests have centered around older issues and older images of the parties (Ladd and Hadley, 1975). The possible existence of a two-tiered party system has been demonstrated in this study; what remains to be empirically demonstrated is whether the voting patterns conform to Ladd and Hadley's expectations.

This two-tiered party system may help us understand the nature of realignments in northern states. The Democratic Party is perceived by many voters as the party better able to manage the American economy (Campbell et al., 1960; Ladd and Hadley, 1975). While this perception may often be muted at the presidential level because of more recent issues, it may remain a very potent force at the state level. In states such as Maine, New Hampshire,

Pennsylvania, and Iowa, this older image of the Democracy may be attractive to persons who live in counties where the economy is stagnant. In other words, these voters may find that the Democratic Party is more congenial to their particular economic interests. In a way, Key's (1964) theory of secular realignments may still be correct; only the nature of economic and political conflict has changed. Partisan cleavages in northern states once occurred between rural and urban voters. Now a cleavage may be developing between persons who live in counties where the economy has changed the most and persons who live in counties where the economy has changed the least. With the exception of New Hampshire, the growth of Democratic Party groupings appears to be a rural phenomenon.

Such a situation, if true, would not be very comforting for the Republican Party. While economic conditions have apparently generated new Democratic groupings in the North, economic change has not encouraged the growth of Republican groupings in the Sunbelt states. Instead, Republican growth appears to be the result of migration by Republicans from other areas into Arizona and Florida.

An affective notion of partisan identification appears quite reasonable in light of the data which are presented in this study. However, an equally plausible hypoothesis, which suggests a totally different type of bond between individual and party, also can be said to

be supported by the data. In this alternate theory of voting, the assumption that the attachment between individual and party is psychological is rejected. Instead, Down's (1957: 37) assertion that the attachment is economic is assumed; that is, the individual has a preference for the party which will maximize the individual's "utility income from government activity." Popkin et al. (1976) have attempted to establish that the Campbell et al. (1960) view of partisan identification always has been incorrect. Instead, Popkin et al. (1976) argue that voters continuously assess the parties on the basis of feedback on party performance. Under this scheme, it is possible to suggest that northern rural voters who have switched parties did so because they became convinced that their "utility income" would increase if Democratic candidates won.

If parties are viewed in this manner, then it also may be proper to suggest that inter-party competition does influence the level of policy outputs. Because parties are chosen on the basis of the benefits they are expected to expend if they are successful, the parties are "forced" to become more generous with government outputs in order to be successful. Of course, this contention is often disputed. Some political scientists, such as Dye (1975), argue that economic factors alone largely determine a

state's policy outputs while other political scientists, such as Sharkensky and Hofferbert (1971), argue that political factors (including the degree of inter-party competition) do influence the level of welfare and education outputs. While resolution of this debate is beyond the scope of this study, there is an indication that it would be worthwhile to assess whether changing levels of inter-party competition cause change in the level of policy outputs. Peirce (1976) notes that the level of welfare and education outputs in Maine have become more generous since the realignment. On the other hand, the quantity of outputs in these two policy areas have remained constant in New Hampshire which is just beginning to realign (Peirce, 1976). The primary balance index is an ideal measurement to use in order to test for this possibility. The index can be used as an independent variable in a time-series model where various variables, such as economic resources, are tested for their correlation with policy outputs.

It should be clear by now that the methods used in this study to establish the possibility of state electoral realignments, cannot establish the nature of bond between individual and party. I cannot suggest a conclusive theory of voting which is either based on economic motivation or human psychology. Only survey research can

supply data which can begin to answer these types of questions. But the study has conclusively demonstrated the continuing importance of the concept of inter-party competition. The primary balance index, as a measurement of inter-party competition, has provided empirical proof that state electoral change is the result of realigning electorates.

APPENDIX A

REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE COMPLETE DATA SETS

Table A-1

Maine Gubernatorial Elections, 1946-1974
(N=16)

Year	a	b	r
1946(R)	260.27	.80	.76
1948(R)	195.54	1.09	.78
1950(R)	312.40	.39	.53
1952(R)	242.87	1.30	.74
1954(D)	559.27	1.84	.57
1956(D)	498.66	1.98	.70
1958(D)	430.43	1.16	.67
1960(R)	314.54	.80	.82
1962(R)*	340.62	.77	.79
1966(D)	283.55	1.04	.85
1970(D)	272.28	.79	.79
1974(I)**	173.89	.06	.89

*In 1962 the term for governor was lengthened from two to four years.
**The general balance index for 1974 is the ratio between the Democratic vote and the combined Republican and Independent vote.

Table A-2

Maine Senatorial Elections, 1946-1972
(N=16)

Year	a	b	r
1946(R)	236.45	.73	.75
1948(R)	160.73	.74	.71
1952(R)	228.74	1.18	.73
1954(R)	300.18	1.29	.63
1958(D)	542.36	1.57	.76
1960(R)	234.24	.49	.76
1964(D)	900.82	.83	.63
1966(R)	149.58	.71	.87
1970(D)	414.68	1.35	.83
1972(D)	204.17	1.31	.87

Table A-3

Maine Presidential Elections, 1948-1972
(N=16)

Year	a	b	r
1948(R)	295.91	1.50	.77
1952(R)	199.01	1.05	.76
1956(R)	105.13	.72	.81
1960(R)	268.84	.66	.80
1964(D)	1009.17	.88	.65
1968(D)*	284.98	1.23	.83
1972(R)	102.82	.71	.88

*The general balance index for 1968 is the ratio between the Democratic vote and the combined Republican and third parties vote. Because there was no state-wide primary in 1968, the dependent variable is regressed against the primary balance index for 1966.

Table A-4

New Hampshire Gubernatorial Elections
(N=12)

Year	a	b	r
1950(R)	257.38	1.09	.99
1952(R)	252.32	.60	.97
1954(R)	299.95	1.03	.97
1956(R)	249.82	1.02	.94
1958(R)	561.90	.57	.80
1960(R)	495.50	.45	.74
1962(D)	592.15	2.05	.94
1964(D)	887.13	1.66	.91
1966(D)	441.56	1.43	.91
1968(R)	226.64	1.39	.96
1970(R)*	53.50	1.62	.97
1972(R)*	194.18	.82	.82
1974(R)**	682.15	.32	.36

*The general balance index for 1970 and 1972 is the ratio between the Democratic vote and the combined Republican and third party vote.
**Not significant at the .05 level.

Table A-5

New Hampshire Senatorial Elections
(N=12)

Year	a	b	r
1950(R)	363.66	.57	.88
1954(R)	309.05	.63	.93
1954(R)*	244.34	.81	.97
1956(R)	192.31	.62	.96
1960(R)	332.61	.53	.89
1962(R)	283.84	.93	.94
1962(D)*	417.99	1.70	.95
1966(D)	595.63	1.07	.80
1968(R)	367.76	.53	.82
1972(D)	817.10	.63	.57
1974**	589.18	.47	.64

*Special election to fill unexpired term.
**First election between Durkin(D) and Wyman (R).

Table A-6

New Hampshire Presidential Elections
(N=12)

Year	a	b	r
1952(R)	318.20	.58	.95
1956(R)	221.02	.44	.94
1960(R)	351.88	.97	.95
1964(D)	1023.12	.93	.82
1968(R)*	449.27	.54	.74
1972(R)**	367.46	.19	.42

*The general balance index for 1968 is the ratio between the Democratic vote and the combined Republican and third parties vote.
**Not significant at the .05 level.

Table A-7

Iowa Gubernatorial Elections
(N=99)

Year	a	b	r
1946(R)	61.58	.41	.41
1948(R)	60.07	.77	.50
1950(R)	47.78	.45	.61
1952(R)	58.18	1.19	.60
1954(R)	53.65	1.25	.74
1956(D)	45.38	1.08	.83
1958(D)	73.45	.78	.75
1960(R)	35.58	.89	.83
1962(D)	48.02	1.26	.73
1964(D)	77.93	1.95	.81
1966(D)	71.00	1.04	.70
1968(R)	33.36	.96	.85
1970(R)	56.15	.36	.82
1972(R)	34.17	.36	.82
1974(R)	37.69	.25	.79

Table A-8

Iowa Senatorial Elections
(N=99)

Year	a	b	r
1948(D)	100.33	1.78	.47
1950(R)	57.62	.52	.54
1954(R)	56.94	1.03	.68
1956(R)	40.26	.80	.78
1960(R)	38.75	.84	.82
1962(R)	41.41	.90	.75
1966(R)	37.66	.43	.66
1968(D)	34.32	1.29	.85
1972(D)	59.76	.70	.84
1974(D)	47.87	.48	.81

Table A-9

Iowa Presidential Elections
(N=99)

Year	a	b	r
1948(D)	77.59	1.20	.49
1952(R)	34.23	.73	.59
1956(R)	33.28	.62	.76
1960(R)	31.38	.70	.85
1964(D)	82.43	1.08	.81
1968(R)*	26.78	.80	.85
1972(R)	33.01	.39	.85

*The general balance index for 1968 is the ratio between the Democratic vote and the combined Republican and third parties vote.

Table A-10

Pennsylvania Gubernatorial Elections
(N=67)

Year	a	b	r
1946(R)	38.84	.80	.79
1950(R)	41.85	1.28	.78
1954(D)	44.27	1.19	.88
1958(D)	12.31	.94	.92
1962(R)	19.73	.60	.89
1966(R)*	20.36	.63	.99
1970(D)	26.47	.66	.97
1974(D)	17.03	.61	.97

*Because the county-level returns for the 1966 state primary were not available, the general balance index for 1966 is regressed against the primary balance index for 1964.

Table A-11

Pennsylvania Senatorial Elections
(N=67)

Year	a	b	r
1946(R)	38.41	.77	.78
1950(R)	41.66	1.24	.78
1952(R)	4.61	1.90	.80
1956(D)	20.12	1.13	.88
1958(R)	22.28	.78	.89
1962(D)	19.38	.85	.94
1964(R)	31.57	.64	.97
1968(R)	-9.93	1.04	.97
1970(R)	19.76	.42	.96
1974(R)	35.83	.37	.95

Table A-12

Pennsylvania Presidential Elections
(N=67)

Year	a	b	r
1948(R)	56.70	1.00	.80
1952(R)	2.90	1.84	.88
1956(R)	9.50	.92	.84
1960(D)	-19.26	1.32	.95
1964(D)	53.21	1.31	.97
1968(D)*	-8.13	1.06	.97
1972(R)**	-.57	.38	.91

*The general balance index for 1968 is the ratio between the Democratic vote and the combined Republican and third parties vote.
**Because the county-level results for the 1972 state primary were not available, the general balance index for 1972 is regressed against the primary balance index for 1970.

Table A-13

Arizona Gubernatorial Elections
(N=14)

Year	a	b	r
1946(D)	18.51	9.88	.98
1948(D)	-8.62	4.59	.98
1950(R)	74.25	6.85	.99+
1952(R)	143.60	4.02	.99+
1954(D)	46.89	3.11	.99
1956(D)	33.25	1.58	.99+
1958(R)	26.24	4.68	.98
1960(R)	130.48	2.77	.99+
1962(R)	97.80	2.29	.99
1964(D)	65.55	1.41	.99+
1966(R)	96.65	1.57	.99+
1968(R)	-1.74	2.11	.99+
1970(R)	81.21	1.35	.99+
1974(D)*	88.14	.96	.99+

*Term for governor was lengthened from two to four years in 1970.

Table A-14

Arizona Senatorial Elections
(N=14)

Year	a	b	r
1946(D)	-2.51	6.72	.99
1950(D)	26.52	4.00	.99
1952(R)	64.98	2.94	.99
1956(D)	41.47	1.42	.99+
1958(R)	62.78	4.58	.99
1962(D)	78.66	1.46	.99+
1964(R)	105.36	1.63	.99+
1968(R)	107.17	1.74	.99+
1970(R)	128.19	1.56	.99+
1974(R)	159.43	1.29	.99+

Table A-15

Arizona Presidential Elections
(N=14)

Year	a	b	r
1948(D)	36.06	5.02	.99+
1952(R)	143.57	3.67	.99
1956(R)	186.01	3.27	.99+
1960(R)	117.30	2.34	.99+
1964(R)	91.13	1.59	.99+
1968(R)*	97.43	1.55	.99+
1972(R)**	204.66	2.52	.99+

*The general balance index for 1968 is the ratio between the Republican vote and the combined Democratic and third parties vote.
**Because there was no state-wide primary in 1972, the general balance index for that year is regressed against the primary balance index for 1970.

Table A-16

Florida Gubernatorial Elections
(N=67)

Year	a	b	r
1952(D)	24.54	4.01	.77
1954(D)*	7.92	2.19	.87
1960(D)	63.62	2.27	.71
1964(D)**	64.87	2.14	.66
1966(R)	113.15	3.52	.75
1970(D)	90.50	.76	.45
1974(D)	50.38	.83	.75

*Speical election to fill unexpired term.
**Two-year term.

Table A-17

Florida Senatorial Election
(N=67)

Year	a	b	r
1964(D)	47.50	1.66	.69
1968(R)	127.74	1.45	.72
1970(D)	42.49	.89	.85
1974(D)*	34.25	1.21	.85

* The general balance index is the ratio between the Republican and the combined Democratic and third parties vote.

Table A-18

Florida Presidential Elections
(N=67)

Year	a	b	r
1952(R)	120.49	12.33	.72
1956(R)*	116.61	12.32	.80
1960(R)	120.61	2.80	.68
1964(D)	105.18	2.10	.61
1968(R)**	41.80	1.23	.85
1972(R)***	256.63	2.01	.73

*Because the Republican Party did not have a state-wide primary in 1956, the general balance index for 1956 is regressed against the primary balance index for 1954.
**The general balance index for 1968 is the ratio between the Republican vote and the combined Democratic and third parties vote.
***Because there was no state-wide primary in 1972, the general balance index for 1972 is regressed against the primary balance index for 1970.

Table A-19

Kentucky Gubernatorial Elections
(N=120)

Year	a	b	r
1943(R)	41.21	1.92	.71
1947(D)	11.28	.88	.82
1951(D)	28.49	.85	.72
1955(D)	-5.51	2.74	.70
1959(D)	-10.79	4.40	.84
1963(D)	25.51	3.48	.95
1967(D)	43.67	.95	.94
1971(D)	-7.75	3.27	.92

Table A-20

Kentucky Senatorial Elections
(N=120)

Year	a	b	r
1940(D)*	36.03	.86	.70
1942(D)	36.95	1.31	.68
1944(D)	27.87	.52	.80
1946(R)*	25.71	1.30	.73
1948(D)	16.44	1.41	.76
1950(D)	19.72	1.52	.92
1952(R)**	38.26	1.05	.62
1954(D)	24.36	.88	.70
1956(R)	14.47	4.20	.96
1956(R)*	23.43	4.35	.95
1960(R)	19.92	4.24	.70
1962(R)	23.74	2.49	.97
1966(R)	63.58	1.03	.94
1968(R)	27.63	1.01	.96
1972(D)	16.45	1.04	.95
1974(D)	-.98	2.21	.96

*Special election to fill unexpired term.
**Special election to fill unexpired term. Nomination for office made by state convention instead of primary. Dependent variable is the primary balance index for 1951.

Table A-21

Kenticky Presidential Elections
(N=120)

Year	a	b	r
1940(D)	37.18	.87	.68
1944(D)	28.89	.51	.79
1948(D)	15.19	1.03	.75
1952(D)*	37.21	.95	.61
1956(R)	24.19	4.60	.94
1960(R)	23.20	3.09	.73
1964(D)**	17.56	1.88	.93
1968(R)***	29.91	.58	.88
1972(R)	36.83	1.98	.93

*The general balance index is regressed against the primary balance index for 1951 because there was no state-wide primary in 1952.
**The general balance index is regressed against the primary balance index for 1963 because there was no state-wide primary in 1964.
***The general balance index for 1968 is the ratio between the Republican vote and the combined Democratic and third parties vote.

APPENDIX B

REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE REDUCED DATA SETS

Table B-1

Maine Gubernatorial Elections, 1946-1974
(N=15)*

Year	a	b	r
1946(R)	166.28	2.11	.77
1948(R)	103.17	2.70	.92
1950(R)	103.74	2.29	.84
1952(R)	77.13	3.91	.91
1954(D)	279.99	6.35	.79
1956(D)	280.40	3.70	.78
1958(D)	224.21	2.41	.73
1960(R)	127.77	1.81	.89
1962(R)	107.70	1.81	.91
1966(D)	75.89	1.82	.93
1970(D)	42.90	1.58	.92
1974(I)**	44.58	.62	.98

*Androscoggin County excluded. In 1962 the term for governor was lengthened from two to four years.
**The general balance index for 1974 is the ratio between the Democratic vote and the combined Republican and Independent vote.

Table B-2

Maine Senatorial Elections, 1946-1972
(N=15)*

Year	a	b	r
1946(R)	143.70	2.02	.78
1948(R)	85.08	2.05	.90
1952(R)	70.41	3.67	.93
1954(R)	115.96	4.27	.86
1958(D)	293.62	3.09	.82
1960(R)	92.16	1.26	.88
1964(D)	505.81	2.61	.76
1966(R)	29.58	1.16	.92
1970(D)	73.21	2.52	.94
1972(D)	58.83	1.88	.93

*Androscoggin County excluded.

Table B-3

Maine Presidential Elections, 1948-1972
(N=15)*

Year	a	b	r
1948(R)	195.56	3.24	.82
1952(R)	72.11	3.04	.92
1956(R)	37.45	1.25	.89
1960(R)	102.01	1.57	.90
1964(D)	594.84	2.75	.77
1968(D)**	42.15	2.14	.90
1972(R)	15.93	1.05	.96

*Androscoggin excluded.
**The general balance index for 1968 is the ratio between the Democratic vote and the combined Republican and third parties vote. Because there was no state-wide primary in 1968, the dependent variable is regressed against the primary balance index for 1966.

Table B-4

New Hampshire Gubernatorial Elections
(N=11)*

Year	a	b	r
1950(R)	264.53	1.05	.88
1952(R)	226.97	.71	.76
1954(R)	266.28	1.17	.88
1956(R)	381.90	.53	.71
1958(R)	391.92	1.20	.73
1960(R)	306.31	1.12	.76
1962(D)	433.16	2.84	.75
1964(D)	913.98	1.58	.69
1966(D)	423.44	1.51	.79
1968(R)	281.28	1.19	.79
1970(R)**	245.41	.91	.83
1972(R)**	-97.99	1.64	.95
1974(R)	269.51	1.33	.79

*Manchester City excluded.
**The general balance index for 1970 and 1972 is the ratio between the Democratic vote and combined Republican and third party vote.

Table B-5

New Hampshire Senatorial Elections
(N=11)*

Year	a	b	r
1950(R)	318.12	.79	.63
1954(R)	264.14	.81	.83
1954(R)**	233.33	.86	.87
1956(R)	236.74	.45	.82
1960(R)	205.52	.98	.84
1962(R)	153.74	1.57	.84
1962(D)**	307.83	2.25	.78
1966(D)	422.67	1.75	.83
1968(R)	191.65	1.17	.90
1972(D)	264.92	2.18	.85
1974***	345.82	1.07	.79

*Manchester City excluded.
**Special election to fill unexpired term.
***First election between Durkin(D) and Wyman(R).

Table B-6

New Hampshire Presidential Elections
(N=11)*

Year	a	b	r
1952(R)	208.35	1.08	.90
1956(R)	233.15	.39	.79
1960(R)	197.62	1.52	.90
1964(D)	925.19	1.22	.66
1968(R)**	230.43	1.33	.86
1972(R)	119.47	.89	.81

*Manchester City excluded.
**The general balance index for 1968 is the ratio between the Democratic vote and the combined Republican and third parties vote.

Table B-7

Iowa Gubernatorial Elections
(N=97)*

Year	a	b	r
1946(R)	30.27	1.50	.77
1948(R)	46.67	1.28	.52
1950(R)	17.11	1.22	.84
1952(R)	34.45	2.03	.61
1954(R)	30.52	2.03	.77
1956(D)	24.77	1.56	.82
1958(D)	39.38	1.54	.78
1960(R)	19.75	1.19	.83
1962(D)	15.65	2.00	.85
1964(D)	61.12	2.25	.76
1966(D)	34.02	1.87	.70
1968(R)	11.00	1.56	.88
1970(R)	22.31	.95	.89
1972(R)	23.92	.51	.84
1974(R)	22.56	.40	.85

*Dubuque and Polk Counties excluded.

Table B-8

Iowa Senatorial Elections
(N=97)*

Year	a	b	r
1948(D)	80.64	2.18	.49
1950(R)	24.68	1.30	.84
1954(R)	33.27	1.83	.78
1956(R)	24.59	1.15	.83
1960(R)	26.00	1.07	.84
1962(R)	15.71	1.50	.87
1966(R)	20.55	.80	.74
1968(D)	5.42	2.05	.88
1972(D)	30.51	1.16	.90
1974(D)	18.47	.78	.90

*Dubuque and Polk Counties excluded.

Table B-9

Iowa Presidential Elections
(N=97)*

Year	a	b	r
1948(D)	62.36	1.62	.50
1952(R)	19.35	1.24	.66
1956(R)	18.70	.96	.83
1960(R)	19.53	.93	.84
1964(D)	62.69	1.44	.77
1968(R)*	4.66	1.38	.88
1972(R)	18.07	.62	.92

*Dubuque and Polk Counties excluded.
**The general balance index for 1968 is the ratio between the Democratic vote and the combined Republican and third parties vote.

Table B-10

Pennsylvania Gubernatorial Elections
(N=65)*

Year	a	b	r
1946(R)	30.32	.74	.86
1950(R)	48.97	.77	.78
1954(D)	54.95	.86	.85
1958(D)	36.65	.63	.82
1962(R)	33.39	.42	.76
1966(R)**	27.63	.56	.86
1970(D)	48.85	.51	.85
1974(D)	43.63	.44	.75

*Allegheny and Philadelphia Counties excluded.
**Because the county-level returns for the 1966 state primary were unavailable, the general balance index for 1966 is regressed against the primary balance index for 1964.

Table B-11

Pennsylvania Senatorial Elections
(N=65)*

Year	a	b	r
1946(R)	29.06	.70	.85
1950(R)	48.04	.76	.79
1952(R)	30.15	1.16	.87
1956(D)	29.88	.89	.87
1958(R)	35.35	.60	.84
1962(D)	37.78	.61	.82
1964(R)	40.67	.55	.80
1968(R)	32.82	.53	.79
1970(R)	34.74	.32	.86
1974(R)	24.66	.43	.85

*Alleghaney and Philadelphia Counties excluded.

Table B-12

Pennsylvania Presidential Elections
(N=65)*

Year	a	b	r
1948(R)	28.25	1.18	.90
1952(R)	27.72	1.12	.87
1956(R)	20.74	.65	.86
1960(D)	24.80	.78	.77
1964(D)	67.49	1.18	.84
1968(D)**	29.76	.59	.81
1972(R)***	25.91	.20	.76

*Allegheny and Philadelphia Counties excluded.
**The general balance index for 1968 is the ratio between the Democratic vote and the combined Republican and third parties vote.
***Because the county-level returns for the 1972 state primary were not available, the general balance index for 1972 is regressed against the primary balance index for 1970.

Table B-13

Arizona Gubernatorial Elections
(N=12)*

Year	a	b	r
1946(D)	86.76	6.61	.80
1948(D)	80.41	2.57	.77
1950(R)	100.43	6.27	.89
1952(R)	118.98	4.81	.93
1954(D)	72.36	2.96	.91
1956(D)	25.09	2.03	.97
1958(R)	61.11	5.37	.94
1960(R)	75.08	3.95	.94
1962(R)	75.22	3.51	.94
1964(D)	47.64	1.88	.93
1966(R)	72.02	2.19	.89
1968(R)	60.44	2.01	.93
1970(R)	72.34	1.63	.85
1974(D)**	73.17	1.16	.71

*Maricopa and Pima Counties excluded.
**Term for governor was lengthened from two to four years in 1970.

Table B-14

Arizona Senatorial Elections
(N=12)*

Year	a	b	r
1946(D)	56.01	3.32	.77
1950(D)	63.01	2.99	.82
1952(R)	76.25	3.17	.96
1956(D)	25.34	1.59	.92
1958(R)	81.55	5.12	.92
1962(D)	50.21	2.01	.92
1964(R)	60.48	2.33	.93
1968(R)	88.01	2.22	.90
1970(R)	82.48	1.98	.89
1974(R)	99.21	1.61	.74

*Maricopa and Pima Counties excluded.

Table B-15

Arizona Presidential Elections
(N=12)*

Year	a	b	r
1948(D)	95.40	3.25	.84
1952(R)	127.65	4.49	.93
1956(R)	92.75	4.91	.91
1960(R)	78.23	3.00	.88
1964(R)	64.74	3.13	.89
1968(R)**	80.45	1.78	.88
1972(R)***	165.25	3.03	.77

*Maricopa and Pima Counties excluded.
**The general balance index for 1968 is the ratio between the Republican vote and the combined Democratic and third parties vote.
***Because there was no state-wide primary in 1972, the general balance index for 1972 is regressed against the primary balance index for 1970.

Table B-16

Florida Gubernatorial Elections
(N=66)*

Year	a	b	r
1952(D)	22.99	2.95	.78
1954(D)**	7.72	1.84	.88
1960(D)	51.29	2.02	.81
1964(D)***	57.82	1.77	.73
1966(R)	108.15	3.31	.74
1970(D)	88.11	.72	.43
1974(D)	48.93	.74	.76

*Dade County excluded.
**Special election to fill unexpired term.
***Two-year term.

Table B-17

Florida Senatorial Elections
(N=66)*

Year	a	b	r
1964(D)	42.34	1.39	.75
1968(R)	121.45	1.38	.73
1970(D)	38.36	.82	.87
1974(D)**	33.06	1.13	.86

*Dade County excluded.
**The general balance index is the ratio between the Republican and the combined Democratic and third party vote.

Table B-18

Florida Presidential Elections
(N=66)*

Year	a	b	r
1952(R)	115.99	9.28	.68
1956(R)**	115.21	11.64	.77
1960(R)	109.95	2.95	.70
1964(D)	100.24	1.84	.59
1968(R)***	34.29	1.15	.92
1972(R)****	246.66	1.85	.74

*Dade County excluded.
**Because the Repuplican party did not hold a state-wide primary in 1956, the general balance index for 1956 is regressed against the primary balance index for 1954.
***The general balance index for 1968 is the ratio between the Republican vote and the combined Democratic and third parties vote.
****Because there was no state-wide state primary in 1972, the general balance index for 1972 is regressed against the primary balance index for 1970.

Table B-19

Kentucky Gubernatorial Election
(N=119)*

Year	a	b	r
1943(R)	45.59	1.51	.90
1947(D)	31.25	.49	.81
1951(D)	39.04	.55	.79
1955(D)	29.59	.87	.64
1959(D)	28.44	1.11	.54
1963(D)	41.13	2.22	.59
1967(R)	35.62	1.18	.60
1971(D)	27.00	1.51	.58

*Jefferson County excluded.

Table B-20

Kentucky Senatorial Elections
(N=119)*

Year	a	b	r
1940(D)**	41.18	.63	.72
1942(D)	43.39	.91	.78
1944(D)	33.33	.43	.87
1946(R)**	49.14	.78	.82
1948(D)	44.46	.68	.76
1950(D)	37.25	.94	.69
1952(R)***	56.52	.52	.67
1954(D)	43.86	.42	.65
1956(R)	36.63	2.66	.72
1956(R)**	42.21	3.05	.69
1960(R)	68.79	1.81	.58
1962(R)	25.65	2.36	.73
1966(R)	91.34	.57	.41
1968(R)	36.24	.83	.57
1972(D)	26.53	.82	.71
1974(D)	15.16	1.55	.65

*Jefferson County excluded.
**Special election to fill unexpired term.
*** Special election to fill unexpired term. Nomination for office made by state convention instead of primary. Dependent variable is the primary balance index for 1951.

Table B-21

Kentucky Presidential Elections
(N=119)*

Year	a	b	r
1940(D)	42.65	.62	.69
1944(D)	34.53	.42	.86
1948(D)	36.23	.47	.72
1952(D)**	53.90	.47	.65
1956(R)	45.60	3.12	.67
1960(R)	54.94	1.52	.62
1964(D)***	22.69	1.46	.60
1968(R)****	22.25	.64	.64
1972(R)	57.59	1.54	.65

*Jefferson County excluded.
**The general balance index is regressed against the primary balance index for 1951 because there was no state-wide primary in 1952.
***The general balance index is regressed against the primary balance index for 1963 because there was no state-wide primary in 1964.
****The general balance index for 1968 is the ratio between the Republican vote and the combined Democratic and third parties vote.

APPENDIX C

CORRELATION MATRICES OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS

Table C-1

Correlation Matrix of Political, Economic, and Social Characteristics: Maine

	PBI	AG	MINE	MAG	SER	MIG	AGE
PBI	1.00	.48	.38	-.42	.16	.14	-.17
AG		1.00	.19	-.61	.05	-.04	-.39
MINE			1.00	-.68	.74	.31	-.25
MAG				1.00	-.82	-.12	.38
SER					1.00	.22	-.21
MIG						1.00	-.17
AGE							1.00

PBI - change in the primary balance index, 1950-1970.
AG - change in the percentage of persons in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, 1950-1970.
MINE - change in the percentage of persons employed in mining, 1950-1970.
MAG - change in the percentage of persons employed in manufacturing, 1950-1970.
SER - change in the percentage of persons employed in the service sector, 1950-1970.
MIG - average of number of persons migrating into the county, 1955-1960, 1965-1970.
AGE - change in the median age, 1950-1970.

Table C-2

Correlation Matrix of Political, Economic, and Social Characteristics: New Hampshire

	PBI	AG	MINE	MAG	SER	MIG	AGE
PBI	1.00	-.47	-.11	.76	-.59	-.07	.43
AG		1.00	-.40	-.52	-.11	-.43	-.32
MINE			1.00	.07	.20	-.14	.43
MAG				1.00	-.77	-.10	.35
SER					1.00	.45	-.15
MIG						1.00	-.62
AGE							1.00

PBI - change in the primary balance index, 1950-1970.
AG - change in the percentage of persons employed in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, 1950-1970
MINE - change in the percentage of persons employed in mining, 1950-1970.
MAG - change in the percentage of persons employed in manufacturing, 1950-1970.
SER - change in the percentage of persons employed in the service sector, 1950-1970.
MIG - average of number of persons migrating into the county, 1955-1960, 1965-1970.
AGE - change in the median age, 1950-1970.

Table C-3

Correlation Matrix of Political, Economic, and Social Characteristics: Iowa

	PBI	AG	MINE	MAG	SER	MIG	AGE
PBI	1.00	.30	-.03	-.18	-.19	.17	-.28
AG		1.00	.05	-.61	-.64	.41	-.23
MINE			1.00	-.08	-.12	.00	.02
MAG				1.00	-.18	-.26	.06
SER					1.00	-.22	.22
MIG						1.00	-.42
AGE							1.00

PBI - change in the primary balance index, 1950-1970.
AG - change in the percentage of persons in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, 1950-1970.
MINE - change in the percentage of persons employed in mining, 1950-1970.
MAG - change in the percentage of persons employed in manufacturing, 1950-1970.
SER - change in the percentage of persons employed in the service sector, 1950-1970.
MIG - average of number of persons migrating into the county, 1955-1960, 1965-1970.
AGE - change in the median age, 1950-1970.

Table C-4

Correlation Matrix of Political, Economic, and Social Characteristics: Pennsylvania

	PBI	AG	MINE	MAG	SER	MIG	AGE
PBI	1.00	.35	-.37	-.12	.22	-.24	.32
AG		1.00	-.23	-.47	-.19	-.36	.15
MINE			1.00	-.53	-.22	.38	-.69
MAG				1.00	-.27	-.16	.42
SER					1.00	.20	.03
MIG						1.00	-.47
AGE							1.00

PBI - change in the primary balance index, 1950-1970.
AG - change in the percentage of persons in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, 1950-1970.
MINE - change in the percentage of persons employed in mining, 1950-1970.
MAG - change in the percentage of persons employed in manufacturing, 1950-1970.
SER - change in the percentage of persons employed in the service sector, 1950-1970.
MIG - average of number of persons migrating into the county, 1955-1960, 1965-1970.
AGE - change in the median age, 1950-1970.

Table C-5

Correlation Matrix of Political, Economic, and Social Characteristics: Arizona

	PBI	AG	MINE	MAG	SER	MIG	AGE
PBI	1.00	.20	-.16	.49	-.23	.63	.33
AG		1.00	-.03	.30	-.94	.00	.28
MINE			1.00	-.36	-.11	-.01	.16
MAG				1.00	-.41	.52	-.09
SER					1.00	.02	-.26
MIG						1.00	-.08
AGE							1.00

PBI - change in the primary balance index, 1950-1970.
AG - change in the percentage of persons in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, 1950-1970.
MINE - change in the percentage of persons employed in mining, 1950-1970.
MAG - change in the percentage of persons employed in manufacturing, 1950-1970.
SER - change in the percentage of persons employed in the service sector, 1950-1970.
MIG - average of number of persons migrating into the county, 1955-1960, 1965-1970.
AGE - change in the median age, 1950-1970.

Table C-6

Correlation Matrix of Political, Economic, and Social Characteristics: Florida

	PBI	AG	MINE	MAG	SER	MIG	AGE
PBI	1.00	.25	-.12	.04	-.22	.70	.39
AG		1.00	-.28	-.20	-.59	.43	-.18
MINE			1.00	.04	.11	-.20	-.03
MAG				1.00	-.62	.00	-.10
SER					1.00	-.35	.15
MIG						1.00	.24
AGE							1.00

PBI - change in the primary balance index, 1952-1970.
AG - change in the percentage of persons employed in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, 1950-1970.
MINE - change in the percentage of persons employed in mining, 1950-1970.
MAG - change in the percentage of persons employed in manufacturing, 1950-1970.
SER - change in the percentage of persons employed in the service sector, 1950-1970.
MIG - average of number of persons migrating into the county, 1955-1960, 1965-1970.
AGE - change in the median age, 1950-1970.

Table C-7

Correlation Matrix of Political, Economic, and Social Characteristics: Kentucky

	PBI	AG	MINE	MAG	SER	MIG	AGE
PBI	1.00	-.13	.21	.35	-.22	.00	.05
AG		1.00	-.41	-.52	-.41	.15	-.29
MINE			1.00	.41	-.42	.04	-.38
MAG				1.00	-.41	-.12	.00
SER					1.00	-.06	.50
MIG						1.00	-.37
AGE							1.00

PBI - change in the primary balance index, 1952-1970.
AG - change in the percentage of persons employed in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, 1950-1970.
MINE - change in the percentage of persons employed in mining, 1950-1970.
MAG - change in the percentage of persons employed in manufacturing, 1950-1970.
SER - change in the percentage of persons employed in the service sector, 1950-1970.
MIG - average of number of persons migrating into the county, 1955-1960, 1965-1970.
AGE - change in the median age, 1950-1970.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Roderick Ashby Mundy, Jr., was born on October 31, 1950, in Englewood, New Jersey. In December 1972, he was graduated from Washington and Lee University with the degree Bachelor of Arts with a major in politics. From 1973 to 1977, he attended the University of Florida as a graduate student in political science and was awarded several graduate research and teaching assistantships. In March 1975, he received the degree Master of Arts with a major in political science and was elected to the Honor Society of Phi Kappa Phi. In August 1978, he received the degree Doctor of Philosophy with a major in political science.

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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